Search

ObjectivesWe test the effects of four policy scenarios on recruitment into organized crime. The policy scenarios target (i) organized crime leaders and (ii) facilitators for imprisonment, (iii) provide educational and welfare support to children and their mothers while separating them from organized-crime fathers, and (iv) increase educational and social support to at-risk schoolchildren.MethodsWe developed a novel agent-based model drawing on theories of peer effects (differential association, social learning), social embeddedness of organized crime, and the general theory of crime. Agents are simultaneously embedded in multiple social networks (household, kinship, school, work, friends, and co-offending) and possess heterogeneous individual attributes. Relational and individual attributes determine the probability of offending. Co-offending with organized crime members determines recruitment into the criminal group. All the main parameters are calibrated on data from Palermo or Sicily (Italy). We test the effect of the four policy scenarios against a baseline no-intervention scenario on the number of newly recruited and total organized crime members using Generalized Estimating Equations models.ResultsThe simulations generate realistic outcomes, with relatively stable organized crime membership and crime rates. All simulated policy interventions reduce the total number of members, whereas all but primary socialization reduce newly recruited members. The intensity of the effects, however, varies across dependent variables and models.ConclusionsAgent-based models effectively enable to develop theoretically driven and empirically calibrated simulations of organized crime. The simulations can fill the gaps in evaluation research in the field of organized crime and allow us to test different policies in different environmental contexts.

What drives the consumption of illicit cigarettes? While criminology has rarely addressed the divers of the illicit cigarette markets from a theoretical and empirical perspective, studies from other disciplines point to two classes of causes. Some studies stress the impact of cigarette prices and taxes on the market for illicit cigarette; others emphasize the importance of different non-price factors, including informal economy and corruption. This study tests the influence of both price and non-price factors on the illicit cigarette market. Multilevel growth curve analysis—three-level MLM for longitudinal measures—of the illicit cigarette market at the subnational level in the European Union. The analysis focuses on 247 regions in the EU between 2007 and 2013. This study shows that both price and non-price factors influence illicit cigarette consumption. Lower affordability of legal products, proximity to sources of cheap cigarettes, higher national income inequality, greater population density, and the levels of illicit cigarettes in neighboring regions are associated with higher illicit consumption. On the contrary, there is no empirical evidence of the role of two ‘usual suspects’: corruption and shadow economy. The paper also shows that the market for illegal cigarettes is shaped by both demand and supply factors. The geographic concentration of illicit consumption and smuggling calls for the creation of anti-illicit-trade units in most densely populated areas or custom task forces at the most sensitive borders. The disproportionate relevance of illicit flows from eastern non-EU countries suggests to increase the political pressure on these source countries. Finally, given the importance of the demand side in determining the size of the illicit market, price increases should be matched with consumer awareness campaigns. These campaigns should focus on the societal consequences of purchasing illicit cigarettes together with illustrating the harm of consuming tobacco products.