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Background: Demand for organisational ethics capacity is growing in health organisations, particularly among managers. The role of clinical ethicists in, and perspective on, organisational ethics has not been well described or documented in the literature. Objective: To describe clinical ethicists’ perspectives on organisational ethics issues in their hospitals, their institutional role in relation to organisational ethics, and their perceived effectiveness in helping to address organisational ethics issues. Design and Setting: Qualitative case study involving semi-structured interviews with 18 clinical ethicists across 13 health organisations in Toronto, Canada. Results: From the clinical ethicists’ perspective, the most pressing organisational ethics issues in their organisations are: resource allocation, staff moral distress linked to the organisation’s moral climate, conflicts of interest, and clinical issues with a significant organisational dimension. Clinical ethicists were consulted in particular on issues related to staff moral distress and clinical issues with an organisational dimension. Some ethicists described being increasingly consulted on resource allocation, conflicts of interest, and other corporate decisions. Many clinical ethicists felt they lacked sufficient knowledge and understanding of organisational decision-making processes, training in organisational ethics, and access to organisational ethics tools to deal effectively with the increasing demand for organisational ethics support. Conclusion: Growing demand for organisational ethics expertise in healthcare institutions is reshaping the role of clinical ethicists. Effectiveness in organisational ethics entails a re-evaluation of clinical ethics training to include capacity building in organisational ethics and organisational decision-making processes as a complement to traditional clinical ethics education.

The "lone" clinical bioethicist working in a large, multisite hospital faces considerable challenges. While attempting to build ethics capacity and sustain a demanding range of responsibilities, he or she must also achieve an acceptable level of integration, sustainability, and accountability within a complex organisational structure. In an effort to address such inherent demands and to create a platform towards better evaluation and effectiveness, the Clinical Ethics Group at the Joint Centre for Bioethics at the University of Toronto is implementing the Hub and Spokes Strategy at seven hospitals. The goal of the Hub and Spokes Strategy is to foster an ethical climate and strengthen ethics capacity broadly throughout healthcare settings as well as create models in clinical bioethics that are excellent and effective.

The justification for advance directives is grounded in the notion that they extend patient autonomy into future states of incompetency through patient participation in decision making about end-of-life care. Four objections challenge the necessity and sufficiency of individual autonomy, perceived to be a defining feature of liberal philosophical theory, as a basis of advance care planning. These objections are that the liberal concept of autonomy (i) implies a misconception of the individual self, (ii) entails the denial of values of social justice, (iii) does not account for justifiable acts of paternalism, and (iv) does not account for the importance of personal relationships in the advance care planning process. The last objection is especially pertinent in light of recent empirical research highlighting the importance of personal relationships in advance care planning. This article examines these four objections to autonomy, and the liberal theoretical framework with which it is associated, in order to re-evaluate the philosophical basis of advance care planning. We argue that liberal autonomy (i) is not a misconceived concept as critics assume, (ii) does not entail the denial of values of social justice, (iii) can account for justifiable acts of paternalism, though it (iv) is not the best account of the value of personal relationships that arise in advance care planning. In conclusion, we suggest that liberalism is a necessary component of a theoretical framework for advance care planning but that it needs to be supplemented with theories that focus explicitly on the significance of personal relationships.

OBJECTIVES: To determine the relationship between ethical reasoning and gender and occupation among a group of male and female nurses and doctors. DESIGN: Partialist and impartialist forms of ethical reasoning were defined and singled out as being central to the difference between what is known as the "care" moral orientation (Gilligan) and the "justice" orientation (Kohlberg). A structured questionnaire based on four hypothetical moral dilemmas involving combinations of (health care) professional, non-professional, life-threatening and non-life-threatening situations, was piloted and then mailed to a randomly selected sample of doctors and nurses. SETTING: 400 doctors from Victoria, and 200 doctors and 400 nurses from New South Wales. RESULTS: 178 doctors and 122 nurses returned completed questionnaires. 115 doctors were male, 61 female; 50 nurses were male and 72 were female. It was hypothesised that there would be an association between feminine subjects and partialist reasoning and masculine subjects and impartialist reasoning. It was also hypothesised that nurses would adopt a partialist approach to reasoning and doctors an impartialist approach. No relationship between any of these variables was observed.

Harris argues that if QALYs are used only 50% of the population will be eligible for survival, whereas if random methods of allocation are used 100% will be eligible. We argue that this involves an equivocation in the use of "eligible", and provides no support for the random method. There is no advantage in having a 100% chance of being "eligible" for survival behind a veil of ignorance if you still only have a 50% chance of survival once the veil is lifted. A 100% chance of a 50% chance is still only a 50% chance. We also argue that Harris provides no plausible way of dealing with the criticism that his random method of allocation may result in the squandering of resources.

Following promulgation of the Nuremberg code in 1947, the ethics of research on human subjects has been a challenging and often contentious topic of debate. Escalation in the use of research participants in low-income countries over recent decades (stimulated by the HIV pandemic and the need to carry out clinical trials expeditiously on large numbers of patients), has intensified the debate on the ethics of international research and led to increasing attention both to exploitation of vulnerable subjects and to considerations of how the 10:90 gap in health and medical research (ie, 90% of resources being spent on 10% of the problems) could be narrowed. In 2000, prompted by the discussions over several years that led to the US NIH launching a capacity building programme on research ethics for members of research ethics committees in developing countries, we advanced a ‘new look’ for the ethics of international research.1 Since then progress has been made on several fronts. First, our ideas—considered somewhat radical and impractical at the time—have been provocatively addressed by scholars who have either contested them or advanced similar conceptions of what obligations international researchers have to research participants and communities in low income countries before, during and after clinical trials. Second, those researchers who have been sympathetic to our ideas have either endeavoured to put these into practice or have investigated the feasibility of doing so. Third, the intractability of the 10/90 gap and the escalation of interest in global health have sensitised many to the need to amplify the uptake of these ideas in practice. Here, we briefly review the conceptual and practical developments in international research ethics. While much conceptual progress has been made (and the concepts are now appearing …

The Toronto experience suggests that there may be several general lessons for academic health sciences complexes to learn from the Olivieri/Apotex affair (OAA) regarding the ethics, independence, and integrity of clinical research sponsored by for profit enterprises. From a local perspective, the OAA occurred when there already was a focus on the complex and changing relationships among the University of Toronto, its medical school, the fully affiliated teaching hospitals, and off campus faculty because of intertwined interests and responsibilities. The OAA became a catalyst that accelerated various systemic reforms, particularly concerning academic/industry relations. In this article, the evolving governance framework for the Toronto academic health sciences complex is reviewed and these policy and process reforms discussed. These reforms have created collaborative activity among research ethics boards and contract research offices of the partner institutions, and allowed the joint university/hospital ethics centre to play a role in governance and policy, while respecting the missions and mandates of the involved institutions. Although few of the policies are dramatically innovative, what is arguably novel is the elaboration of an overarching governance framework that aims to move ethics to a central focus in the academic complex. Time alone will tell how sustainable and effective these changes are.

Per Sundström has totally misunderstood what I was trying to do when, in the context of my debate with some German opponents of my views, I referred to their views as implying that if we break a leg, we should not try to get it mended. My brief response corrects this misunderstanding.

In vitro fertilisation is now an established technique for treating some forms of infertility, yet it remains ethically controversial. New developments, such as embryo donation and embryo freezing, have led to further discussion. We briefly discuss the ethical aspects of IVF, focusing on the issues of resource allocation, the 'unnaturalness' of the procedure, the moral status of the embryo, surrogate motherhood, and restrictions on access to IVF. We argue that, on the whole, IVF is an ethically justifiable method of assisting infertile couples.Two Australians, a professor at the Monash University Centre for Human Bioethics and a member of Parliament, present a summary of a paper they submitted to the Victorian Government Commmittee of Inquiry into the Social, Ethical, and Legal Issues Arising from In Vitro Fertilization. They discuss the ethical implications of IVF, including questions of whether scarce medical resources should be devoted to it, whether the procedure is "natural," the moral status of the embryo and the disposition of excess fertilized ova, surrogate motherhood, and restrictions on access to IVF. They contend that, overall, IVF is an ethically justifiable method of assisting infertile couples.

Mitchell, a sociologist, comments on a companion paper on in vitro fertilization by Peter Singer and Deane Wells. He criticizes the failure of Singer and Wells to consider the deleterious effects on society and on the children of artificial reproduction involving donated sperm or ova and accuses them of placing the desire of the individual to have a child above the good of society and of future generations. Singer, in a brief response, defends his utilitarian argument that reproductive technologies should be available to all. He does not consider knowledge of one's genetic identity to be a crucial issue, pointing out that the child's alternative is no existence at all.

Thomas Long has argued that there is an irreconcilable metaphysical difference between the views of those who, like ourselves, believe that on quality-of-life grounds it is sometimes justifiable to end the life of a severely handicapped infant, and those who, like Paul Ramsey, reject this view. Because of this metaphysical difference, Long considers it impossible for our arguments to refute Ramsey's position. We disagree.

considered jointly have no special moral status'. That is to say, an egg and a sperm in separate test-tubes in the same rack have no greater moral status than the egg alone or the sperm alone. But this is irrelevant. For from it we can derive no conclusions about the moral status of the embryo unless we can rely on (A). But (A) is false. Contrary to what Singer and Kuhse suppose, I am not eager to find elementary fallacies in their work. None the less those fallacies are there and the authors have done nothing to eliminate them.