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This paper critically assesses the conceptual utility of smart power to Singapore’s evolving defence and foreign policy and behaviour. First, as a political concept adopted by the United States for its post-Afghanistan strategy, smart power does not travel easily. With qualifications, however, the notion is relevant to Singapore’s policy pragmatism and its emphasis on deterrence and diplomacy. Second, Singapore’s willingness to employ its military assets in disaster relief and peacekeeping arguably hews most closely to smart power’s mix of hard and soft approaches. Third, Singapore’s contributions to global governance, albeit limited, imply a rethinking among its leaders on the place of values in its policy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article contains a reply to a previously published paper on the use and abuse of the so-called Dutch approach to counterinsurgency. In addition to commenting on this paper, the article constitutes an argument to initiate more comparative studies in the field of military and strategic studies. Only comparative studies will help to better understand the effectiveness of military force in preventing, containing and solving violent conflicts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After 15 years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, many now see ‘small-footprint’ security force assistance (SFA) – training, advising and equipping allied militaries – as an alternative to large US ground-force commitments. Yet, its actual military efficacy has been little studied. This paper seeks to fill this gap. We find important limitations on SFA’s military utility, stemming from agency problems arising from systematic interest misalignment between the US and its typical partners. SFA’s achievable upper bound is modest and attainable only if US policy is intrusive and conditional, which it rarely is. For SFA, small footprints will usually mean small payoffs. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The build-up of Japan's military apparatus in the 1990s and 2000s has been often regarded by security analysts as indicative of a departure from the country's Cold War strategic posture. Japan appears to be engaged in a process of militarisation that is eroding the foundations of its 'exclusively defence-oriented' policy. In the case of the archipelago's naval strategy, such assessments overlook the longstanding significance of a core feature of its defence policy, namely the surveillance of maritime crossroads delivering the wealth of the country. The paper reassesses the evolution of the Japanese strategy since the Cold War by examining the development of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force's submarine force, one of the key components of the defensive shield for these crossroads. The paper argues that with the changes in the security environment of the 1990s, Japan already fielded a mature force with state-of-the-art submarines, and that the rise of a new naval competitor aiming at controlling key strategic points along Japan's sea lanes reconfirmed the critical importance of submarine operations to Japanese national security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the military doctrinal studies of the U.S. Air Service. It proposes to trace two themes suggested by military officer Edgar S. Gorrell's papers on bombardment: the structure and logic of his arguments, and the sources of Gorrell's ideas. The French sources and British air officers, including Trenchard had influenced the youthful value of Gorrell. According to the author, the impact of his views has yet to be fully correlated with the wartime origins of American strategic bombing doctrine. However, several preliminary points have already emerged from its initial survey.

China's defense economy has been vigorously developing a comprehensive set of innovation capabilities that will eventually allow it to join the world's top tier of military technological powers. China's target is to catch up by 2020. Although this maybe possible in a few select areas, the defense economy as a whole will likely require another decade or more to successfully master the ability to produce major innovations of a radical nature. This paper analyzes the key areas in the Chinese defense economy's gradual but accelerating shift from imitation to indigenous innovation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By any objective measure, defense institutions in Central and Eastern Europe have all but universally been incapable of producing viable defense plans that are based on objective costing and operational planning data. This situation exists in spite the provision of considerable Western advice and assistance, let alone reporting to and receiving assessments by NATO’s International Staff under Partnership for Peace, as well as via the integrated defense planning and reporting systems. An explanation for this systematic failure across European post-Communist defense institutions can be found in the continued slow development of an over-arching policy framework which directs and approves all activities of the armed forces, as well as the de-centralization of financial decision-making down to capability providers. The essay ends with an examination of the adverse effects of the early introduction of planning programming, budgeting system (PPBS), have had on the development of effective policy and planning capabilities within these defense institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After renouncing an offensive chemical warfare programme in 1956, the UK Cabinet Defence Committee decided in 1963 to re-acquire a chemical warfare retaliatory capability. This article describes how the re-acquisition decision was engendered by a combination of novel research findings, changes in strategic thinking, new intelligence and pressures from NATO. Despite the 1963 decision, no new chemical weapons capability was acquired by the UK and information that Britain lacked a stockpile of chemical weapons was eventually leaked to the public, initiating a fierce debate between ministries over the significance of this leak. This paper argues that non-existent technology is equally problematic for government secrecy, and equally consequential for government action, as what exists. Furthermore, actors' different interpretations of what constituted a secret, point towards a more subtle understanding of secrecy than simply construing it as the hiding or uncovering of items of information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper evaluates to what extent the improving Sino-Indian relations coincide with a mitigation of military threat perceptions. A critical review of the demilitarisation of the border, the military strategies with respect to the Indian Ocean and nuclear arms programmes, reveals that the two countries are still locked in a military security dilemma. Distrust still results in military balancing. The outcome is a complex and multi-level military balance of power that might not bring about peace but enhances stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The failed expedition of Suez in 1956 and France’s subsequent strategic ‘divorce’ from the United Kingdom and the United States lies at the heart of a policy paradigm that has dictated France’s defence posture from de Gaulle’s presidency to the end of the Cold War. Some crucial features of the Gaullist posture remain today enduring references for French presidents in the definition of France’s exceptionalism. While it is so, there have been significant changes since the 1990s when it comes to France’s strategic relations with the United States and the United Kingdom. This article demonstrates the extent and mechanisms of this rapprochement by analysing it through three dimensions of policy change: modes of action, institutional commitments and discourses. The article demonstrates the dimensions’ mutually reinforcing effects and argues that France’s exceptional posture has de facto been reversed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Understanding the development of Republic of Korea (ROK) seapower is central in exploring the evolution and nature of its security consciousness. This article aims to examine how the wider East Asian maritime sphere has influenced ROK perceptions of its own security and how such perceptions have come into conflict with the needs of maintaining its deterrent capabilities within the peninsular context. In doing so it concludes that for the ROK seapower has been an expression of wider engagement and international developing security concerns but that it is curtailed and influenced by the realities of the threat from the North. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does 'doctrine drive technology' or does 'technology drive doctrine'? For the United States with its advanced industrial and technological base, many examples of 'doctrine driving technology' can be found. For the People's Liberation Army (PLA), however, most evidence from military sources indicates that 'technology drives doctrine' or, as the Chinese say, 'technology determines tactics' (but not necessarily strategy). Within an overarching Chinese strategic framework, tactics and doctrine will be developed appropriate for (a) the weapons and technologies that are actually in the Chinese armed forces and (b) the people who must operate and maintain them. The Chinese civilian and military leadership has designated 2049 for completion of the modernization of the Chinese armed forces, a date selected in conjunction with the target for achieving China's main strategic priority, national economic modernization. Barring a major change in the strategic or domestic environment, we can expect that Beijing will continue to pursue the development of new weapons and technology in a manner consistent with the larger goal of national economic development. Exactly how China fights in the future will be dependent upon the weapons and technologies available - and they will be employed within the parameters defined by active defense and People's War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines 'Fourth Generation Warfare' (4GW), a theory of how warfare has evolved and is evolving, from the perspective of military history. The author makes three primary claims: 4GW advocates' boxing of history into 'generations' is logically and temporally inconsistent; 4GW authors misuse history by selectively choosing case studies and applying them out of context; and other arguments regarding the current and future character of warfare are more convincing. The author concludes that scholars and policymakers would be well served by considering elements of 4GW, particularly its analysis of insurgency, but that the concept should be subsumed by a broader US grand strategy that retains a strong focus on preparation for conventional warfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The story of the demise of Canada's remarkable CF-105 Arrow jet-fighter interceptor has been told and retold by numerous Canadian writers. As told by most, it is a tragic tale. Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker, in an act as unforgivable as it was incomprehensible, not only destroyed a highly promising all-Canadian state-of-the-art aircraft but ruined all hopes of Canada ever being an important player in the North American defense industry. This article offers a contrasting interpretation - locating the problems leading to the aircraft's cancellation further back in history, and in particular in serious and determinative failures in strategic thinking and analysis by senior Canadian military officials at the time of the Arrow program's birth in 1953. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

France's interventions in Mali and the wider Sahel appear to mark a new departure in French military policy in terms of the approach to multilateralism adopted, the regionalisation of the response, and the levels of violence deployed. Yet how 'new' is this approach, when set against the historical backdrop of French military interventions in Africa? Should it be seen as a modified version – an adaptation – of the new type of multilateral engagement that emerged in the wake of the 1994 Rwandan genocide? Using a historical institutionalist lens, employing the notions of critical junctures, 'layering', and 'drift', this article briefly sets out the unilateral approach that marked French military policy in Africa prior to 1994 before going on to analyse the multilateral approach and associated path-dependent practices that emerged after the Rwandan genocide. Drawing on elite interviews in Europe, the US and Africa, the article shows that, while France's engagement in the Sahel is characterised by an ostensibly novel multilateral approach, it does in fact combine new and old norms, ideas and practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A constructive and effective interaction between politicians and their military advisers is an essential element in the successful conduct of strategy. The author draws on his own experience at the political-military interface and the operational level to argue that the political-military relationship is inherently problematic and that it has become increasingly so in the twenty-first century in the United Kingdom, partly due to changes in the character of conflict, but also due to an erosion of trust between political decision-makers and their senior military advisers. The article concludes that certain approaches need to be taken to resolve these challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The world is mired in history again, as historical modes of competition return and historical grievances fuel the policies of multiple revisionist actors. If the end of history has ended, then it follows that the time is ripe for an engagement with history’s wisdom. We argue that the making of American statecraft—the deliberate, coordinated use of national power to achieve important objectives—can be significantly enhanced by a better understanding of the past. This essay, which draws on the extensive literature on history and statecraft, U.S. foreign policy, and the author’s own research and experiences, offers a defense of the use of history to improve statecraft, as well as a typology of ten distinct ways in which an understanding of history can improve government policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past decade, Western military doctrines concerned with matters of irregular warfare and counterinsurgency have emphasised the requirement for properly ‘understanding’ the social, political and cultural environments in which those militaries may operate; the so-called human and socio-political ‘terrain’. This has led to a number of advancements and initiatives designed to facilitate the way that militaries may enhance that understanding. One of those initiatives has been the emergence from within the British military of a doctrine - JDP 04 ‘Understanding’ - designed for that purpose. Using that doctrine and other subsequent publications as a template, this article will examine the utility of ‘understanding’ for those commanders seeking to match military activities with political ends. It proposes that while any advances in understanding the operating environment are to be applauded, the ‘understanding’ of greatest importance is that relating to the feasibility of the strategic objectives at hand. If those objectives lack inherent feasibility, then the development of subordinate forms of understanding, particularly in relation to the socio-political dynamics of target societies, will likely only serve to slow the process of failure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does a great power need to formulate a long-term Grand Strategy to guide its foreign policy actions? While some scholars continue to debate the competing merits of various grand strategies, a growing literature now emphasizes emergent learning and improvisation as the keys to success, as opposed to implementing a long-term design. In this article, I explore these scholarly arguments by framing the debate as one between two schools of thought, Grand Strategy and Emergent Strategy. After presenting the main arguments and the historical examples associated with each school, I evaluate the two approaches across four categories: the type of international security environment each of them is most suited for, the way each approach deals with short-term vs. long-term priorities, the domestic political conditions needed for each approach to be successful, and the type of presidential management qualities each school demands. Lastly, I discuss the implications of these arguments for the scholarship and the practice of foreign policy and national security strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 1981 Defence Review undertaken by John Nott as Secretary of State for Defence controversially and dramatically cut the capabilities of the Royal Navy’s surface fleet. Many of those involved in these decisions have emphasised the budgetary and politico-strategic drivers for these reductions in capability, and the first generation of academic analysis has broadly followed this position. However, recently released government and private archival sources demonstrate that Nott’s review was initially much more severe than thought, and that this was due as much to the presumptions and assumptions of the key decision makers as to any strategic or budgetary factors. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In this article we analyse to what degree the three functions of doctrine proposed by Harald Høiback – doctrine as a tool of operations, a tool of education, and a tool of change – have driven defence transformation in two Scandinavian states, Norway and Sweden. We conclude that doctrine, both allied and national, has had some impact on defence transformation in both countries: through the operations in Afghanistan, through education both at the branch level and joint level, and through organizational adaption to (first) the US ‘RMA paradigm’ and (later) to the subsequent ‘COIN paradigm’. However, other factors, such as threat perception and defence spending, have also played an important role. It also remains to be seen whether the changes are ephemeral or of a more permanent nature. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article argues that US military doctrine, and by extension that of most Western militaries, missed an opportunity in the period following the Cold War to rediscover the many types of military strategies employed to good effect before the industrial-age wars of the twentieth century. This missed opportunity resulted in Coalition forces having to relearn many of those strategies through costly trial and error in Iraq and Afghanistan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Secure second strike nuclear forces are frequently held to be easy to procure. Analysts have long argued that targeting intelligence against relocatable targets like submarine launched and land mobile ballistic missiles is difficult to obtain. However, the scholarly consensus on intelligence for counterforce operations is seriously overdrawn. Both during and after the Cold War, the United States developed substantial intelligence capabilities to track and target submarines and mobile missiles. These efforts achieved important and under-appreciated success. Second strike forces have been far more vulnerable than most analysts are willing to credit. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article draws upon previously unavailable document materials to question views pointing to a degree of stagnation in Japanese maritime thinking. It similarly reviews claims about trends to compensate the decline of national military power with the build-up of projection capabilities. The article’s main argument is that Japanese seapower is not declining. The Japanese Navy is evolving to combine enhanced capabilities to retain sea control in the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea with extended operational reach and flexibility, including an expeditionary component to meet alliance and diplomatic commitments in East Asia and beyond its confines. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

India has increasingly high aspirations in the Indian Ocean, as enunciated by politicians, naval figures and the wider elite. These aspirations, its strategic discourse, are of pre-eminence and leadership. India's maritime strategy for such a self-confessed diplomatic, constabulary and benign role is primarily naval-focused; a sixfold strategy of increasing its naval spending, strengthening its infrastructure, increasing its naval capabilities, active maritime diplomacy, exercising in the Indian Ocean and keeping open the choke points. Through such strategy, and soft balancing with the United States, India hopes to secure its own position against a perceived growing Chinese challenge in the Indian Ocean. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

China's nuclear deterrent relies on so-called ‘first strike uncertainty’, which means not letting the other side be confident of a completely successful disarming strike. But in order to deter, the uncertainty must be high enough. After reviewing the developmental history of China's nuclear capability and the evolution of Chinese and foreign leaders’ perceptions of China's nuclear retaliatory capability, this article identifies the criteria of nuclear deterrence for China and other countries. This research can contribute to Sino-US strategic dialogue and deepening understanding of the security consequences of nuclear proliferation. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

For six years, India has sought to implement an army doctrine for limited war, ‘Cold Start’, intended to enable a Cold War era force optimised for massive offensives to operate under the nuclear threshold. This article asks whether that is presently feasible, and answers in the negative. Doctrinal change has floundered on five sets of obstacles, many of which are politically rooted and deep-seated, thereby leaving the Army unprepared to respond to challenges in the manner envisioned by the doctrine's architects. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The mounting challenge posed by China's military modernization has highlighted the need for the United States to analyze its ability to execute a naval blockade. A blockade strategy is viable, but it would be limited to a narrow context: the United States would have to be engaged in a protracted conflict over vital interests, and it would need the support of key regional powers. The United States would also need to implement a mix between a close and distant blockade in order to avoid imperiling the conflict's strategic context. If enacted, a blockade could exact a ruinous cost on the Chinese economy and state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two big ideas have shaped recent debate about military doctrine: the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and Counterinsurgency (COIN). These ‘network centric’ and ‘population centric’ worldviews appear contradictory, but this is a false dichotomy. American forces have actively developed RMA concepts in COIN environments during recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; the exemplar par excellence is innovation by US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) in doctrine, technology, and organization for counterterrorism. Ironically, SOCOM's reimagining of the RMA managed to both improve the strengths and underscore the weaknesses of the American military's technological prowess. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

From the late 1970s and until the end of the Cold War, the 'High North' constituted a central theatre for military forces. Extensive NATO preparations were made, a solid infrastructure developed in northern Norway, and frequent and large-scale exercises were carried out. These developments, from the late 1970s, were much discussed by scholars and strategists. However, the change of perception, laying the foundation for the military build-up, had actually occurred a decade earlier, in the late 1960s. This change has not yet been given its rightful attention, partly because the relevant documents have only recently become available. This essay takes the chronology of events back into the 1960s and to NATO's secret discussions between the national Ministers of Defence and Chiefs of Staff. The most significant turning-points were the Flexible Response strategy of 1967; SACLANT's concern over increased Soviet naval activity and his 'Maritime Strategy' studies of 1965 and 1967; NATO's awakening to the Soviet SSBN threat in 1967; and the concept of 'External Reinforcement of the Flanks' of 1968 - finally followed by the 'Brosio Study' (named after the then NATO Secretary-General) of 1969. As a consequence of these developments NATO's 'tactical northern flank' was set to become an independent strategic theatre. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article uses a sequential mixed method approach to examine the origins and persistence of paramilitaries and state-sponsored militias in the developing world. Combining comparative case studies of Southeast Asia and the Middle East with statistical analysis, it shows that revolutionary decolonization produces more decentralized and localized force structures, while direct inheritance of colonial armies leads to more conventional force structures. Subsequently, the level of competition within the regional system influences whether a state can persist in the use of paramilitaries or must transition to a more centralized, conventional force. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan's defense production model is often portrayed as an exemplar of techno-nationalism, but can it serve as a model for China to follow in pursuit of technological military catch-up? Japan in the past has exploited civilian industrial strengths to create a defense production base with footholds in key technologies. However, Japan's defense production model is now displaying structural limits - constrained defense budgets, deficient procurement management, limited international collaboration - with the risks of civilian industry exiting the sector, the loss of even basic competency in military technologies, and the consequent weakening of national security autonomy. Japan's case thus offers emerging comparative lessons for China to study in what to do and not to in pursuing civilian-military integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article views China's development of anti-access capabilities against the backdrop of the theory and history of military innovation. It begins with a discussion of the process of military innovation, as well as the indicators that may appear at different stages of that process. It then discusses the barriers to recognizing new ways of war and applies that framework to China's development of advanced ballistic missiles, to include precision-guided conventional ballistic missiles and anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs). It concludes with several suggestions for how to improve the ability to recognize and understand foreign military innovation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates how key actors within the US defence policy community realigned their interests to forge a new consensus on the redirection of US defence strategy following the 'peace shock' they faced with the collapse of bipolarity. This consensus centred on the idea that achieving US security in the 'age of uncertainty' demanded overwhelming US military power, which was widely interpreted as necessitating military capabilities to fight multiple major theatre wars simultaneously against regional 'Third World' adversaries. This helped to preserve many of the principal pillars of US Cold War defence policy through deflecting calls for more radical organisational changes and deeper cuts to defence budgets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Pakistan Army elicits many concerns about terrorism, nuclear and the coherence of the state. However, very little is actually known about this institution. This article mobilizes unique data to address one important facet: the Army's geographical recruitment base. We find that the Pakistan Army has been successful at expanding the geographical recruitment base while some groups (namely those who are native to Sindh) remain highly under-represented. We also find that the officer corps is increasingly coming from urban areas. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of these important shifts subject to the limitations of our data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the late 1950s, as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) replaced bombers, the development of Soviet ICBMs prompted fears of strategic vulnerability in the West. The Eisenhower administration's decision to deploy Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) on the territory of NATO allies sought to redress the perceived vulnerability until American ICBMs were ready. British deception planners considered how to enhance the threat posed by the IRBMs. An outline plan codenamed 'Celestial' was intended to persuade the Soviets that the otherwise vulnerable missiles could not be readily neutralised. This article explores this deception and how such planning also sought to convey accurate information alongside disinformation. It also suggests that deception planners appear to have given little heed to the potentially counterproductive consequences of such an operation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese strategists believe the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) offers a 'historic opportunity' to alter the military balance with the United States. Having long downplayed the People's Liberation Army (PLA)'s capabilities and aims, China is now publicizing its capacity to inflict damage while cultivating uncertainty about its precise intentions to induce caution in adversaries. Key dimensions of China's RMA include complementary kinetic and information attacks and the substitution of 'information deterrence' for nuclear deterrence. Contrary to earlier analyses focused on a decisive surprise strike, current journal articles emphasize the need for 'serialized' information and kinetic attacks. Chinese strategists may err in three ways, however: They may underestimate US resilience; they may overestimate the PLA's ability to conduct 'warfare engineering'; and China's peacetime preparations for the RMA may incite an unexpected response. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article considers disputes the Royal Navy and Coastal Command had with Bomber Command, the Air Staff and supporters of strategic bombing over what was the 'proper' use of air power. The disputes centred on the provision of air support for the anti-submarine campaign in the Battle of the Atlantic. This article will argue that the balance was too much in favour of strategic bombing at the expense of the security of the Atlantic convoys, but that when corporate culture and grand strategy are considered, the reasoning behind such an imbalance becomes easier to comprehend. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's grand ambition is to become a world-class military industrial power by 2020, but can it succeed? A concerted restructuring of the defense industry is taking place to tackle deep-seated obstacles constraining its ability to absorb, create and diffuse technological innovation. This includes promoting competition and creativity by reducing the reach of the state and encouraging enterprises to play a leading role, developing a robust regulatory and standards regime to provide benchmarks and rules, and forging integration between the civilian and military portions of the economy through spin-ons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the first months of the Italian Campaign, partisans' activity was isolated and spasmodic, and Allied support was minimal. In fact, it took the Allies nine months to consider the Italian partisans not so much as a threat as a potential opportunity. This article seeks to explain the Allies' attitude toward the Italian partisans. Relations among the Allies, the Italian government and the partisans involved a combination of military and political problems. The Allies' weak support for Italian partisans was in fact the by-product of an overall strategic plan in which means were limited and priorities had naturally to be established in a context of world war. It also revealed their fears: the common suspicion toward irregular fighters, the growing fear of communists and the fear of possible Italian post-war demands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The debates on the pace, scope and nature of Ottoman military reform tend to be dominated by domestic and/or cultural explanations. Issues of military competition and efficiency, embodied in Neorealist perspectives, might appear to have little to offer as an explanatory tool in the Ottoman context. This article argues that this view is mistaken. First, despite their value, there remains an indeterminacy about domestic and cultural explanations that limits their usefulness as single-cause explanations. Second, Neorealism does generate valuable insights into the dynamics of military reform in the Ottoman Empire; issues of military competition and efficiency do matter in explaining the nature of Ottoman military reform during this period. Ultimately, domestic, cultural, and Neorealist perspectives are complementary, and mono-causal explanations of eighteenth century developments in the Ottoman military are likely to be too simplistic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The roots of the information technology Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) can be traced to the mid-1970s, when the West capitalized on scientific-technological developments to neutralize the threat posed by Soviet second echelons. However, the cultivation of the technological seeds of the American RMA preceded the maturation of the conceptual ones. Although it was the US that was laying the technological groundwork for the RMA, Soviet, rather than the American military theorists, were the first to argue that the new range of technological innovations constituted a fundamental discontinuity in the nature of war, which they dubbed the 'Military-Technical Revolution' (MTR). About a decade later, this fundamental Soviet approach to the transformations in military affairs was analyzed, adapted and adopted by the US, and designated the RMA. This article deals with the intellectual history of the Soviet MTR and the American RMA. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Power-transition theory and institutionalist theory offer sharply contrasting views about the implications of China's rise. Power-transition theory sees China's rise as most likely dangerous because it will pose a challenge to the international order underpinned by American power. Institutionalist theory sees China's rise presenting at least an opportunity for building cooperation, rather than intensifying conflict. The logic of these two theoretical perspectives as it pertains to China's rise is explained and their different implications for three flashpoints in East Asia (the South China Sea, Korea, and the Taiwan Strait) is set forth. These expectations are then compared with the still skimpy empirical record of the post-Cold War era. Events in the South China Sea and Korea mainly lend credence to the expectations of institutionalist theory, though the evidence is arguably inconclusive. In the Taiwan Strait, however, the evidence mainly lends credence to the expectations of power-transition theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study of military doctrine is one tool that scholars can use to understand a rising power's potential for involvement in interstate war. In its evolving joint operational doctrine, China pursues a defensive approach to securing its land borders and maintaining territorial integrity. Despite the prominence of a Taiwan conflict in China's defense planning, frontier defense remains a core mission for China's armed forces, involving almost half of the PLA's ground forces. China's force structure is consistent with a defensive doctrine for securing its borders, as light infantry units are stationed on the border itself while most maneuver units capable of offensive operations are based hundreds of kilometers away in the interior. Due to the potential for ethnic unrest in the frontiers, which places a premium on cooperation with neighboring states, China's defensive posture on the Asian continent is likely to endure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article answers three questions: What is the nature of the Long War? How is progress (or lack thereof) to be assessed? Where is it likely to go next? An appreciation of Clausewitz shows that practical centers of gravity exist for the Long War, and that the conflict pivots upon the ability to persuasively link ideology to events via a strategic narrative. A close examination of an illustrative case study, the interaction between the US and the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq 2004 - 2006, shows that Al Qaeda has suffered a severe setback, but also that the nature of the war is set to shift yet again. Further tangible progress for the US requires waging the Long War as a global counterinsurgency based on a strategy of 'selective identification' (versus pure 'disaggregation') as well as an understanding of how to more effectively craft a strategic narrative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many believe that US speed, precision, and situation awareness account for low Coalition casualties and limited damage to Iraqi infrastructure in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The details of the campaign's actual conduct, however, suggest otherwise. An analysis using evidence collected in a series of 176 interviews with a wide range of campaign participants from both sides of the conflict suggests that Iraqi weaknesses, and not just US strengths, may have been necessary preconditions for the initial campaign's low cost - a finding with very different implications for defense policy than the prevailing view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article borrows from the work of Clausewitz to posit two general approaches to the pursuit of limitation in war, one being political and the other technical. The political approach seeks to control escalation via consensual arrangements with the adversary, while the technical approach seeks to forestall escalation by peremptorily destroying the enemy's military capability. It is argued that the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA) instantiates the second, technical, approach to war limitation. By exploiting advanced technology, the US armed forces hope to limit the costs of war by defeating their adversaries in a rapid, decisive manner. The problems associated with this approach are discussed in relation to the nature of the conflicts that the US is likely to face in the foreseeable future. The article concludes by suggesting that such conflicts will require that more attention be paid to the political sources of limitation in war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The goal of this article is to provide a preliminary assessment of civil-military relations in France at the beginning of the full professionalisation of the French armed forces. Using existing data, the author laid out a basis of comparison to evaluate the future evolution of civil-military relations. Since key elements of data, particularly surveys of military personnel about the state of civil-military relations, are missing. A detailed comparison with the U.S. military policy is not always possible. However, the existing data do reveal interesting patterns, beyond a high level of global confidence in the military.

Civil-military relations has always been the heart of military sociological research. This is particularly true for democratic societies. This article, too, focuses on civil-military relations. A study was conducted which shows similarities and differences in the attitudes of the civilian and the military population on several issues. Overall, there is a broad overlap of attitudes, yet differences do exist, especially on issues of foreign policy and things military. It is argued that at the beginning of the 21st century, civil-military relations in Germany are largely uncontested, but will become more strained.