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If stereotypes function to protect people against death-related concerns, then mortality salience should increase stereotypic thinking and preferences for stereotype-confirming individuals. Study 1 demonstrated that mortality salience increased stereotyping of Germans. In Study 2, it increased participants' tendency to generate more explanations for stereotype-inconsistent than stereotype-consistent gender role behavior. In Study 3, mortality salience increased participants' liking for a stereotype-consistent African American and decreased their liking for a stereotype-inconsistent African American; control participants exhibited the opposite preference. Study 4 replicated this pattern with evaluations of stereotype-confirming or stereotype-disconfirming men and women. Study 5 showed that, among participants high in need for closure, mortality salience led to decreased liking for a stereotype-inconsistent gay man.

The hypothesis that mortality salience (MS) motivates aggression against worldview-threatening others was tested in 4 studies. In Study 1, the experimenters induced participants to write about either their own death or a control topic, presented them with a target who either disparaged their political views or did not, and gave them the opportunity to choose the amount of hot sauce the target would have to consume. As predicted, MS participants allocated a particularly large amount of hot sauce to the worldview-threatening target. In Studies 2 and 3, the authors found that following MS induction, the opportunity to express a negative attitude toward the critical target eliminated aggression and the opportunity to aggress against the target eliminated derogation. This suggests that derogation and aggression are two alternative modes of responding to MS that serve the same psychological function. Finally, Study 4 showed that MS did not encourage aggression against a person who allocated unpleasant juice to the participant, supporting the specificity of MS-induced aggression to worldview-threatening others.

Previous research has shown that after a mortality salience (MS) treatment, death thought accessibility and worldview defense are initially low and then increase after a delay, suggesting that a person's initial response to conscious thoughts of mortality is to actively suppress death thoughts. If so, then high cognitive load, by disrupting suppression efforts, should lead to immediate increases in death thought accessibility and cultural worldview defense. Studies 1 and 2 supported this reasoning. Specifically, Study 1 replicated the delayed increase in death accessibility after MS among low cognitive load participants but showed a reversed pattern among participants under high cognitive load. Study 2 showed that, unlike low cognitive load participants, high cognitive load participants exhibited immediate increases in pro-American bias after MS. Study 3 demonstrated that worldview defense in response to MS reduces the delayed increase in death accessibility. Implications of these findings for understanding both terror management processes and psychological defense in general are discussed.

The authors hypothesized, on the basis of terror management theory and cognitive-experiential self-theory, that participants in an experiential mode of thinking would respond to mortality salience with increased worldview defense and increased accessibility of death-related thoughts, whereas participants in a rational mode would not. Results from 3 studies provided convergent evidence that when participants were in an experiential mode, mortality salience produced the typical worldview defense effect, but when participants were in a rational mode it did not. Study 4 revealed that mortality salience also led to a delayed increase in the accessibility of death-related thoughts only when participants were in an experiential mode. These results supported the notion that worldview defense is intensified only if individuals are in an experiential mode when considering their mortality. Discussion focuses on implications for understanding terror management processes.

On the basis of the terror management theory proposition that self-esteem provides protection against concerns about mortality, it was hypothesized that self-esteem would reduce the worldview defense produced by mortality salience (MS). The results of Experiments 1 and 2 confirmed this hypothesis by showing that individuals with high self-esteem (manipulated in Experiment 1; dispositional in Experiment 2) did not respond to MS with increased worldview defense, whereas individuals with moderate self-esteem did. The results of Experiment 3 suggested that the effects of the first 2 experiments may have occurred because high self-esteem facilitates the suppression of death constructs following MS.

The present authors hypothesized, in contrast to 1 influential revision of cognitive dissonance theory, that the production of aversive consequences is not necessary to create cognitive dissonance and that cognitive dissonance will occur even when aversive consequences are not produced. In Experiment 1, participants drank a pleasant- or unpleasant-tasting beverage and were given high or low choice to write a sentence that said they liked the beverage. Participants threw the paper away once they had written the sentence and then rated how much they liked the beverage. In support of the hypothesis, unpleasant-tasting beverage/high-choice participants liked the beverage more than unpleasant-tast-ing beverage/low-choice participants. A 2nd experiment replicated this effect, using a different counterattitudinal action and different choice manipulation. By demonstrating that the manipulation of dissonance produced increased physiological arousal, a 3rd experiment suggested that self-perception theory could not alternatively explain the results of Experiments 1 and 2.

Trivialization as a mode of dissonance reduction and the conditions under which it is likely to occur were explored in 4 studies. Study 1 tested and supported the hypothesis that when the preexisting attitude is made salient, participants will trivialize the dissonant cognitions rather than change their attitudes. Study 2 tested and supported the hypothesis that following a counterattitudinal behavior, participants will choose the first mode of dissonance reduction provided for them, whether it is trivialization or attitude change. Study 3 tested and supported the hypothesis that following a counterattitudinal behavior, the typical self-affirmation treatment leads to trivialization. Study 4 demonstrated that providing a trivializing frame by making an important issue salient also encourages trivialization rather than attitude change even when there was no opportunity for self-affirmation. The implications for cognitive dissonance theory and research are briefly discussed.

On the basis of terror management theory, research has shown that subtle mortality salience inductions engender increased prejudice, nationalism, and intergroup bias. Study 1 replicated this effect (increased preference for a pro-U.S. author over an anti-U.S. author) and found weaker effects when Ss are led to think more deeply about mortality or about the death of a loved one. Study 2 showed that this effect is not produced by thoughts of non-death-related aversive events. Studies 2 and 3 demonstrated that this effect occurs only if Ss are distracted from mortality salience before assessment of its effects. Study 4 revealed that although the accessibility of death-related thoughts does not increase immediately after mortality salience, it does increase after Ss are distracted from mortality salience. These findings suggest that mortality salience effects are unique to thoughts of death and occur primarily when such thoughts are highly accessible but outside of consciousness.

Three studies were conducted to assess the proposition that self-esteem serves an anxiety-buffering function. In Study 1, it was hypothesized that raising self-esteem would reduce anxiety in response to vivid images of death. In support of this hypothesis, Ss who received positive personality feedback reported less anxiety in response to a video about death than did neutral feedback Ss. In Studies 2 and 3, it was hypothesized that increasing self-esteem would reduce anxiety among individuals anticipating painful shock. Consistent with this hypothesis, both success and positive personality feedback reduced Ss' physiological arousal in response to subsequent threat of shock. Thus, converging evidence of an anxiety-buffering function of self-esteem was obtained.

Terror management research has shown that reminding Ss of their mortality leads to intolerance. The present research assessed whether mortality salience would lead to increased intolerance when the value of tolerance is highly accessible. In Study 1, given that liberals value tolerance more than conservatives, it was hypothesized that with mortality salience, dislike of dissimilar others would increase among conservatives but decrease among liberals. Liberal and conservative Ss were induced to think about their own mortality or a neutral topic and then were asked to evaluate 2 target persons, 1 liberal, the other conservative. Ss evaluations of the targets supported these hypotheses. In Study 2, the value of tolerance was primed for half the Ss and, under mortality-salient or control conditions, Ss evaluated a target person who criticized the United States. Mortality salience did not lead to negative reactions to the critic when the value of tolerance was highly accessible.