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Some early phase clinical studies of candidate HIV cure and remission interventions appear to have adverse medical risk-benefit ratios for participants. Why, then, do people participate? And is it ethically permissible to allow them to participate? Recent work in decision theory sheds light on both of these questions, by casting doubt on the idea that rational individuals prefer choices that maximise expected utility, and therefore by casting doubt on the idea that researchers have an ethical obligation not to enrol participants in studies with high risk-benefit ratios. This work supports the view that researchers should instead defer to the considered preferences of the participants themselves. This essay briefly explains this recent work, and then explores its application to these two questions in more detail.

In the past, a vast majority of medical assistance in dying (MAiD) patients were elderly patients with cancer who are not suitable for organ donation, making organ donation from such patients a rare event. However, more expansive criteria for MAiD combined with an increased participation of MAiD patients in organ donation is likely to drastically increase the pool of MAiD patients who can serve as organ donors. Previous discussions of ethical issues arising from these trends have not fully addressed difficulties involved in separating decision to end one's life from the one to donate one's organs. However, realities of organ donation logistics and human decision making suggest that this separation can be extraordinary difficult. The need to maximise quality of donated organs complicates dying experience of the donor and is likely in tension with the dying experience the patient envisioned when first considering MAiD. Furthermore, the idea that patients will think about MAiD first, and only when firmly decided to end their life, consider organ donation, runs contrary to organ donation policies in some countries as well as end of life and everyday decision making. This opens the door for organ donation to serve as an incentive in MAiD decisions. Dispensing with the simplistic assumption that organ donation can never be a factor in MAiD decisions is, therefore, essential first step to properly addressing ethical issues at hand. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Integrating large language models (LLMs) like GPT-4 into medical ethics is a novel concept, and understanding the effectiveness of these models in aiding ethicists with decision-making can have significant implications for the healthcare sector. Thus, the objective of this study was to evaluate the performance of GPT-4 in responding to complex medical ethical vignettes and to gauge its utility and limitations for aiding medical ethicists. Using a mixed-methods, cross-sectional survey approach, a panel of six ethicists assessed LLM-generated responses to eight ethical vignettes.The main outcomes measured were relevance, reasoning, depth, technical and non-technical clarity, as well as acceptability of GPT-4's responses. The readability of the responses was also assessed. Of the six metrics evaluating the effectiveness of GPT-4's responses, the overall mean score was 4.1/5. GPT-4 was rated highest in providing technical (4.7/5) and non-technical clarity (4.4/5), whereas the lowest rated metrics were depth (3.8/5) and acceptability (3.8/5). There was poor-to-moderate inter-rater reliability characterised by an intraclass coefficient of 0.54 (95% CI: 0.30 to 0.71). Based on panellist feedback, GPT-4 was able to identify and articulate key ethical issues but struggled to appreciate the nuanced aspects of ethical dilemmas and misapplied certain moral principles.This study reveals limitations in the ability of GPT-4 to appreciate the depth and nuanced acceptability of real-world ethical dilemmas, particularly those that require a thorough understanding of relational complexities and context-specific values. Ongoing evaluation of LLM capabilities within medical ethics remains paramount, and further refinement is needed before it can be used effectively in clinical settings., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2024. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

A lively topic of debate in decision theory over recent years concerns our understanding of the different risk attitudes exhibited by decision makers. There is ample evidence that risk-averse and risk-seeking behaviours are widespread, and a growing consensus that such behaviour is rationally permissible. In the context of clinical medicine, this matter is complicated by the fact that healthcare professionals must often make choices for the benefit of their patients, but the norms of rational choice are conventionally grounded in a decision maker's own desires, beliefs and actions. The presence of both doctor and patient raises the question of whose risk attitude matters for the choice at hand and what to do when these diverge. Must doctors make risky choices when treating risk-seeking patients? Ought they to be risk averse in general when choosing on behalf of others? In this paper, I will argue that healthcare professionals ought to adopt a deferential approach, whereby it is the risk attitude of the patient that matters in medical decision making. I will show how familiar arguments for widely held anti-paternalistic views about medicine can be straightforwardly extended to include not only patients' evaluations of possible health states, but also their attitudes to risk. However, I will also show that this deferential view needs further refinement: patients' higher-order attitudes towards their risk attitudes must be considered in order to avoid some counterexamples and to accommodate different views about what sort of attitudes risk attitudes actually are., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2023. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

Over the last quarter of a century, English medical law has taken an increasingly firm stand against medical paternalism. This is exemplified by cases such as Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority, Chester v Afshar, and Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board. In relation to decision-making on behalf of incapacitous adults, the actuating principle of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 is respect for patient autonomy. The only lawful acts in relation to an incapacitous person are acts which are in the best interests of that person. The 2005 Act requires a holistic assessment of best interests. Best interests are wider than 'medical best interests'. The 2018 judgment of the Supreme Court in An NHS Trust v Y (which concerned the question of whether a court needed to authorise the withdrawal of life-sustaining clinically administered nutrition/hydration (CANH) from patients in prolonged disorders of consciousness (PDOC)) risks reviving medical paternalism. The judgment, in its uncritical endorsement of guidelines from various medical organisations, may lend inappropriate authority to medical judgments of best interests and silence or render impotent non-medical contributions to the debate about best interests-so frustrating the 2005 Act. To minimise these dangers, a system of meditation should be instituted whenever it is proposed to withdraw (at least) life-sustaining CANH from (at least) patients with PDOC, and there needs to be a guarantee of access to the courts for families, carers and others who wish to challenge medical conclusions about withdrawal. This would entail proper public funding for such challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some philosophers have argued that during the process of obtaining informed consent, physicians should try to nudge their patients towards consenting to the option the physician believes best, where a nudge is any influence that is expected to predictably alter a person's behaviour without (substantively) restricting her options. Some proponents of nudging even argue that it is a necessary and unavoidable part of securing informed consent. Here I argue that nudging is incompatible with obtaining informed consent. I assume informed consent requires that a physician tells her patient the truth about her options and argue that nudging is incompatible with truth-telling. Instead, nudging satisfies Harry Frankfurt's account of bullshit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: High healthcare costs make illness precarious for both patients and their families' economic situation. Despite the recent focus on the interconnection between health and financial risk at the systemic level, the ethical conflict between concerns for potential health benefits and financial risk protection at the household level in a low-income setting is less understood.Methods: Using a seven-step ethical analysis, we examine a real-life dilemma faced by families and health workers at the micro level in Ethiopia and analyse the acceptability of limiting treatment for an ill newborn to protect against financial risk. We assess available evidence and ethical issues at stake and discuss the dilemma with respect to three priority setting criteria: health maximisation, priority to the worse-off and financial risk protection.Results: Giving priority to health maximisation and extra priority to the worse-off suggests, in this particular case, that limiting treatment is not acceptable even if the total well-being gain from reduced financial risk is taken into account. Our conclusion depends on the facts of the case and the relative weight assigned to these criteria. However, there are problematic aspects with the premise of this dilemma. The most affected parties-the newborn, family members and health worker-cannot make free choices about whether to limit treatment or not, and we thereby accept deprivations of people's substantive freedoms.Conclusion: In settings where healthcare is financed largely out-of-pocket, families and health workers face tragic trade-offs. As countries move towards universal health coverage, financial risk protection for high-priority services is necessary to promote fairness, improve health and reduce poverty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article critically examines the legal arguments presented on behalf of Charlie Gard's parents, Connie Yates and Chris Gard, based on a threshold test of significant harm for intervention into the decisions made jointly by holders of parental responsibility. It argues that the legal basis of the argument, from the case of Ashya King, was tenuous. It sought to introduce different categories of cases concerning children's medical treatment when, despite the inevitable factual distinctions between individual cases, the duty of the judge in all cases to determine the best interests of the child is firmly established by the case law. It argues that the focus should not have been on a threshold for intervention but on whether his parents had established that the therapy they wanted was a viable alternative therapeutic option. In the April hearing, Charlie's parents relied on the offer of treatment from a US doctor; by July they had an independent panel of international experts supporting their case although by this time the medical evidence was that it was too late for Charlie. One of Charlie's legacies for future disputes may be that his case highlighted the need for evidence as to whether the treatment parents want for their child is a viable alternative therapeutic option before a court can determine which therapeutic option is in the best interests of the child. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The public often believes that parents have a right to make medical decisions about their child. The idea that, in respect of children, doctors should do what parents tell them to do is problematic on the face of it. The effect of such a claim would be that a doctor who acted deliberately to harm a child would be making a morally correct decision, providing only that it is what the child's parents said they wanted. That is so obviously nonsense that it cannot be what people who claim it actually mean. In this paper, I suggest that the claim actually represents either or both of two misunderstandings. It can be a result of wrongly appealing to the principle of respect for autonomy, or a belief that doctors are not committed to acting in the interests of the child. In this paper, I show that, while neither belief is entirely justified, there are elements of truth in both. I argue that if ethically correct decisions are those that are directed to improving the quality of a child's existence, then neither parents nor doctors are in a position to make ethically correct decisions about a child except in discussion with one another. Where such discussion is not possible, I suggest there should be a national Children's Interests Panel to agree on the child's interests. The panel should include, but not be limited to, paediatricians and lawyers and its decisions should be legally binding on all parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Patients are increasingly turning to medical crowdfunding as a way to cover their healthcare costs. In the case of Charlie Gard, an infant born with encephalomyopathic mitochondrial DNA depletion syndrome, crowdfunding was used to finance experimental nucleoside therapy. Although this treatment was not provided in the end, we will argue that the success of the Gard family's crowdfunding campaign reveals a number of potential ethical concerns. First, this case shows that crowdfunding can change the way in which communal healthcare resources are allocated. Second, within the UK's National Health Service, healthcare is ostensibly not a market resource; thus, permitting crowdfunding introduces market norms that could commodify healthcare. Third, pressures inherent to receiving funds from external parties may threaten the ability of patients-cum-recipients to voluntarily consent to treatment. We conclude that while crowdfunding itself is not unethical, its use can have unforeseen consequences that may influence conceptions of healthcare and how it is delivered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The right to active participation by disabled people in academic research has been discussed at length in recent years, along with the potential for such research to function as a tool in challenging oppression and pursuing disability rights. Significant ethical, legal and methodological dilemmas arise, however, in circumstances where a disabled person loses the capacity to provide informed consent to such participation. In this article, I consider disability politics and academic research in the context of the Mental Capacity Act (MCA) 2005, which sets out in Anglo-Welsh law the circumstances and requirements for research participation by individuals lacking the capacity to provide informed consent. Drawing on my own perspective on research participation in relation to physical and psychosocial disability, I consider the implications of my potential future loss of capacity (eg, if I were to be in a vegetative or minimally conscious state following an accident) for my right to participate in disability-related research. I examine the barriers to such participation and suggest that partial solutions may be found in the advance decision-making and advance care-planning frameworks of the MCA 2005 and related policy, but that current legislative and policy frameworks nevertheless still curtail my rights with regard to research participation on loss of capacity to consent. In so doing, I seek to provoke debate concerning what this legislative provision means for the disability rights movement, and the possibilities and challenges it presents to the movement's commitment to 'nothing about us without us'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Current management of people with prolonged disorders of consciousness is failing patients, families and society. The causes include a general lack of concern, knowledge and expertise; a legal and professional framework which impedes timely and appropriate decision-making and/or enactment of the decision; and the exclusive focus on the patient, with no legitimate means to consider the broader consequences of healthcare decisions. This article argues that a clinical pathway based on the principles of (a) the English Mental Capacity Act 2005 and (b) using time-limited treatment trials could greatly improve patient management and reduce stress on families. There needs to be early and continuing use of formal best interests meetings, starting between 7 and 21 days after onset of unconsciousness (from any cause, including progressive disorders). The treatment options need to evolve as the clinical state and prognosis becomes more certain. A formal discussion of treatment withdrawal should occur when the upper bound of predicted recovery falls below a level the patient would have considered acceptable, and it should always be discussed when the condition is considered permanent. Any decision to stop treatment should be contingent on a formal second opinion from an independent expert who should review the clinical situation and expected prognosis, but not the best interests decision. The article also asks how, if at all, the adverse effects on the family and the resource implications of long-term care of people left in a prolonged state of unconsciousness should be incorporated in the process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Doctors sometimes encounter parents who object to prescribed treatment for their children, and request suboptimal substitutes be administered instead (suboptimal being defined as less effective and/or more expensive). Previous studies have focused on parental refusal of treatment and when this should be permitted, but the ethics of requests for suboptimal treatment has not been explored.Methods: The paper consists of two parts: an empirical analysis and an ethical analysis. We performed an online survey with a sample of the general public to assess respondents' thresholds for acceptable harm and expense resulting from parental choice, and the role that religion played in their judgement. We also identified and applied existing ethical frameworks to the case described in the survey to compare theoretical and empirical results.Results: Two hundred and forty-two Mechanical Turk workers took our survey and there were 178 valid responses (73.6%). Respondents' agreement to provide treatment decreased as the risk or cost of the requested substitute increased (p<0.001). More than 50% of participants were prepared to provide treatment that would involve a small absolute increased risk of death for the child (<5%) and a cost increase of US$<500, respectively. Religiously motivated requests were significantly more likely to be allowed (p<0.001). Existing ethical frameworks largely yielded ambiguous results for the case. There were clear inconsistencies between the theoretical and empirical results.Conclusion: Drawing on both survey results and ethical analysis, we propose a potential model and thresholds for deciding about the permissibility of suboptimal treatment requests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Best interests decision-making and end-of-life care for patients in permanent vegetative or minimally conscious states (VS/MCS) is a complex area of clinical and legal practice, which is poorly understood by most clinicians, lawyers and members of the public. In recent weeks, the Oxford Shrieval lecture by Mr Justice Baker ('A Matter of Life and Death', 11 October 2016) and its subsequent reporting in the public press has sparked debate on the respective roles of clinicians, the Court of Protection and the Mental Capacity Act 2005 in decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatments from patients with disorders of consciousness. The debate became polarised and confused by misquotation and inaccurate terminology, and highlighted a lack of knowledge about how patients in VS/MCS die in the absence of court approval. This article sets out the background and discussion and attempts to give a more accurate representation of the facts. In the spirit of transparency, I present a mortality review of all the patients in VS/MCS who have died under the care of my own unit in the last decade-with or without referral to the court, but always in accordance with the law. These data demonstrate that clinicians regularly undertake best interests decision-making in conjunction with families that may include life and death decisions (sometimes even the withdrawal or withholding of clinically assisted nutrition and hydration); and that these can be made within the current legal framework without necessarily involving the court in all cases. This is the first published case series of its kind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Artificial intelligence is currently changing many areas of society. Especially in health, where critical decisions are made, questions of control must be renegotiated: who is in control when an automated system makes clinically relevant decisions? Increasingly, the concept of meaningful human control (MHC) is being invoked for this purpose. However, it is unclear exactly how this concept is to be understood in health. Through a systematic review, we present the current state of the concept of MHC in health. The results show that there is not yet a robust MHC concept for health. We propose a broader understanding of MHC along three strands of action: enabling, exercising and evaluating control. Taking into account these strands of action and the established rules and processes in the different health sectors, the MHC concept needs to be further developed to avoid falling into two gaps, which we have described as theoretical and labelling gaps., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2023. Re-use permitted under CC BY. Published by BMJ.)

Background: Surrogates frequently are unable to predict which treatment their charges would want and also can experience significant distress as a result of making treatment decisions. A new method, the patient preference predictor (PPP), has been proposed as a possible way to supplement the process of shared decision-making to address these two concerns. The PPP predicts which treatment the patient would want based on which treatment similar patients want in similar circumstances. The present article describes the results of the first evaluation to assess whether patients support the use of a PPP.Methods: Self-administered survey of patients at a tertiary care centre.Results: Overall, 1169 respondents completed the survey (response rate=59.8%). In the event that the respondent became unable to make decisions due to a car accident, 78.9% would want the PPP to be incorporated into the process of making treatment decisions for them. In contrast, 15.2% of respondents would not want the PPP to be used for them. Respondents who endorsed the PPP cited the possibility that its use could increase the chances that they receive the treatments they prefer and/or reduce the burdens on their surrogate decision-maker.Conclusions: The majority of respondents endorsed the possibility of incorporating a PPP into the process of shared decision-making based on its potential to increase surrogates' predictive accuracy and/or reduce surrogate distress. These data provide strong patient support for further research to assess whether, in practice, the use of a PPP can increase the chances that incapacitated patients receive the treatments they prefer and reduce the burden of making decisions on their surrogates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: In a landmark 2013 decision, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) ruled that the withdrawal of life support in certain circumstances is a treatment requiring patient or substitute decision maker (SDM) consent. How intensive care unit (ICU) physicians perceive this ruling is unknown.Objectives: To determine physician knowledge of and attitudes towards the SCC decision, as well as the self-reported changes in practice attributed to the decision.Methods: We surveyed intensivists at university hospitals across Canada. We used a knowledge test and Likert-scale questions to measure respondent knowledge of and attitudes towards the ruling. We used vignettes to assess decision making in cases of intractable physician-SDM conflict over the management of patients with very poor prognoses. We compared management choices pre-SCC decision versus post-SCC decision versus the subjective, respondent-defined most appropriate choice. Responses were compared across predefined subgroups. We performed qualitative analysis on free-text responses.Results: We received 82 responses (response rate=42%). Respondents reported providing high levels of self-defined inappropriate treatment. Although most respondents reported no change in practice, there was a significant overall shift towards higher intensity and less subjectively appropriate management after the SCC decision. Attitudes to the SCC decision and approaches to disputes over end-of-life (EoL) care in the ICU were highly variable. There were no significant differences among predefined subgroups.Conclusions: Many Canadian ICU physicians report providing a higher intensity of treatment, and less subjectively appropriate treatment, in situations of dispute over EoL care after the Supreme Court of Canada's ruling in Cuthbertson versus Rasouli. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems are quickly gaining ground in healthcare and clinical decision-making. However, it is still unclear in what way AI can or should support decision-making that is based on incapacitated patients' values and goals of care, which often requires input from clinicians and loved ones. Although the use of algorithms to predict patients' most likely preferred treatment has been discussed in the medical ethics literature, no example has been realised in clinical practice. This is due, arguably, to the lack of a structured approach to the epistemological, ethical and pragmatic challenges arising from the design and use of such algorithms. The present paper offers a new perspective on the problem by suggesting that preference predicting AIs be viewed as sociotechnical systems with distinctive life-cycles. We explore how both known and novel challenges map onto the different stages of development, highlighting interdisciplinary strategies for their resolution., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2023. Re-use permitted under CC BY-NC. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

In conceptual debates on addiction, neurobiological research has been used to support the idea that addicted drug users lack control over their addiction-related actions. In some interpretations, this has led to coercive treatment models, in which, the purpose is to 'restore' control. However, neurobiological studies that go beyond what is typically presented in conceptual debates paint a different story. In particular, they indicate that though addiction has neurobiological manifestations that make the addictive behaviour difficult to control, it is possible for individuals to reverse these manifestations through their own efforts. Thus, addicted individuals should not be considered incapable of making choices voluntarily, simply on the basis that addiction has neurobiological manifestations, and coercive treatment models of addiction should be reconsidered in this respect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The American Academy of Paediatrics endorses obtaining assent when prescribing medications for attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) in older children whenever possible. Studies indicate the concept of assent may not be well understood by clinicians, possibly effecting effective and widespread implementation. We argue that though the concept of assent continues to evolve, it is critical in the context of patient-centred care, shared decision-making and in supporting minors' transition to adulthood. Based on the principle of respect for young persons, we argue that obtaining assent is an ethical imperative when prescribing medication for ADHD. We highlight the instrumental benefits of obtaining assent in the paediatric clinical encounter when prescribing medications for treatment of ADHD. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

'Calling' a code can be an ambiguous undertaking. Despite guidelines and the medical literature outlining when it is acceptable to stop resuscitation, code cessation and deciding what not to do during a code, in practice, is an art form. Familiarity with classic evidence suggesting most codes are unsuccessful may influence decisions about when to terminate resuscitative efforts, in effect enacting self-fulfilling prophesies. Code interventions and duration may be influenced by patient demographics, gender or a concern about the stewardship of scarce resources. Yet, recent evidence links longer code duration with improved outcomes, and advances in resuscitation techniques complicate attempts to standardise both resuscitation length and the application of advanced interventions. In this context of increasing clinical and moral uncertainty, discussions between patients, families and medical providers about resuscitation plans take on an increased degree of importance. For some patients, a 'bespoke' resuscitation plan may be in order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cryonics is the low temperature preservation of people who can no longer be sustained by contemporary medicine in the hope that future medicine will make it possible to revive them and restore their health. A speculative practice at the outer edge of science, cryonics is often viewed with suspicion. In this paper I defend two theses. I first argue that there is a small, yet non-negligible, chance that cryonics is technically feasible. I make the case for this by reference to what we know about death and cryobiology, and what we can expect of future nanorobotics. I further argue that insofar as the alternatives to cryonics are burial or cremation, and thus certain, irreversible death, even small chances for success can be sufficient to make opting for cryonics a rational choice. Finally, I reply to five objections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Belgium has recently extended its euthanasia legislation to minors, making it the first legislation in the world that does not specify any age limit. I consider two strands in the opposition to this legislation. First, I identify five arguments in the public debate to the effect that euthanasia for minors is somehow worse than euthanasia for adults—viz, arguments from weightiness, capability of discernment, pressure, sensitivity and sufficient palliative care—and show that these arguments are wanting. Second, there is another position in the public debate that wishes to keep the current age restriction on the books and have ethics boards exercise discretion in euthanasia decisions for minors. I interpret this position on the background of Velleman's ‘Against the Right to Die’ and show that, although costs remain substantial, it actually can provide some qualified support against extending euthanasia legislation to minors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background We studied preferences on continuing or forgoing different types of treatments at the end of life in two groups: the general public and people with an advance directive (AD). Furthermore, we studied factors associated with these preferences and whether people's preferences concurred with the content of their AD. Methods A representative sample of the Dutch population (n=1402) and a cohort of people who own an AD, consisting of members of Right to Die-NL (NVVE, n=5661) and the Christian-orientated Nederlandse Patiënten Vereniging (NPV, n=1059), answered written questionnaires in 2005 or 2007. We used two hypothetical scenarios, about cancer and dementia, and asked questions about continuing or forgoing four medical treatments. Results A majority of the Dutch public (62–87%) and NVVE members (88–99%) wanted to forgo the different treatments in both scenarios, while members of the NPV generally wanted to continue treatment (46–73%). In all three groups, in both scenarios, a substantial group (13–38%) had different preferences for the different treatments. People were more explicit in their preferences in case of dementia than in case of cancer. Being female, over 55 years of age, having had a higher education and having no (significant) religion increased the odds to refuse treatment. ADs that gave the direction to refuse treatment generally concurred with the preference of their owners (85–98% wanting to refuse treatments). Discussion The fact that people with and without ADs have different preferences concerning different treatments and diseases stresses the importance of communication surrounding decision making at the end of life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is a response to Dr Joseph Mazor's paper 'The child's interests and the case for the permissibility of male infant circumcision.' I argue that Dr Mazor fails to prove that bodily integrity and self-determination are mere interests as opposed to genuine rights in the case of infant male circumcision. Moreover, I cast doubt on the interest calculus that Dr Mazor employs to arrive at his conclusions about circumcision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Decision-making in initiating life-sustaining health technology is complex and often conducted at time-critical junctures in clinical care. Many of these decisions have profound, often irreversible, consequences for the child and family, as well as potential benefits for functioning, health and quality of life. Yet little is known about what influences these decisions. A systematic review of reasoning identified the range of reasons clinicians give in the literature when initiating technology dependence in a child, and as a result helps determine the range of influences on these decisions., Methods: Medline, EMBASE, CINAHL, PsychINFO, Web of Science, ASSIA and Global Health Library databases were searched to identify all reasons given for the initiation of technology dependence in a child. Each reason was coded as a broad and narrow reason type, and whether it supported or rejected technology dependence., Results: 53 relevant papers were retained from 1604 publications, containing 116 broad reason types and 383 narrow reason types. These were grouped into broad thematic categories: clinical factors, quality of life factors, moral imperatives and duty and personal values; and whether they supported, rejected or described the initiation of technology dependence. The majority were conceptual or discussion papers, less than a third were empirical studies. Most discussed neonates and focused on end-of-life care., Conclusions: There is a lack of empirical studies on this topic, scant knowledge about the experience of older children and their families in particular; and little written on choices made outside 'end-of-life' care. This review provides a sound basis for empirical research into the important influences on a child's potential technology dependence., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2022. Re-use permitted under CC BY. Published by BMJ.)

Many ethical concerns have been voiced about Clinical Decision Support Systems (CDSSs). Special attention has been paid to the effect of CDSSs on autonomy, responsibility, fairness and transparency. This journal has featured a discussion between Rosalind McDougall and Ezio Di Nucci that focused on the impact of IBM's Watson for Oncology (Watson) on autonomy. The present article elaborates on this discussion in three ways. First, using Jonathan Pugh's account of rational autonomy we show that how Watson presents its results might impact decisional autonomy, while how Watson produces knowledge might affect practical autonomy. Second, by drawing an analogy with patient decision aids we identify an empirical way of estimating Watson's impact on autonomy (ie, value-congruence). Lastly, McDougall introduced the notion of value-flexible design as a way to account for the diverging preferences patients hold. We will clarify its relation with the established domain of value-sensitive design. In terms of the tripartite methodology of value-sensitive design, we offer a conceptual clarification using Pugh's account of rational autonomy, an empirical tool to evaluate Watson's impact on autonomy and situate a group of technical options to incorporate autonomy in Watson's design., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2022. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

Most jurisdictions require that a mental capacity assessment be conducted using a functional model whose definition includes several abilities. In England and Wales and in increasing number of countries, the law requires a person be able to understand, to retain, to use or weigh relevant information and to communicate one's decision. But interpreting and applying broad and vague criteria, such as the ability 'to use or weigh' to a diverse range of presentations is challenging. By examining actual court judgements of capacity, we previously developed a descriptive typology of justifications (rationales) used in the application of the Mental Capacity Act (MCA) criteria. We here critically optimise this typology by showing how clear definitions-and thus boundaries-between the criteria can be achieved if the 'understanding' criterion is used narrowly and the multiple rationales that fall under the ability to 'use or weigh' are specifically enumerated in practice. Such a typology-aided practice, in theory, could make functional capacity assessments more transparent, accountable, reliable and valid. It may also help to create targeted supports for decision making by the vulnerable. We also discuss how the typology could evolve legally and scientifically, and how it lays the groundwork for clinical research on the abilities enumerated by the MCA., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2022. Re-use permitted under CC BY. Published by BMJ.)

Decreasing unintended teenage pregnancy, especially repeat teenage pregnancy, is an important public health goal. Unfortunately, legal barriers in the USA impede this goal as all minors are unable to consent for birth control in 24 states, and only 10 of those states allow consent after the minor has given birth according to state statutory law. Placement of long-acting reversible contraception (LARC) is one of the most effective methods of preventing rapid repeat pregnancies. However, restrictions are placed on adolescents who may not have the option of parental consent if the parents are unwilling, or not present, to give consent. A predicament arises when healthcare professionals are willing to place the contraceptive for the patient, but cannot due to the restrictions and guidelines outlined by each state. Even though these adolescents are legally viewed as minors, adolescent mothers should be able to consent to the placement of LARC. Notably, adolescents have the legal ability to give consent for the healthcare of their child starting in the prenatal period. I argue that this ability should be extended to include adolescent consent for their own healthcare. Additionally, the procedure to place LARC is relatively low risk and highly effective, which is an opportune situation to allow minors to consent. Allowing adolescents to consent to LARC after delivery is a simple and effective way to decrease rapid repeat pregnancy rates in the USA., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2022. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

Both the diagnosis and medical treatment of gender dysphoria (GD)-particularly in children and adolescents-have been the subject of significant controversy in recent years. In this paper, we outline the means by which GD is diagnosed in children and adolescents, the currently available treatment options, and the bioethical issues these currently raise. In particular, we argue that the families and healthcare providers of children presenting with GD currently face two main ethical dilemmas in decision making regarding treatment: the pathway dilemma and the consent dilemma., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2022. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

We argue why interpretability should have primacy alongside empiricism for several reasons: first, if machine learning (ML) models are beginning to render some of the high-risk healthcare decisions instead of clinicians, these models pose a novel medicolegal and ethical frontier that is incompletely addressed by current methods of appraising medical interventions like pharmacological therapies; second, a number of judicial precedents underpinning medical liability and negligence are compromised when 'autonomous' ML recommendations are considered to be en par with human instruction in specific contexts; third, explainable algorithms may be more amenable to the ascertainment and minimisation of biases, with repercussions for racial equity as well as scientific reproducibility and generalisability. We conclude with some reasons for the ineludible importance of interpretability, such as the establishment of trust, in overcoming perhaps the most difficult challenge ML will face in a high-stakes environment like healthcare: professional and public acceptance., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2022. Re-use permitted under CC BY. Published by BMJ.)

The COVID-19 pandemic has strained healthcare resources the world over, requiring healthcare providers to make resource allocation decisions under extraordinary pressures. A year later, our understanding of COVID-19 has advanced, but our process for making ethical decisions surrounding resource allocation has not. During the first wave of the pandemic, our institution uniformly ramped-down clinical activity to accommodate the anticipated demands of COVID-19, resulting in resource waste and inefficiency. In preparation for the second wave, we sought to make such ramp down decisions more prudently and ethically. We report the development of a tool that can be used to make fair and ethical decisions in times of resource scarcity. We formed an interprofessional team to develop and use this tool to ensure that a diverse range of stakeholder perspectives were represented in this development process. This team, called the clinical activity recovery team, established institutional objectives that were combined with well-established procedural values, substantive ethical principles and decision-making criteria by using a variation on the well-known accountability for reasonableness ethical framework. The result of this is a stepwise, semiquantitative, ethical decision tool that can be applied to resource allocation challenges in order to reach fair and ethically defensible decisions. This ethical decision tool can be applied in various contexts and may prove useful at both the institutional and the departmental level; indeed this is how it is applied at our centre. As the second wave of COVID-19 strains healthcare resources, this tool can help clinical leaders to make fair decisions., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2022. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)