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The South-east Europe and Black Sea region presents a fertile terrain for examining recent international migration trends. A wide range of types of migration can be observed in this region: large-scale emigration in many countries, recent mass immigration in the case of Greece, return migration, internal migration, internal and external forced migration, irregular migration, brain drain etc. These migratory phenomena occur within the context of EU migration policies and EU accession for some countries. Yet within this shifting migration landscape of migrant stocks and flows, the fundamental economic geography of different wealth levels and work opportunities is what drives most migration, now as in the past. This paper sets the scene for the special issue in three ways: first, by defining the three key concepts of migration, transnationalism and development; second, by setting the geographical scene, with the aid of relevant statistics on the migration, development and remittance trends in the various countries of the region; and third, by summarizing the highlights of the papers in this issue of the journal, which range in their coverage from Ukraine and Moldova in the north, to Greece and Albania in the south. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The CoViD-19 pandemic has led to a resurgence of health diplomacy in international relations. Especially the great powers and middle powers have provided different kinds of assistance to countries in need and utilized health diplomacy as an opportunity to construct, reconstruct or consolidate their role in regional and global politics. Turkey was no exception with its assertive and ambitious health diplomacy, of which the Balkans were central. Crisis periods have proved critical junctures for Turkish decision-makers to assert their ambitions in the Balkans. This article examines Turkish diplomacy towards the Balkan countries during the CoViD-19 pandemic and examines how Turkish decision-makers reconstructed a 'regional power' identity. Informed by the constructivist theory, the paper critically investigates how Justice and Development Party tried to consolidate Turkey's identity as a regional power in the Balkans. It delves into the following questions: What are the main reasons for Turkey's coronavirus diplomacy towards the Balkans? How are Turkish decision-makers trying to reconstruct Turkey's role as a regional power during the pandemic? What does the Turkish case tell us about the coronavirus diplomacy of the middle powers in general?. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the beginning of the 2000s, extensive academic research has echoed one popular opinion, 'Turkey is back to the Balkans'. These studies have been scrutinizing the complicated role of Turkey in the Balkans, usually drawing upon the use of soft power by the former. This impact in the region remained intact during the 2010s, although the overall Turkish foreign policy in the 2010s has been highly securitized and de-Europeanized, losing its soft power character that had been its trademark starting from the early 2000s. In this regard, this paper aims to decipher different dimensions of Turkey's foreign policy in the Balkans through a more general exploration of the de-Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy in the 2010s. Through more than 80 semi-structured interviews, which were conducted between 2016–2020, with political actors, diplomats, religious leaders, scholars and journalists in Turkey and the Balkans, we address the question of whether the divergence of Turkish foreign policy from a soft power perspective and its concomitant de-Europeanization tendency had been crystallized in its policy towards the Balkans within the context of the 2010s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the ‘mega-enlargement’ of the European Union into the erstwhile communist territories of Eastern Central Europe and the Baltics in 2004/2007, the prospect for further EU enlargement(s) has seriously dissipated. Terms such as ‘enlargement fatigue’ and ‘absorption capacity’ have become en vogue in the post-2007 enlargement setting where older EU member states have developed negative attitudes towards future enlargements. However, the accession of Croatia into the EU in 2013 has inevitably raised questions of which states or regions could be next. This paper contends that due to a multitude of issues surrounding Turkey, particularly the political impasse within the EU towards Turkish accession coupled with its sheer size, only the smaller states of the Western Balkans represent viable candidates (Iceland’s accession prospects have stalled significantly due to internal pressures). This paper argues that the limits of EU eastern enlargement are set by both prevailing (subjectively defined) political attitudes founded on various grounds in the leading EU member states and by the rationally defined objective capacity of the EU’s institutions to absorb potential new member states. It is through the latter, and in comparison to the three most recent accession states - Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia – which this paper attempts to assess the objective potential of the remaining Western Balkan states to accede into the EU in the near future. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Organized crime and corruption have become the biggest security threats in the Western Balkans since the major wars there ended. They have slowed down the transition and accession progress of several countries. We argue in this paper that the Western Balkans occasionally faces the problem of networked state capture based on a corrupt nexus among organized crime, business, politics, security services and the judiciary. First, the concept of multidimensional and networked state capture is developed in order to identify the roles played by typical actors (captors) and their mutual relations (nexus). Second, the very complex nexus of circumstances leading to state capture in the Western Balkans is explained. In the empirical part, the network established by the Zemun clan, one of the worst examples of state capture in the entire region, is reconstructed using social network software. The case reveals the strong and deadly interconnections among the mentioned captors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reflects upon the socio-economic legacies of Dayton Peace Accords, and the ways in which these legacies were brought into focus by the 2014 Bosnian Uprising. This wave of protests, which started in February of 2014 in the industrial city of Tuzla but quickly spread all over the country, was the (un)anticipated result of rising popular indignation over high unemployment, economic decline and general sense of futurelessness. Protesters attacked both symbolic and literal centres of power, targeting local political elites whose self-serving behaviours and insolent attitudes helped deepen the post-war political and economic crisis. Combining long-term ethnographic research of post-war grassroots politics with more recent investigations of the effects of post-war deindustrialization, this paper anchors the new politics of indignation in Bosnia in its broader historical context. The 2014 protests, this paper argues, demarkate Dayton Bosnia as a postsocialist space, deeply transformed by ongoing socio-economic restructuring, and changing conceptions of political solidarity, social justice and political action. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Analysing a 2013 survey of the informal economy in six Southeast European nations, this paper reveals how such tax non-compliance arises when the codified laws and regulations of a society’s formal institutions are not aligned with the norms, values and beliefs of citizens (its informal institutions). Tackling the informal economy is therefore shown to require a re-aligning of a society’s formal and informal institutions. This necessitates not only changing citizens’ norms, values and beliefs using, for example, tax education campaigns, but also changing the formal institutions to improve trust in government. The wider theoretical and policy implications are then discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

To what extent has the European Union’s (EU) foreign policy been coherent in the Western Balkans? Moreover, is EU policy behaviour seen as coherent by local stakeholders? Such questions are of high significance regarding the role of the EU as an external actor and with regard to the Western Balkans in particular. This article assesses EU policy coherence in the case of Kosovo, focusing on the latter’s EU accession prospects and the EU rule of law mission EULEX. Introducing the novel concept of ‘perceived coherence’, the paper argues that EU policies and actors are not perceived as coherent by both local elites and civil society organizations. As a result, the effectiveness of the implementation of the Union’s foreign policy in Kosovo remains low. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is about the main framework and the rationale of the special issue, which deals with Turkey's increasing ethno-religious, pragmatic and complicated involvement and activism in the Balkans since 2002, under the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP). The main focus of the Issue is how the intersectionality between domestic and foreign policy has played an important role in Turkey's recent relations with the Balkan countries and how the Europeanization process influences this relationality. The overall claim is that religion, ethnicity and kin politics as indispensable components of identity politics, have the capacity to transform Turkey's foreign policy attitudes as well as the orientations of the Balkan countries and the impact of the processes of Europeanization and de-Europeanization on the relationship between Turkey and the Balkans needs to be included into the analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses how new concepts of human security or civil liberties that were institutionalized by the 1948 UN declaration of human rights could apply to the pre-Communist Balkan territory, a region that has traditionally shaped its reputation as realm of ethnic conflicts as well as of political and economic backwardness. The paper examines whether concepts of human security that could be traced to the Enlightenment are applicable or not to the Balkan nation-states. It specifically tackles the issues of the nature of Balkan nationalisms, the role of religion in the demarcation of ethnic lines and the enhancement of human security, as well as the role of boundaries and ethnic un-mixing of populations in safeguarding the human security of natives and refugees in the area before the rise of communism. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper shows how the crisis has evolved in south-eastern Europe (SEE) and why this region was affected by developments that originated elsewhere. It argues that the impact has been better than many feared and that this resilience can be attributed in large part to the mature and sensible reaction of the region itself. However, the paper notes that recovery is proceeding more slowly than elsewhere in the transition region. It also points to the strong financial support from publicly owned international organizations, and the continued commitment of privately owned foreign companies and banks to the region. The paper concludes that the region is well-placed to take advantage of a future global upturn, but at growth rates that are likely to be subdued compared with those seen in the few years before the crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on interviews and a series of fieldwork visits to Albania, Greece, Bosnia, Macedonia, Bulgaria and Turkey, this paper provides a synopsis of the main Muslim communities in Southeast Europe, their ethno-linguistic differentiation and their community organisations. It argues that in the last decade, an often-exaggerated concern with Islamist terrorism in the region has obfuscated the much more important processes of de-Islamization and emigration within the context of ambivalent or unsympathetic nation-states. As this paper shows, Muslim communities in the Balkans are characterised by the tension between both fragmentation and stagnation on the one side and stabilisation on the other: Fragmentation in linguistic, ethnic and religious terms as well as demographic and cultural stagnation particularly in Bulgaria and Greece, countered by processes of stabilisation through the re-emergence of established Muslim administrations and communities, particularly in the Western Balkans. This stabilisation is partly supported by Turkish state and religious institutions, which have replaced the conservative missionaries from the Gulf and Saudi Arabia. This 'Turkish turn', the paper argues, is likely to have a considerable impact on the future of Islam and Muslims in the Balkans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the nature of undeclared work in southeast Europe and evaluates the consequences for tackling such work. Reporting a survey of undeclared work in five southeast European countries (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Romania and Slovenia), a diverse array of types of undeclared work are uncovered ranging from waged employment to own-account work conducted for closer social relations such as kin, friends and neighbours. The outcome is a call for greater recognition of the diverse array of kinds of undeclared work in southeast Europe and for a wider range of policy approaches and measures to be employed when tackling such work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article intends to look at the role of the EU during the post-Cold War period, as an external factor encouraging regional cooperation in South-Eastern Europe and the protection of individuals both as victims and as sources of insecurity. The paper analyses the implementation of the Stability Pact and the Stabilization and Association Process as clear manifestations of asymmetrical inter-regionalism. It also examines the whole process of the Regional Cooperation Council and argues that it should be considered as a case of ‘sub-regionalism through inter-regionalism’ which could be named dependencia sub-regionalism. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

South-eastern Europe is depicted as a highly insecure region owing to a combination of factors including its function as the gateway to the EU and the many socio-economic problems that have arisen out of the democratization process in eastern Europe. The already existing internal differences within south-eastern Europe have been rendered huge by the effects of transition. Migratory flows mirror the complexity of the political and socio-economic conditions in the area. This paper aims to provide an overview of migration trends in south-eastern Europe, with particular emphasis on the security threats they entail. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Demographic shifts, settlement patterns and population movements profoundly alter the geo-political landscape with important ramifications for human security. Though the theoretical framework is not as yet fully elaborated, the growing volume of relevant literature reflects a fast-growing interest in the political and international implications of demographic phenomena. Demography poses new challenges both for public policy and for international relations. This paper aims to offer an overview of the possible linkages between demographic dynamics and human security, focusing on the case of south-eastern Europe in the post-communism era. This region gives a striking illustration of the relevance of demographic trends to security, highlighting the multilayered linkages between economic and social transition and stability. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the 2000 and 2010s, Turkey embarked on an activist policy in Southeast Europe reliant on personal diplomacy, economic outreach, and the projection of soft power. Coupled with the drift away from the West, such overtures have prompted observers to qualify Turkey as a revisionist power similar to Russia, China and other non-Western actors making inroads into the region. This article seeks to correct this view. It argues that Turkey is not an external player but very much part of the Balkans. Secondly, the article contends that Turkish foreign policy is not posing a frontal challenge to the EU and NATO, the two anchors of regional order. Rather, it benefits from its close relationship and membership in the two institutions. Though it has shifted from multilateralism to unilateralism, Ankara pursues a parallel, as opposed to an adversarial, strategy to that of the West. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The externalization of EU asylum and immigration policy that arose from the EU Council of Seville bears the conflicting dichotomy that is proven detrimental to the EU asylum and immigration reform: the contradiction between principles of human rights on the one hand, and that of internal security on the other. However, in the EU foreign policy, the element of internal security seems to prevail. There exists only a limited need to pacify dissented domestic actors such as human rights and refugee rights groups, whom, whereas they are very vocal in opposing EU asylum and immigration reform at home, remain uninformed and ill-equipped to be able to protest against the external wing of this reform. Rather, a limited number of international NGOs and international organizations have criticized many elements of the EU foreign policy regarding asylum and immigration. I argue that the external wing of the EU asylum and immigration policy is overwhelmingly infused with a tendency to halt the immigration influx toward its territories, with little concern for human rights and international standards of refugee protection. I empirically analyze my argument through considering the case of the EU policies and UNHCR assistance to Balkan countries as they work to establish asylum systems in this region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Western Balkan region needs credible European development prospects to break the cycle of enlargement and accession fatigue and to speed up regional adjustment to the EU. Post-accession EU budget flows can provide the necessary funding for such prospects. This article assesses the expected changes in the size and composition of EU budget flows to the Western Balkan countries after their EU accession. Our results show a sudden and substantial increase in gross and net flows, which gradually intensifies over several years before levelling off. EU budget flows are economically important relative to the size of the Western Balkan economies, and their composition is strongly biased towards development policies. We also find that Western Balkan enlargement comes at a minimal budgetary cost for the remaining EU member states. Our findings can help reduce scepticism behind the Western Balkan countries' accession fatigue and the EU's enlargement fatigue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The contribution assesses the role of the media in respect to democratization and EU accession in the countries of the Western Balkans (WB) and the development of press freedom over the long run. The author closely analyses the legislative framework and its implementation in practice and focuses in particular on the economic and political pressure on the media in the region. The article offers three arguments to explain the bad shape of media freedom in the Balkans: structural factors (state advertisements as the main source of income, economic tycoons close to incumbents as media owners), proximate or external factors (the deteriorating level of media freedom in some EU countries and the whole WB region, with an accent on stability rather than democracy) and political-societal dynamics (defamation and libel as means to punish journalists, verbal and physical assaults on journalists). The media in the WB region do not serve as the watchdog of democracy but are instead used as a means to reinforce illiberal regimes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using data compiled during extensive survey research carried out in the societies of the Western Balkans, we attempt to contribute to the discussion on whether informality, which in this region is largely present even in formal settings, is a consequence of a specific culture brought about by particular historical circumstances – several centuries of Ottoman rule, delayed modernization, and the legacy of socialism – or whether it is a manifestation of a contextualized rational choice, embodied as a response to the transitional environment in which citizens live. Trying to contribute to these deliberations and create a new basis for the better understanding of these 'informal ways of getting things done', we operationalize two sets of indicators that speak in favour of one or the other standpoint. We apply Multiple Correspondence Analysis and regression methods, but the complexity of the analysis produced results that defy simple oppositions. However, we identified perceptions of the level of informality, lack of trust in institutions and readiness to justify informality as the strongest predictors of informal practices, with a non-linear relationship between the age of respondents and their involvement in informal practices, and a rather weak correlation with indicators of their economic, social and cultural capital. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Greece’s position towards the EU’s enlargement to the Western Balkans remains ambivalent: on the one hand, Greece remains declaratively one of the most ardent supporters of integrating the whole Balkan region into the EU; on the other hand, Greece is also a persistent obstructing factor whenever its multiple interests in the Balkans produce friction. We investigate this ambivalent position to understand its origins. We argue that Greece’s position can be understood with reference to three key factors: (a) the particularities of Greece’s foreign policy-making and its persistent traits, (b) the background of Greece’s relationship with the region and the legacy of multiple disputes that were created or exacerbated in the early post-Communist period and (c) the legacy of turning EU enlargement policy into a Greek foreign policy tool during the 1990s. These factors not only explicate the existence and persistence of Greece’s ambivalent policies, but also are likely to continue to shape Greece’s enlargement policy in the future. In that context, we expect that Greece will engage in a delicate balance of, on the one hand, strategically placing conditionality to ensure favourable compromises with neighbours, and, on the other, not jeopardizing the continuation of the enlargement process per se. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Italy is a vocal supporter of EU enlargement to the Western Balkans. Relying on primary and secondary sources and semi-structured interviews, this article analyses Italy’s position, including the ‘what?’ (the traditional views of the country on EU enlargement), the ‘how?’ (formal processes and actual practices of decision-making) and the ‘why?’ (the main factors influencing its position). The expected economic and security benefits for Rome largely compensate for the perceived costs of EU enlargement towards the region. Nevertheless, Italy’s influence capacity is hampered by lack of resources and a traditional focus on mere diplomatic presence, as it emerges from the recent examples of the Berlin Process, the refugee crisis, and the EUSAIR. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Germany has demonstrated an active commitment towards the accession perspective of the Western Balkans, which found its most vocal expression in the initiation of a Western Balkans summit in August 2014 and the ensuing “Berlin process”. However, German support reflexively goes hand in hand with a reference to rigid accession conditionality. This not only fosters stabilization and transformation in the Western Balkan states, but also – at the domestic level – counters widespread enlargement scepticism among decision makers and the German public. The far-reaching participation rights of the Federal Parliament, acquired by the 2009 amendments to the Act on EU Cooperation, involves the Bundestag inter alia in the opening of accession negotiations, thus also increasing domestic constraints for Germany’s position in the Council. Federal elections due in late 2017 and a political environment shaped by a discussion about migration, including from and through the Western Balkans, make enlargement policy a particularly hard-to-sell issue. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines the United Kingdom’s approach to the question of European Union enlargement in the Western Balkans. It shows that while Britain had no traditional attachment to the region, it championed expansion as part of its long-standing aim to widen EU membership to prevent deeper political union. However, as immigration from the EU increased after the 2004 enlargement and a Eurosceptic Conservative-led government took charge in 2010, official support for enlargement began to decline. Britain ceded its place to Germany as the strongest supporter of EU expansion. Meanwhile, during the referendum campaign on EU membership, the prospect that future enlargement could further increase the number of migrants emerged as a central point of debate. Although this discussion was primarily focused on Turkey, the Western Balkans also played a part. Therefore, even had the United Kingdom decided to remain in the EU, there is an argument to be made that Britain could well have become more opposed towards future expansion. As it is, the decision to leave the EU (Brexit), has ensured that Britain has now all but lost its say over enlargement. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Cyprus’ commitment to the European perspective of the Western Balkans is shaped by a range of factors. As well as balancing its national interests, it also aims to stand by a ‘position of principles’ on conflict issues. It equally seeks to be a reliable partner to the EU and move closer to its Western allies, while accommodating its Eastern ones. Nevertheless, over the last 10 years, Nicosia has Europeanised its policies and thinking. This has seen it reach out to Kosovo to try and build de facto relations. However, since the ‘national problem’ remains at the core of its foreign policy, relations with ‘motherland’ Greece are also key. This has in turn complicated dealings with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Overall, Cyprus remains more firmly focused on the Middle East, making it a rather peripheral actor in the Western Balkan countries’ EU integration process. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

France’s hesitant stance on EU enlargement towards the Balkans is illustrative of a broader ambivalence among both French elites and citizens towards the European project. Despite principled support for the Balkans’ EU membership, achieving this step is no strategic priority for France. The official approach emphasizes strict conditionality and a rigorous monitoring of reform progress in aspirant countries. A hostile public opinion and superficial media coverage further strengthen the country’s reluctance to admit new, possibly unprepared candidates into the Union. Analysing the historical evolution of the French position on EU enlargement as well as its current political, institutional and societal expressions, this article construes France’s disinvestment from the Balkans’ EU perspective as the result of failed expectations and a growing disillusionment with the EU’s international role and its political future more broadly. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article aims to shed light upon the ways of how the Europeanization of Turkey and the Balkans has so far led the Alevi-Bektashi order to revitalize its transnational and heterodox stand, which actually originates from the early encounters of the Turkish tribes with the Christian natives in Anatolia and the Balkans. The main premise of this work is that the Alevi-Bektashi communities residing in Turkey have recently reconnected themselves with their relational communities residing in the European Union and the Balkans through various layers of social learning and interaction provided by the process of European integration offering subordinated groups opportunity structures to transcend the hegemony of their nation states and to revitalize their transnational characteristics. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the last decade, a wide literature has critically analysed individual aspects related to the role and the impact of international aid to Southeast Europe (SEE), bringing to light both its successes and failures. However, 22 years after the communist collapse and the Yugoslav dismemberment, a broad re-examination of the aid policies pursued in SEE and of the rationale behind these policies is becoming increasingly necessary, in light of (a) the global financial and economic crisis, (b) the sharp decline of support from external bodies and (c) the persistence of controversial and unresolved conflicts and rivalries at the macro-regional level, particularly where reconciliation remains to be reached. Therefore, this article aims to discuss whether, under these new conditions, the support so far offered to SEE requires the most relevant donors to change their strategy and methods in order to achieve the proclaimed goals of stability, development and integration into the Euro-Atlantic framework, which appears to be still fragile in the region under scrutiny. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article sets out to study relations between Turkey and Bulgaria during the Inter-war period of 1923–1934 and its effects on the Turkish minority living in Bulgaria. In bringing international, national and community level dynamics together, it will attempt to show how the relations developed between the Republic of Turkey and Bulgaria affected the conditions of the Turkish minority. Once the diplomatic relationship was established between the two states, Ankara and Sofia made efforts to constrain deliberately the influence of the minority issue on these relations. Consequently, this article asserts that the Turkish minority in Bulgaria constituted rarely, if ever, a factor in its own right that could influence the nature and the direction of the two countries’ bilateral relationship for much of the Inter-war era. However, the Bulgarian government began to exert pressure on the Turkish minority, when bilateral relations showed signs of deterioration. Additionally, this article also demonstrates how the reaction of other Balkan countries to regional and international developments had an impact on Turkish–Bulgarian relations and made minorities susceptible to ebbs and flows in bilateral relations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

During the 2000s, the European Union (EU) and the euro zone provided anchors for regional integration in South-East Europe including the Western Balkans. Today’s crisis has called into question the credibility but not the desirability of that framework, and regional actors can still mobilize building blocks forged in the past decade for much needed bottom-up reforms. The process could be galvanized by a regional insider with economic and political capital. With Greece absorbed in its own crisis, Turkey is a candidate for such a role. Assessing Ankara’s capacity to drive change in the region vis-à-vis the debate over its once touted, apparently moribund ‘zero-problems-with-neighbours’ policy, we argue that Turkey’s most sustained foreign policy success has been in the Western Balkans. This is because its approach complement the soft instrument legacies of the earlier EU framework for regional integration. As such, if Ankara abandons its own commitment to economic and political liberalization, it may forfeit its potential to serve as a leader in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The European Union’s enlargement towards the Western Balkans may be facing its most difficult challenge since its launch in Zagreb in 2000. The prospect of Balkan enlargement has been hard-hit by the deterioration of the European economy, and particularly the Greek sovereign debt crisis, as the countries of the region have been deeply affected by the shock waves emanating from Greece. The negative repercussions include a deterioration of their economies, their prospects for growth, their capacity for reform, their social, political and institutional structures, and their ability to fulfil the accession criteria. Crucially, the EU’s hitherto undisputable symbolic role as an ‘anchor’ of stability, as a one-way path to prosperity and as a goal to be aspired to, may be losing its credibility and appeal for some of these countries. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the long discourse on whether the environment is a security issue, we support that there is strong connection of environmental threats with security, in its wider concept. Their interface is threefold: scarcity-induced conflict; environmental degradation threatening human health and welfare and environmental damage caused by war. Significant global and localized environmental threats may adversely impact human security in the Balkans. Foci of tension do exist, especially regarding water resources, which are expected to experience increasing scarcity in the future due to climate change. However, environmental factors seem unlikely to cause great scale of inter- or intra-state conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

External assistance to the Balkans was largely successful in stopping or preventing conflict and in strengthening state institutions. International donors (and especially the European Union) have developed an implicit ‘human security’ agenda in their aid policies towards the region, an agenda that heavily influenced decisions and helped to achieve the goal of reconstruction. Without using the term ‘human security’, bilateral and multilateral donors in the Balkans adopted a ‘human security’ approach. Their priorities (first promote peace, then strengthen public institutions, then introduce democratic norms and finally bring development) show a growing consistency (especially after 2005) and a rather clear understanding that the simultaneous promotion of possibly conflicting goals (i.e. democracy/stability) might undermine their reconstruction objectives. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article presents the economic, social and regional problems that poverty poses for six Balkan countries. Poverty is a multidimensional concept not easily defined. There is a direct relationship between security and poverty, as poor people are affected by different forms of violence. Inter-temporal and cross-country comparisons were not always possible due to the fact that there was paucity of data in most of the countries. In all cases, poverty seems to have been reduced, especially in comparison to the state of poverty in the 1990s. Education seems to be an important determinant; poverty has also a spatial dimension in all these countries. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Violent conflict in the Western Balkans has been a significant problem for more than a decade. Addressing the problem of violence in the Western Balkans requires attention to the availability, circulation and control of weapons - particularly small arms and light weapons, which continue to cause the most significant problems. After a tremendous influx of armaments during the Balkan wars of the 1990s - as well as a significant proliferation of weapons made in Yugoslavia - a large amount of weaponry continues to exist in the region, and governments must struggle to develop and implement appropriate arms control measures in an effort to meet standards of western integration. This article analyses the extent to which the countries of the Western Balkans are addresssing their weapons issues and specifically to what extent they have successfully developed and implemented measures to control the movement of arms. The author finds that there is a significant gap between policy and practice as most countries have developed legal instruments on small arms control but struggle somewhat to implement them. Finally, the author argues that motivations for small arms control behaviour vary throughout the region, requiring individual country considerations in order to address each country's specific behaviour. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This opening contribution provides the framework for discussion for the case studies that follow. It outlines the key concepts employed - simple and compound polities, Europeanization and multi-level governance - and explains the origins and development of EU cohesion policy and related pre-accession instruments. It concludes by summarizing the main themes and issues addressed in the subsequent contributions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyses and compares how democracy and governance assessments evaluate Southeast European countries. Datasets and expert studies from the Bertelsmann Foundation, the Economist Intelligence Unit, Freedom House, the Polity Project, and the World Bank Institute have been selected to compare numerical ratings and verbal assessments, cross-nationally within Southeast Europe, in comparison with other regions of Europe and over time. The main findings are the following: The differential placement of states on levels of relations between the EU and Southeast Europe correlates with the ranking of states emerging from the surveys, while there is scarce evidence of a clear causality in either direction. The successive upgrading of relations between the EU and the Southeast European countries also corresponds to convergence trends observed by two of the surveys. Differences in the relative placement of states by individual surveys can only partially be explained by the country reports attached to the surveys, suggesting the need for methodological improvements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article introduces a special issue on political and economic transitions in the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe.

During the past five years, the economies of the West Balkans have been experiencing a period of sustained economic recovery with strong GDP growth, declining price inflation, increasing foreign direct investment (FDI), and the prospect of EU membership in the medium term. With Bulgaria and Romania having joined the European Union in January 2007, the terms of reference and institutional dynamics are changing for countries in the Western Balkans. Croatia is an accession country currently negotiating with Brussels the complex catalogue of membership requirements. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has been an EU candidate country since December 2005 and Montenegro completed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the Commission in October 2007, while Serbia's SAA was adopted in the summer of 2008 but is currently on hold. The economic progress achieved in the Western Balkans and the European perspectives raise the question over the region's continued ability to take full advantage of this rather favourable mix of developments. This article explores the countries' varying success in confronting political and economic challenges and seeking opportunities on their road to Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the nature of the EU's political conditionality in the Western Balkans, and the effort of the EU to manage the diversity of bilateral agreements in a small space with a mixed record of compliance. The Western Balkan region reveals special trends in the EU's handling of the strategy of political conditionality, and some creeping contradictions and dangers are beginning to reveal the changing nature and the limits of conditionality. More specifically, the EU (a) is adding further, yet necessary, political conditions and criteria to weaker or more reluctant partners and emphasizes the 'journey' rather than the outcome of accession, affecting the credibility of the strategy; (b) is blending together normative, functional and realpolitik claims in the choice of its conditions, affecting the clarity of its intentions; (c) is pursuing, in some cases, a rigorous assessment of compliance and, in other cases, a more adaptable and pragmatic assessment, affecting the consistency of the process. These Western Balkan trends are bound to become more pertinent in future cases, as the EU gets more involved with other more difficult states in its eastern and southern periphery, and where the carrot of membership will be either very distant or irrelevant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Southeastern Europe is going through its most profound period of change since Slobodan Milosevic's overthrow in 2000. The pillars supporting Balkan stability over the past decade - the large US military presence in the region, the promise of foreseeable EU accession, and the international consensus on agreements guaranteeing Balkan stability (such as the Dayton Peace Agreement, UN Security Council Resolution 1244, and the Ohrid Accords in FYR Macedonia) - are under attack or are being increasingly questioned. Meanwhile, no new security architecture has been erected, while several new developments, including Russia's return to the Balkans and the creation of two new states, is throwing new unknown strategic variables into the Balkan security equation. Without serious re-engagement by the EU and the US in the region, southeastern Europe's democratic and market transitions could still be derailed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Before 1923, the Balkans, Anatolia and the Black Sea regions had been home to a large number of religious groups, who had preserved ancient practices, languages and beliefs for centuries. Muslims were driven towards Anatolia with the expansion of the Russian Empire and the emergence of new states in the Balkans. This process often involved considerable violence that often had a quasi-religious element to it. Similarly, the position of Jews in Imperial Russia deteriorated rapidly during the reign of the last two Romanov Tsars, with waves of pogroms that hit Odessa very badly. By the Civil War, whole Jewish communities were threatened. Ottoman Christians were simply killed or expelled in a long wave of violence between 1913 and 1923. Many contemporaries regarded the destruction of these communities as a predominantly religious phenomenon, but the crisis created by the increasing globalization of world trade (which was greater before 1914 than in the interwar decade) and attempts to create autarchic states should not be overlooked. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Stability in the European Union (EU) and the Balkans are tightly interconnected. Following the re-emergence of ethnic conflicts and division in the Balkans, the EU increasingly has assumed greater responsibility in shaping post-Yugoslav security. Indeed, in the context of the growing scope of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), expectations are rising. As this article points out, however, major problems persist. There is a need to define more substantive priorities and mould a coherent policy. Many lessons can be learned from previous Balkan experiences, both in terms of achieving coherent operational success on the ground and by combining Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Community instruments. This article draws on such lessons to elaborate criteria for the deployment and foreign engagement of ESDP missions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Developments in the Balkans have always been at the top of Greece’s foreign policy considerations. This article reviews Greece’s approach to the region during the Cold War period and especially since then by attempting to explain why the region holds such a high priority for Greece and how the country and its foreign policy elite deal with it. The need for having a domestic consensus, lining up policy with that of the European Union, working with the United States and keeping relations with Turkey on an even keel are some of the conclusions the author draws. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A strong upward trend in foreign direct investment inflows is among the most remarkable recent developments in the Balkans—a process that is being led by the private sector in the face of ostensibly insurmountable barriers. External official inputs have contributed little to the trend of improvement, beyond the provision, arguably, of the most basic conditions. Private business does not operate in a political and social vacuum. But it is striking that the upsurge in foreign private sector involvement has been based on only a few minimal conditions—the restoration of peace and basic security, the beginnings of economic recovery and modest improvement in business environments. Medium-term forecasts suggest that the buoyant FDI trend is likely to be sustained. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is concerned with particularism in the post-communist Balkans. First, it discusses notions such as particularism and social capital in a post-communist context, attempting to relate these two concepts to each other. Second, it provides a descriptive picture of particularism, informal behaviour and social capital in Southeast Europe based on a comparative survey conducted in 2003 in five countries: Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia. Third, it constructs explanatory models of social capital and discusses the policy implications for the region's Europeanization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides a brief overview of the background to organized crime in the Balkans. It attempts to cast light on its economic and systemic (i.e. political and economic) prerequisites. It speculates on issues like the causes and provisional size of the black economy and semi-economic factors and constellations that have supported it in the last ten years. It concludes that organized crime in the Balkans is not an independent reality, separated from wars, nation building and the reforms of the 1990s. For this reason, policies to tackle it should be broader. They should address sources of demand and financing, deal with EU integration and development prospects and support local government, business and societal structures that can suppress and outperform criminal economic activities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The last few decades have seen an overwhelming advance by the neo-liberal paradigm in terms of defining 'best practices' and spreading the gospel of its policies throughout the world, mainly through international financial institutions. However, this framework has been far from sufficient in enabling policy makers to deal with the complexity of development efforts in regions that are replete with asymmetries, market imperfections and precarious equilibria. The western Balkans is one case in point. This article argues that there is substantial scope for institutional and policy diversity to operate as a means of fostering economic development and that there might be paradigmatic cyclicity in the dynamic of economic policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents general considerations concerning the ethnic conflict in the Balkans and in the Caucasus. Nature of the conflicts; Challenge brought by the conflicts for peacemakers; Corrective factors in order to better balance the principles of territorial integrity and national self determination.