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In the IFMIF-DONES facility of the future, the back-plate behind the Li target will receive strong irradiation from high-energy neutrons. The potential use of the back-plate for material specimens is attractive with respect to providing complementary irradiation data for Eurofer. In this work, DPA (displacement per atom) and gas production rates as well as DPA gradients and temperature distributions have been studied for the center segment of the back-plate, using both a nominal beam and a reduced beam footprint. It is shown that specimens can be produced with high DPA in similar conditions to the DEMO first-wall. Based on the size of the SSTT (small specimen test technology) specimens, the limited number of samples obtainable from the adopted arrangement scheme is driven by a major constraint: the thickness of the back-plate. A parametric study of the back-plate's thickness provides an alternative arrangement scheme; thus, the DPA and gradient of the specimens are remarkably improved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Integration of safety aspects in IFMIF-DONES design is a main objective of EUROfusion and European Commission projects. IFMIF-DONES will be a radioactive facility of the first category, and stringent safety objectives must be achieved and demonstrated. A very low acceptable risk for the worker, the public and the environment is the main principle in the design phase. The progress of safety activities is performed iteratively as detailed engineering develops, taking into account the uniqueness of the facility: a high-power deuterons accelerator (125 mA, 40 MeV), a target of flowing liquid lithium, traps for activation products, a dedicated-design module for irradiated samples, a massive shielding cooled room with confinement function, and a number of conventional systems with safety functions. Several phases are developed: (i) identification of sources and materials at risk, radioactive and nonradioactive, subject to potential mobilization, (ii) failure mode analysis and effects of systems, starting at the functional level, and support with probabilistic analysis, (iii) identification of scenarios leading to unacceptable risk if unmitigated, (iv) proposal of layers of defense by means of safety-credited components and design features, (v) deterministic analysis of scenarios in support of requirements, and (vi) definition and demonstration of safety requirements charged to components. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]