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An analogy is sometimes drawn between the proper treatment of conscientious objectors in healthcare and in military contexts. In this paper, I consider an aspect of this analogy that has not, to my knowledge, been considered in debates about conscientious objection in healthcare. In the USA and elsewhere, tribunals have been tasked with the responsibility of recommending particular forms of alternative service for conscientious objectors. Military conscripts who have a conscientious objection to active military service, and whose objections are deemed acceptable, are required either to serve the military in a non-combat role, or assigned some form of community service that does not contribute to the effectiveness of the military. I argue that consideration of the role that military tribunals have played in determining the appropriate form of alternative service for conscripts who are conscientious objectors can help us to understand how conscientious objectors in healthcare ought to be treated. Additionally, I show that it helps us to address the vexed issue of whether or not conscientious objectors who refuse to provide a service requested by a patient should be required to refer that patient to another healthcare professional.

Contrary to the widespread concern about over-treatment at the end of life, today, patient preferences for palliative care at the end of life are frequently respected. However, ethically challenging situations in the current healthcare climate are, instead, situations in which a competent patient requests active treatment with the goal of life-prolongation while the physician suggests best supportive care only. The argument of futility has often been used to justify unilateral decisions made by physicians to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment. However, we argue that neither the concept of futility nor that of patient autonomy alone is apt for resolving situations in which physicians are confronted with patients' requests for active treatment. Instead, we integrate the relevant arguments that have been put forward in the academic discussion about 'futile' treatment into an ethical algorithm with five guiding questions: (1) Is there a chance that medical intervention will be effective in achieving the patient's treatment goal? (2) How does the physician evaluate the expected benefit and the potential harm of the treatment? (3) Does the patient understand his or her medical situation? (4) Does the patient prefer receiving treatment after evaluating the benefit-harm ratio and the costs? (5) Does the treatment require many resources? This algorithm shall facilitate approaching patients' requests for treatments deemed futile by the physician in a systematic way, and responding to these requests in an ethically appropriate manner. It thereby adds substantive considerations to the current procedural approaches of conflict resolution in order to improve decision making among physicians, patients and families.

It is now an ethical dictum that patients should be informed by physicians about their diagnosis, prognosis and treatment options. In this paper, I ask: 'How informed are the 'informers' in clinical practice?' Physicians have a duty to be 'well-informed': patient well-being depends not just in conveying adequate information to patients, it also depends on physicians keeping up-to-date about: (1) popular misunderstandings of illnesses and treatments; and (2) the importance of patient psychology in affecting prognosis. Taking the case of depression as an entry point, this paper argues that medical researchers and physicians need to pay serious attention to the explanations given to patients regarding their diagnosis. Studies on lay understanding of depression show that there is a common belief that depression is wholly caused by a 'chemical imbalance' (such as 'low serotonin') that can be restored by chemically restorative antidepresssants, a claim that has entered 'folk wisdom'. However, these beliefs oversimplify and misrepresent the current scientific understanding of the causes of depression: first, there is consensus in the scientific community that the causes of depression include social as well as psychological triggers (and not just biochemical ones); second, there is significant dissensus in the scientific community over exactly what lower level, biological or biochemical processes are involved in causing depression; third, there is no established consensus about how antidepressants work at a biochemical level; fourth, there is evidence that patients are negatively affected if they believe their depression is wholly explained by (the vague descriptor) of 'biochemical imbalance'. I argue that the medical community has a duty, to provide patients with adequate information and to be aware of the negative health impact of prevalent oversimplifications-whatever their origins.

Editor's note In this paper Mr Stalley explores the role of the doctor through comparing and contrasting medicine and politics, but aims to illuminate the role of the physician rather than look at the nature of politics as many previous philosophers have done. Mr Stalley takes the extremes of the doctor as a 'philosopher king9 and then as a 'technician' to illustrate the point that either one of these roles would seriously threaten the freedom of the individual to choose. The role of the doctor as an adviser, he feels, is much more what we want and need, as in that role he is more likely to combine scientific knowledge with the ability to achieve a sympathetic understanding of his fellow beings. From very early times philosophers have made comparisons between medicine and politics or between the role of the physician and that of the politician or statesman. These comparisons have generally been intended to cast light on the nature of politics but in this paper I wish to consider whether they can also illuminate the role of the physician. The philosophers who have compared medicine

Termination of pregnancy after a certain gestational age and following prenatal diagnosis, in many nations seem to be granted with a special status to the extent that they by law have to be discussed within a predominantly medical context and have physicians as third parties involved in the decision-making process ('indication-based' approach). The existing legal frameworks for indication-based approaches, however, do frequently fail to provide clear guidance for the involved physicians. Critics, therefore, asked for professional ethics and professional institutions in order to provide normative guidance for the physicians in termination of pregnancy on medical grounds. After outlining the clinical pathway in an indication-based approach and the involved types of (clinical) judgements, this paper draws upon different understandings of professional ethics in order to explore their potential to provide normative guidance in termination of pregnancy on medical grounds. The analysis reveals that professional ethics will not suffice-neither as a set of established norms nor as internal morality-in order to determine the normative framework of indication-based approaches on termination of pregnancy. In addition, there seem to be considerable inconsistencies regarding the target and outcome between prenatal testing on the one hand and following termination of pregnancy on the other hand. A source of morality external to medicine has to be the basis of evaluation if a consistent and workable normative framework for termination of pregnancy and prenatal testing should be established.

Background While it is generally acknowledged that self-prescribing among physicians poses some risk, research finds such behaviour to be common and in certain cases accepted by the medical community. Largely absent from the literature is knowledge about other activities doctors perform for their own medical care or for the informal treatment of family and friends. This study examined the variety, frequency and association of behaviours doctors report providing informally. Informal care included prescriptions, as well as any other type of personal medical treatment (eg, monitoring chronic or serious conditions). Method A survey was sent to 2500 randomly-selected physicians in Colorado, 600 individuals returned questionnaires with usable data. The authors hypothesised: (1) physicians would prescribe the same types of treatment at home as they prescribed professionally; and (2) physicians who informally prescribed addictive medications would be more likely to engage in other types of informal medical care. Results Physicians who wrote prescriptions for antibiotics, psychotropics and opioids at work were more likely to prescribe these medications at home. Those prescribing addictive drugs outside of the office treated more serious illnesses in emergency situations, more chronic conditions and more major medical/surgical conditions informally than did those not routinely prescribing addictive medications. Physicians reported a variety of informal care behaviour and high frequency of informal care to family and friends. Discussion The frequency and variety of informal care reported in this study strongly argues for profession-wide discussion about ethical and guideline considerations for such behaviour. These areas are discussed in the paper.

Although physician alcohol use that leads to impairment has been extensively discussed, few statements address the issue of alcohol use of physicians who are on call. In this paper the authors review recent information on physicians' perceptions of alcohol use by themselves and their colleagues while on call. It is argued that conflicts in physicians' perceptions are due to the fact that the larger society has not addressed the question of whether drinking on call is public or private behaviour. The authors argue that when medicine is understood as a practice defined partly in terms of standards of excellence, the present approach of the American Medical Association to prohibit practicing medicine under the influence of alcohol requires a prohibition of drinking alcohol while on call, unless studies determine a clear threshold for drinking alcohol without placing patients at risk.

Until recently, moral case deliberation (MCD) sessions have mostly been facilitated by external experts, mainly professional ethicists. We have developed a train the facilitator programme for healthcare professionals aimed at providing them with the competences needed for being an MCD facilitator. In this paper, we present the first results of a study in which we evaluated the programme. We used a mixed methods design. One hundred and twenty trained healthcare professionals and five trainers from 16 training groups working in different healthcare organisations throughout the Netherlands were included. After completion of the programme, participants feel sufficiently confident and equipped to facilitate an MCD session. Feeling competent does not mean that participants have no doubts or questions left. Rather, they are aware of their limitations and see the need for continuous learning. According to the respondents, the actual exercise of facilitating MCD during and in between the training sessions contributed most to the development of competences necessary for being an MCD facilitator. Respondents without prior experience of participating in MCD sessions felt less competent after the training than those who had participated in MCD sessions before. Self-attributed competence varied between participants with different professional backgrounds.

To meet all physicians' needs for ethics consultation in Finland, a novel form of service, the Physicians' Ethics Forum, was founded in 2003. The Forum is a cost-efficient service based on electronic communication. In this paper, experiences throughout its first 6 years are described.

The debate on responsibility for health takes place within political philosophy and in policy setting. It is increasingly relevant in the context of rationing scarce resources as a substantial, and growing, proportion of diseases in high-income countries is attributable to lifestyle. Until now, empirical studies of medical professionals’ attitudes towards personal responsibility for health as a component of prioritisation have been lacking. This paper explores to what extent Norwegian physicians find personal responsibility for health relevant in prioritisation and what type of risk behaviour they consider relevant in such decisions. The proportion who agree that it should count varies from 17.1% (‘Healthcare priority should depend on the patient’s responsibility for the disease’) to 26.9% (‘Access to scarce organ transplants should depend on the patient’s responsibility for the disease’). Higher age and being male is positively correlated with acceptance. The doctors are more willing to consider substance use in priority setting decisions than choices on food and exercise. The findings reveal that a sizeable proportion have beliefs that conflict with the norms stated in the Norwegian Patient Act. It may be possible that the implementation of legal regulations can be hindered by the opposing attitudes among doctors. A further debate on the role personal responsibility should play in priority setting seems warranted. However, given the deep controversies about the concept of health responsibility and its application, it would be wise to proceed with caution. Design Nationally representative cross-sectional study. Setting Panel-data. Participants 1072 respondents, response rate 65%.

Supererogatory acts are considered by some to be part of medicine, whereas others accept supererogation to be a gratuitous virtue, to be extolled when present, but not to be demanded. The present paper sides with those contending that medicine is duty-bound to benefit patients and that supererogation/altruism must per definition remain outside and beyond any role-description of the profession. Medical ethics should be bound by rational ethics and steer away from separatist views which grant exclusive privileges but also create excessive demands, way beyond what physicians perform or are willing and able to offer.

Two studies reported in the Journal of Medical Ethics add to the growing body of qualitative evidence relating to the use of sedatives at the end of life.1 ,2 Respondents in the two studies affirm a number of important concerns, most of which have been elaborated in the philosophy and palliative care literature, relating to the use of sedation. There seems little doubt that the common moral thread to most of these concerns is the possibility that end-of-life sedation can resemble assisted death. Most of the Dutch respondents in the paper by Reitjens et al 1 were reported to believe that sedation does not hasten death. That is an oversimplification. Were it not for the potential to hasten death, I doubt we would be discussing the use of sedatives so frequently in ethics journals. It is true that there is little evidence that sedation significantly hastens death when doses are carefully titrated against symptoms —giving only that amount of a drug necessary to make the patient feel less distressed, and preserving consciousness as far as possible.3 Probably most sedative …

The “family rule” paper by Dr Foreman proposes a way of resolving the present uncertainty about medical law on children's consent and refusal. This commentary reviews how doctors' decisions are already well protected by English law and respected by the courts. The “family rule” appears to be likely only to complicate the already diffuse law on parental consent, and to weaken further the competent minor's position in cases of uncertainty and disagreement. It leaves the difficult questions about defining and assessing children's competence unanswered. This commentary suggests that these questions would be better resolved through professionally determined standards of good practice that respect children and parents, rather than through rules or laws.

Dr. Jansen's paper raises three main issues. The one with which he himself is most concerned is the question of which methods of abortion are ethically right, and whether methods which risk the birth of a damaged baby are wrong. But there are two others: first, how the (originally unintended) birth of a live but damaged child alters the moral situation, and secondly, whether the overcoming of sterility by inducing a multiple pregnancy in which some of the fetuses have to be killed in order for any of them to survive is at all morally acceptable.

The paper comments on Scott Dunbar's "An obstructed death and medical ethics," arguing contra Dunbar that we should not view truth-telling to the terminally ill as primarily governed by principles of veracity and respect for autonomy. All such rules are of limited value in medical ethics. We should instead turn to an ethics deriving from the centrality of moral relationships and virtues. A brief analysis of the connections between moral relationships and moral rules is offered. Such an ethics would lower the value that philosophical fashion places on truth-telling and autonomy and leave decisions about truth-telling and the terminally ill more dependent on the circumstances of particular cases.

All illness represents a state of diminished autonomy and therefore the doctor-patient relationship necessarily and justifiably involves a degree of medical paternalism argues the author, an American medical student. In a broad-ranging paper he discusses the concepts of autonomy and paternalism in the context of the doctor-patient relationship. Given the necessary diminution of autonomy which illness inflicts, a limited form of medical paternalism, aimed at restoring or maximising the patient's autonomy is entirely acceptable, and indeed fundamental to the relationship he argues. However, the exercise of this paternalism should be flexible and related to the current 'level of autonomy' of the patient himself. An editorial in this issue comments briefly on this paper.After reviewing philosophical interpretations of autonomy and paternalism, the author considers these principles in the context of the physician-patient relationship. He concludes that, since illness entails a state of diminished autonomy, a limited form of medical paternalism--aimed at maximizing the patient's autonomy--is justified.

The FME symposium on teaching medical ethics takes up the issue of competence and responsibility in matters concerning bioethics (1). Foreseeably, the medical participants argue that physicians are prepared, or can be easily prepared, to handle all relevant aspects of medical ethics. The contrary position is sustained by the philosophically trained participants, who believe that physicians do not, in fact cannot, sufficiently manage medico-ethical problems. This paper sees a role for both parties. Medical ethicists should properly be involved in medical education and in analytical and systematic study of medical ethics. They should not generally be involved in clinical medico-moral decision-making, which is properly the realm of patient and (ethically competent) doctor.Participants in a symposium on teaching medical ethics published in the September 1982 Journal of Medical Ethics disagreed on whether physicians are prepared or can learn to incorporate ethical considerations into clinical decision making, and on what role bioethicists should play in the clinical setting. Kottow criticizes the positions of several participants, concentrating on the conservative stance of J.D. Swales, and proposes a two-tiered decisional system. At the clinical level decisions would be made by physicians and patients, working as members of ethically informed medical teams, while bioethicists would contribute at a more analytical level as advisors, evaluators, and educators.

It is now eighteen years on since the Human Tissue Act 1961, but this legislation is still unchanged in England, Scotland and Wales. Ian Kennedy, in this paper, lays before us the law as it is, the problems of its interpretation and his opinion of what government should be doing to help clarify the situation and remove some of the problems which exist daily for the doctors who face the dilemma of seeking consent for transplants at the moment of extreme grief for the surviving spouses or relatives of the patient who has been in his care only moments before. Ian Kennedy suggests that by doing nothing the Department of Health and the government are being both callous and less than honest.