Search

Following World War II, General Heinz Guderian claimed authorship of the development of Germany's Panzer arm, which he had led to successes at the war's start. In fact, Guderian had little influence on the foundation of the Reichswehr's mechanized forces. He had built on the work of Germany's first armored warfare theorist: Ernst Volckheim. One of a few German officers to command a tank in World War I, Volckheim was Germany's leading theorist of tank warfare in the 1920s. His work would reshape decisions crucial to Germany's development of armored forces in World War II. This article reassesses Volckheim's influence on German training, doctrine, and tank design. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay looks at the activities of the Bavarian, Saxon, and Württemberg military plenipotentiaries stationed at German General Headquarters during the First World War. Prior to unification, Germany's most powerful monarchs signed a series of agreements that created a contingent-based army. Managing relations between the army's contingents thereafter became the responsibility of the military plenipotentiaries. Examining their activities reveals that the wartime German army, despite the centralizing pressures created by a multi-front war of attrition, remained a federal institution in which sub-national interests could at times be marginalized, but never altogether ignored. Germany's military federalism remained alive and well, at least until the empire's "de-crowning" in the autumn of 1918. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By 1943, the German army deployed in the Soviet Union was engaged in a total war with an enemy far superior in material and manpower resources. Recognizing this disparity, German field commands instituted more systematic and conciliatory policies designed to mobilize Soviet resources for the German war effort. Attempts to win over the population changed following German defeat in the Battle of Kursk, however; German policy became more violently coercive. An examination of the policies and actions of three German divisions will demonstrate that the army's shifting conduct was due to its understanding of the reality of total war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although armies grew larger during the seventeenth century, size estimates are often inaccurate. This article uses diverse sources to produce accurate troop counts for Electoral Saxony during the Thirty Years' War (1618-48), concluding that its army was large only briefly. It also discusses Saxony's overlooked role in this war. This research suggests that the military revolution thesis should be revised: army sizes did not necessarily stabilize at higher levels and war did not necessarily "make the modern state." Saxony went to war using traditional means of raising revenue: different states responded to their challenging environment differently. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the military participation of Germans in early modern colonialism, focusing on their service to colonial trading companies and colonial powers. It shows that the German colonial empire had a long pre-history, since German mercenaries provided a vital "tool of empire" for European colonial powers. It is argued here that the extensive participation of German soldiers in early modern colonialism demonstrates a hybridity in European colonialism in that national colonial empires relied on trans-national European human resources in addition to local manpower. The article examines German soldiers' identification with their colonial employers and shows that soldiers recruited as a group retained a stronger sense of separate identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the work of the late nineteenth-century German military historian Max Jähns. A career officer in the Prussian Army, he taught military history at the elite War Academy for fourteen years and was a prolific and highly respected author. Significantly, he focused not on operational history--for which the Imperial German Army was and remains well known--but on the place of military institutions and practices in the context of general history. This and the army's positive response to his work shed new light on the evolution of the new military history and the Imperial German Army's reaction to it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the development of the strategic and tactical thought of Germany's Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz in the 1890s. Highlights of von Tirpitz's career as the chief of staff of the German Naval High Command or Oberkommando der Marine from 1892 to 1895; Historical significance of von Tirpitz; Details on how bruising bureaucratic conflict radically altered von Tirpitz's understanding of how to achieve power and influence within the navy.

Discusses the main factors that contributed to the unstable military condition of Germany in 1640s. Details on the campaigns between France and Bavaria in Germany during the years 1643-1648; Importance of military intelligence; Sources of military intelligence; Consequences of the intelligence situation.

Focuses on the German Volkssturm, a compulsory Nazi-administered local defense militia composed of all German males. Information on the goals of Volkssturm; Role of Adolf Hitler in the control of Volkssturm in the country; Key impacts of the National Socialist ideology on the Reich leadership; Analysis of the failure of the defense militia.

Examines a number of unexplored questions regarding the German military during World War II. Examination of the oath of German officers to Hitler; Exploration of the number and nature of death sentences in the German armed forces; Description of the three types of formation in Germany's military during the war; Focus on the establishment of suicide units by Germany.