Search

This paper attempts to identify the variables that define the political and social boundaries within Xinjiang's multi-ethnic society. Traditionally, ethnicity has been the point from which scholars examine political and social loyalties in Xinjiang. It is proposed here that, while ethnicity is a crucial component in defining the divisions in Xinjiang society, it is also important to consider the role of language. This latter trait cuts across ethnic lines and is responsible for creating important subgroups within established communities. The paper will demonstrate that while the Uighur Min kao Han are ethnically Uighur, they culturally and linguistically have taken on many ethnic Chinese characteristics. They are favoured for admission into Chinese society and receive political and employment advantages over their co-ethnics who remain linguistically/culturally Uighur. However, these advantages do not always materialize and the social costs are high. The Min kao Han are generally excluded from the Uighur community, while simultaneously enduring discrimination from the Han. It is argued here that the history of the Min kao Han , as well as the trends in Chinese politics and society affecting this group's future development, are key to understanding what their current role is and will be in the future. It is clear that the psychological condition of the Min kao Han is largely the result of their isolated position in Xinjiang society, and of their experience as children in Han classrooms. It will be shown that there is potential for this group to lead the Uighur population into conflict with the Han, but also, and more importantly, for them to help facilitate reconciliation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the topic of Xinjiang has received considerable attention from scholars in the recent years, there has been a lack of scholarship on policy proposals for what should be done there to improve the situation for the Uyghurs. Moreover, and even though the literature on democratization in China is plentiful, Xinjiang scholars have not fully engaged that literature in their writings. Likewise, scholars on the topic of democratization in China have not devoted adequate attention to Xinjiang, focusing instead on China overall. His paper argues that the best approach for the Chinese government in bringing about lasting and sustainable peace in Xinjiang is through adopting a combination of competitive democratic elections to be held throughout Xinjiang and fostering political openness through participatory democracy in Xinjiang, the People's Republic of China (PRC). However, with the massive influx of Han into Xinjiang following the founding of the PRC, tensions between the Uyghurs and the Han have exacerbated significantly. Denying Uyghurs basic freedoms such as speaking their own language and going to the mosque further adds to the tensions and is not a viable policy. Thus, in order to improve the situation in Xinjiang, it is essential that Uyghurs are engaged in the democratic process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2000, the Chinese Communist Party established the Xinjiang Class (Xinjiang neidi gaozhong ban), a program that funds middle school-aged students from Xinjiang, mostly ethnic Uyghur, to attend school in predominately Han populated cities located throughout eastern China. This paper examines the efficacy of the Xinjiang Class in promoting ethnic unity and Chinese nationalism. By examining the extent to which Uyghur students participating in the Xinjiang Class interact with Han students; speak Chinese outside of the classroom; and by considering if these Uyghur students are returning to Xinjiang, I argue that many Uyghurs are resisting integration, and the Xinjiang Class is largely failing to promote ethnic unity between Han and Uyghurs. Conversely, this program has even strengthened some Uyghur students' sense of ethnic identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The fear of a burgeoning Salafi-jihadism in Xinjiang has been a public driving factor in Chinese policies in the region. This menace is exaggerated. Though there may be Salafi-jihadist elements among the larger, discontented Uyghur population, it is not a mass movement posing an existential threat to the Chinese political order in Xinjiang. Nationalism fuels this Sino-Uyghur conflict while Islam functions as a pragmatic weapon. Uyghur Islam, Uyghur identity, and the history of Uyghur rebellions in the twentieth century, all undergird this conclusion. The form of Islam—Hanafi, Sufi, and indigenous customs—commonly practiced by Uyghurs is antithetical to Salafism and the state imposes constraints on religious praxis. A Muslim identity is only one among several competing identities that comprise the ethnic idea of a Uyghur. The character of Uyghur rebellions, even ones that blatantly declare jihad, demonstrates the primacy of nationalism, the absence of Salafi-jihadism, and the malleability of Uyghur identity. These three evidences bolster the case to revisit the question of Salafi-jihadism in Xinjiang and find a more complex socio-religious perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]