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This paper inquires into the necessity and limits of what Edmund Husserl calls a "pure" phenomenological psychology. It argues that there may be merit to this notion as a kind of philosophical psychology, the notion of purity in clinical psychology would unnecessarily limit the kinds of factors that the psychologist must take into account in understanding and treating most of the psychological conditions the therapist faces. The paper suggests that phenomenological psychology nonetheless has value in providing a counter-balance to naturalistically inclined psychology that for its part neglects the meaning of various life events for the agent and can serve as means of critical reflection on the operative concepts guiding psychological practice. It can also help correct a deterministic tendency in modern psychology that does not take seriously enough human beings' capacity for self-reflection and for self-responsibility that can often serve as key elements in psychological therapy and healing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Alfred Schutz is, without a doubt, one of the phenomenologists that contributed the most to the reflection on how to apply insights from phenomenological philosophy to the, empirical and theoretical, human and social sciences. However, his work tends to be neglected by many of the current advocates of phenomenology within these disciplines. In the present paper, I intend to remedy this situation. In order to do so, I will systematically revisit his mundane and social-scientifically oriented account of phenomenology, which, as I shall show, emerges from a theoretical confrontation with the Husserlian distinction between transcendental phenomenology and phenomenological psychology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ambivalence, broadly defined as feeling more than one emotion at a time, is thought to be a central aspect of human experience and to play an important role in a range of psychological processes. Ambivalence is experienced in close relationships, identity development, social and political attitudes, decision-making behavior, anxiety states, as well as in psychotherapeutic change. Eight under-graduate students participated in phenomenological interviews that were transcribed and served as the basis for the investigation. The primary purpose of this paper is to shed light on the meaning of the experience of ambivalence by explicating the organizational relationships of its constituent meanings. The paper will also clarify the relation of ambivalence to important psychological processes and developmental transitions during young adulthood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In response to criticisms of phenomenology as being a solipsistic approach to psychological research and theory, this paper examines the interplay of both the creative/active and receptive/passive constituents of subjective experience identified in Husserl's exposition of intentional analysis. By delineating the ways in which intentional constitution requires passive as well as active processes, we come to see in the first part of this paper how experience and personal identity are as much formed and informed by the social and historical world as they are created by individual subjects. Once we have established the non-solipsistic nature of phenomenology, we then apply it in the second part of this paper to open a window onto the disorder of self long considered to be integral to schizophrenia. Through an exploration of the constitution of sense of self in the experiences of two people with schizophrenia, we see how cognitive disruptions, auditory hallucinations, and delusional ideation may be related to fundamental peculiarities in a person's experiences of intentionality and his/her resulting sense of agency and identity. In conclusion, we suggest that while phenomenology may not be able to provide a complete account of psychosis, it may be used to shed valuable, descriptive light on subjective aspects that provide a conceptual base for the consideration of other factors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many philosophers have argued that psychological time is a fundamental, inherent quality of consciousness that provides continuity and sequence to mental events--enabling memory. And, since memory is consciousness, psychological time enables the individual intentionality of consciousness. Levinas (1961), on the other hand, argues that an individual's past, in the most original sense, is the past of other. The irreducible alterity of one's past sets the stage for the other who co-determines the meaning of the past. This paper is about the exploration cultural memory within the context of a Caucasian doctoral student entering into an African-American community during an internship, who finds that cultural memories are remarkably more complicated than the propositional description of historic events. The paper further explores how cultural memory is not a record of "what happened" hut a sociolinguistic creative meaning making process. Histories can he contested. Memory, on the other hand, never adheres to the strict true or false dichotomy. Memory is like searching for the Divine, it cannot he found, only revealed in mysterious and small details. Memory, is the intruding of the infinite, creating as an effect the idea of a finite (August, 2011), they are not "representations" of the past nor are they a kind of mnemonic system of subjectivism to mediate all of consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Phenomenological descriptions of depressed mental life offer a profound understanding of depression from the first-person perspective. In this paper, such descriptions are developed by drawing on the work by Ludwig Binswanger (1881-1966) and on the autobiographical report of depression by Piet C. Kuiper (1919-2002). I will argue that Binswanger's central claim in his phenomenological description of the depressed state of mind fails due to crucial misunderstandings of Edmund Hus-serl's (1859-1938) phenomenology. Nonetheless, by drawing on Kuiper's first-hand account, I will develop a phenomenological description of depressed mental life, highlighting the altered manner of pre-reflective valuing in depression and introducing the concept of a 'depressive habituality.' This term refers to the acquisition of a new set of habitualisations, especially on the foundational levels of automatic mental life. It offers explanations for the fact that it is not easy to recover from depression and that people may more easily become depressed again. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Derrida (1992 /1991) made the case (following Mauss, 1990 /1925) that the 'pure gift' is impossible. Because of the element of obligation and reciprocity involved, gift relationships are inevitably reduced to relationships of economic exchange. This position echoes the exchange theory of the social behaviourists, the cost-benefit analyses of evolutionary psychology, and other reductionist conjectures. In this paper, 18 written accounts of gifting are analysed using established phenomenological tools of reflection. It is shown that the dynamics of the gift relationship are complex (for example the statuses of giver and recipient are problematical, as is the expression of gratitude) and, specifically, reciprocation in gifting is not akin to 'repaying' the gift, but should rather be seen as a response to the gift as an expression of affective affirmation, rendering this mutual. Gift giving is in the expressive realm rather than the practical (Harré, 1979). This was, intriguingly, known explicitly by Adam Smith (2006/1790). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Part of teaching the descriptive phenomenological psychological method is to assist students in grasping their previously unrecognized assumptions regarding the meaning of 'science.' This paper is intended to address a variety of assumptions that are encountered when introducing students to the descriptive phenomenological psychological method pioneered by Giorgi. These assumptions are: 1) That the meaning of 'science' is exhausted by empirical science, and therefore qualitative research, even if termed 'human science,' is more akin to literature or art than methodical, scientific inquiry; 2) That as a primarily aesthetic, poetic enterprise human scientific psychology need not attempt to achieve a degree of rigor and epistemological clarity analogous (while not equivalent) to that pursued by natural scientists; 3) That 'objectivity' is a concept belonging to natural science, and therefore human science ought not to strive for objectivity because this would require 'objectivizing' the human being; 4) That qualitative research must always adopt an 'interpretive' approach, description being seen as merely a mode of interpretation. These assumptions are responded to from a perspective drawing primarily upon Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, but also upon Eagleton's analysis of aestheticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nine short manuscript fragments by Dorion Cairns, one of Husserl's closest followers, are edited and presented here from Cairns' Nachlass (The Unpublished Papers), which are held at the Center for Advanced Research on Phenomenology, Inc. at the University of Memphis. The fragments address aspects of method for phenomenological psychology, namely: the natural theoretical attitude, reflection, psychological epochē and reduction, eidetic and factual description, understanding, and intersubjective verification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is a continuation of the challenge begun by early phenomenologists of the reductionistic scientism of Natural Science Psychology. Inspired by five distinctions of Emmanuel Levinas, it seeks to bring a deeper interruption of the seemingly unalterable force of mainstream psychology to model itself after the hard sciences. Levinas distinguishes the experience of totality from infinity, need from desire, freedom as self-initiated and self-directed from freedom as invested by and for the Other, active agency from radical passivity, and the said from saying. Five commonly accepted characteristics of science, objective, empirical, causal, reducible, and value neutral, are used to compare three approaches to psychology: Natural Science, Phenomenology (psychology as a human science), and Psychology for the Other. Using the definition of science, "knowing the phenomenon as it shows itself," this paper argue that Natural Science Psychology is the least "scientific," Phenomenological Psychology is more scientific, and Psychology for the Other is the most "scientific" with its ethical command to allow the Other to reveal her/himself. This extravagant but compelling claim is illustrated with descriptions of research and therapy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Because of the recent rapid transition in Britain from an elite system of higher education (HE) to one in which a much larger propor tion of the population is intended to participate, many students—whose social backgrounds would previously have (to a large extent) precluded their involvement in HE—experience strangerhood within academia in a particularly acute form. This paper deals with the experiences of members of an one particular HE course, especially designed for students over 21 years old—such "mature" students are a group who has not been traditionally found in large numbers in British HE Such students describe dramatic changes in their sense of self and in their relationships with others—to the extent that their biographical continuity with their own past becomes problematical.The applicability of an idea touted by certain postmodern writers, "the new selfconsciousness," is considered. Attention is also paid to the practical implications of the findings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The last in a series of examinations, this paper articulates Husserl's mature position on the nature of a phenomenologically informed human science. Falling between the naïve positivity of a naturalistic approach to psychology and the transcendental view of consciousness at the base of phenomenological philosophy, we argue that a human scientific psychology—while not itself transcendental in nature needs to re-arise upon the transcendental ground as an empirical—but no longer transcendentally naïve—discipline through Husserl's notion of the "return to positivity." This notion of the return allows us to avoid "transcendental psychologism," differentiating psychological from transcendental subjectivity but from a transcendental, rather than naïve perspective. In this way, the return to positivity reclaims psychology as a worldly, but no longer naïve, discipline. To facilitate an understanding of the different perspectives in question, and the process of leaving the naturalistic perspective in order to return to it once armed with a transcendental understanding and its associated tools, we continue to develop the illustrative example of anorexia provided in the first part of this series. In conclusion, we discuss the implications of this framework for transcendental reforms both of clinical practice and of psychological research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents a list of books on psychology and philosophy.

Discusses an approach to phenomenological psychology concerning the contingencies of the lifeworld. Version of phenomenological psychology which has been practiced in Sheffield, England; Information on the lifeworld; Fractions of the lifeworld.

After a brief perusal of the various meanings of phenomenology in psychopathology, the contributions to schizophrenia of phenomenological psychology (psychiatry) in the European sense are reviewed. The last twenty years are deemed fruitful and productive. Following the central themes and motives of this literature allows us to come to a different and perhaps wider understanding of schizophrenia than that proposed currently by mainstream psychiatry. These diverse investigations converge in seeing as the core of schizophrenia the disorders related to intersubjectivity and ipseity (mineness), in turn related to what Bleuler had once called Autism. Finally, a critical discussion of the limitations and the strengths of the phenomenological approach is offered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

David Katz (1884-1953)was an experimental psychologist who worked in the early years of psychology as an independent science. He performed many experiments on color vision and touch by means of what he called the "phenomenological method." He claimed to have learned the method by attending Husserl's lectures on phenomenological philosophy while the latter was teaching at Göttingen. However the method that Katz actually used was "description with an attitude of disciplined naiveté". Consequently, while such a method was known as "phenomenological" at the time Katz was working, the nomenclature reflects a historically dated meaning of phenomenology and not the sense of phenomenological method that Husserl developed later in his career. Katz's method was actually qualitative and empirical. It was not phenomenological according to Husserl's complete, mature philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the introduction to his Allgemeine Psychopathologie, published in 1913, Karl Jaspers stated that psychology has little value for the psychopathologist because it focuses on all kinds of interesting matters, but not on normal psychic life. In this article we argue that today, in the year 2013, little has changed in this respect. During the past century, normal psychic life (non-pathological psychic life) has rarely been a topic of research. Clinical psychology has focused primarily on studying three other topics: the mind-body problem (does the mind actually exist, or are we exclusively the result of brain function?), the methodological debate (should psychology use quantitative or qualitative research results as a basis for its expertise?) and the psychotherapy debate (Is psychotherapy effective? If so, which form is the most effective?). Due to this focus, our knowledge in the above-mentioned areas has increased significantly, but the issue raised by Karl Jaspers about normal psychic life has still not been addressed. In this article, we propose that normal psychic life should indeed become the new focus of clinical psychology. We illustrate the importance of this new focus with three examples from clinical psychology: the Global Assessment of Functioning scale, empathy and the emergence of positive psychology during the past decade. We then explore the efficacy of phenomenology for studying this normal psychic life, thereby discovering a useful epistemological basis in Husserl's systematic phenomenology. Various phenomenologi-cal research methods are evaluated in the light of this systematic phenomenology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research investigates flow experiences and explores meaning construction for artistic practices that differ in haptic nature. In addition to the phenomenological analysis of interviews, videos of artistic practice and practice-based research (in which participants instruct the researcher in their primary techniques) were employed to obtain both retrospective and real- time records of the physicality of artistic practice. Drawing on authors who emphasise the automatisation of actions in flow (Dietriche, 2004; Spinelli, 2005) and heightened body awareness (Pagis, 2009) flow is reconceptualised in non-representational terms as optimal precognitive engagement with the world. In this light meaning in flow results not from bringing order to the mind as Csikszentmihalyi (2002) proposed, but through its embodied construction in activity. Analyses revealed that the sources of enjoyment and meaning, the relationship between artist, tools and artwork, and the nature and extent of self-differentiation differ between artists who work in two (2D) and three (3D) dimensions, and whose physical actions differ in the production of their artwork. 2D artists derive enjoyment from their creative process and meaning from capturing an atmosphere or place, and attribute artistic control to their artwork. 3D artists derive more enjoyment from the product of their artistic activity and meaning from the recreation of the self in material form, and do not attribute artistic control to the artwork. Consequently, embodied physicality of activity appears fundamental to similarities in flow experiences and meaning-making: accounts of flow and the meanings generated in activity differ between activities that differ in their haptic or performative nature but are similar among haptically similar activities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract This article is a response to Jonathan Smith's attempted rebuttal to the accusations I had made that Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis's (IPA's) methodical procedures did not meet generally accepted scientific criteria. Each of Smith's defenses was carefully examined and found to be lacking. IPA's claim to have roots in contemporary phenomenological philosophy was found to be seriously deficient and its claim that it has a basis in hermeneutics was superficial. IPA's hesitation to proclaim fixed methods makes the possibility of replication of IPA studies impossible and thus it makes the fulfillment of an important scientific criterion impossible. Its claim that its findings are subjective fails to meet the important scientific criterion of objectivity or even intersubjectivity. Consequently, the claims that I made in my original article were basically sustained and repeated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract In this article, it is argued that William Stern was a forerunner of human science thinking in child psychology. Stern's view of development, though widely neglected even among humanists, is consonant with human science thought on the whole as well as human science child developmental theory. Certain core characteristics of human science psychology are noted with special emphasis on how they relate to the study of child development. Stern's views are then shown to be illustrative of these characteristics. In addition, various aspects of Stern's highly humanistic approach to child development are shown to be relevant today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The phenomenology-psychology dialogue has been taking place for over 100 years now and it is still not clear how the two disciplines relate to each other. Part of the problem is that both disciplines have developed complexly with competing, not easily integratable perspectives. In this article the Husserlian phenomenological perspective is adopted and Husserl's understanding of how phenomenology can help psychology is clarified. Then the usage of phenomenology within the historical scientific tradition of psychology is examined to see the senses of phenomenology that were employed in that tradition. The German literature of psychology between the founding of the discipline and the beginning of the Nazi regime indicates quite clearly that the phenomenological perspective was part of the mainstream psychology of that era. The article ends by listing four difficult challenges that have to be met if a viable psychology based upon Husserlian phenomenology is to be possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The experience of being famous was investigated through interviews with 15 well-known American celebrities. The interviews detail the existential parameters of being famous in contemporary culture. Research participants were celebrities in various societal categories: government, law, business, publishing, sports, music, film, television news and entertainment. Phenomenological analysis was used to examine textural and structural relationship-to-world themes of fame and celebrity. The study found that in relation to self, being famous leads to loss of privacy, entitization, demanding expectations, gratification of ego needs, and symbolic immortality. In relation to other, or world, being famous leads to wealth, access, temptations, and concerns about family impact. Areas of psychological concern for celebrity mental health include character-splitting, mistrust, isolation, and an unwillingness to give up fame. Being-in-the-world of celebrity is a process involving four temporal phases: love/hate, addiction, acceptance, and adaptation. Findings are presented in the form of a Composite Textural Description and two Individual Structural Descriptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An expanded conceptualization of the dialogal research methodology was used to gain a deeper understanding of the dyadic experience of Being a couple. Twenty-two committed couples from a variety of backgrounds were interviewed, responding to the question: "What does it mean to 'Be' a couple?" The interviews were videotaped, allowing the researchers to engage with both verbal and nonverbal interpersonal expression. The authors describe the dialogal process used, and identify and discuss three core themes expressed by the couples regarding the meaning of being a couple: commitment, morphogenesis, and transcending paradox through witness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concern of this article is to establish the difference between physiognomy and expression as it may be understood phenomenologically. The work of Merleau-Ponty founds the phenomenological appreciation of physiognomy, and Gestalt psychological studies on perceptual organization elaborate the specifics of physiognomic structure despite the naturalist assumptions of that school of psychology. Physiognomy is the organized structural specification of expression in the phenomenon that presents itself. This view is an alternative to conventional topical but nonthematic considerations on physiognomy (e.g., "face value," visual inspection, physiognomy in language perception, and facial expressiveness). Art therapy with its use of various media is a venue in which the physiognomy of clients' art products is a display of integralness or pathology. It is an immediate access to the world of the patient. The work of the Gestalt psychologist Rudolf Arnheim and of the art therapist Mala Betensky are associated with the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty in order to advance understanding of the significance of physiognomy in experience, in behavior, and in art therapy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After reviewing Freud's 1909 case of the Rat Man, the form of the patient's psychological life is analyzed from existential-phenomenological and socio-historical perspectives.The predominant structure of the analysand's individual life is characterized by the image of an incarcerated criminal. Its constituents include power expropriation, devaluation of self, and epistemic disavowal and oblivion that are subject to intermittent overthrow by lightening strikes of disruptively revolting and irresponsible arrogance. This individual existential structure is traced to the collective structure of the panoptical institutions of modern society delineated by Foucault. An examination of anomalous data in Freud's case study, especially in his evening process notes, suggests a different though tentative and faint form of existence that is more proximally the patient's own, one based on authentic care in the sense of Heidegger. Freud's psychoanalytic treatment ingeniously extends and implements the panoptical social order. However, key modifications of modern discipline embodied in psychoanalysis undermine dehumanization and liberate the patient's subjectivity for a life of responsible action. Freud's interpersonal presence in this case shows such humanizing virtues as openness, respect, strength, mercy, trustworthiness, encouragement, and maternal acceptance at the heart of the therapeutic relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author reflects on his long career as an educational psychologist and on the role of literature in his vision of psychological science. The author followed with great interest the major developments in psychology around the world, but he felt himself progressively alienated from the revealing power of art and literature. At one moment, he realized that a simple narrative constitutes the most profound and also the most effective means of transmitting genuine insights about teaching from one generation to another. This narrative reveals a career guided by high ideals and compromised by the harsh realities of the discipline of psychology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduces a series of articles on psychology and science.

Addresses the problem of ambivalence in contemporary treatments of erotic interest. Attitude toward sexual objectification; Distinction between `objectification' of pornographic depiction and the `beauty' of erotic depiction; Parts of the phenomenon of context; Artistry of erotic depiction.

Examines how a general psychological model of intentional reflection can be developed on the basis of H. Kohut's self psychology, a model that illustrates one of the central organizational principles of human psychology. What self psychology is; How it differs from Freudian psychoanalysis; Its relationship to the phenomenological-existential perspective.

Presents that findings of phenomenological research on forgiving another with a focus on impetus, outcome and relationship to reconciliation. Introduction of preliminary implications of psychotherapeutic application of the distinction between forgiveness and reconciliation.