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Presents a call for papers for a special issue of the "Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior." Assembly of a set of experimental and conceptual articles that illustrate and assess efforts to relate neuroscience and behavior; Consideration of the parallels envisioned by B.F. Skinner, author of the 1938 text "The Behavior of Organisms"; Mappings between neurophysiology and behavior.

Many philosophers, psychologists, and lay folk associate volition with autonomy (actions are independent of an individual's environment) and free will (individuals originate their actions). Most behaviorists hold these views to be incompatible with behavior analyses. The present paper describes volition as interpreted by B. F. Skinner, Howard Rachlin, and Allen Neuringer. Skinner relates volition to positively reinforced operant behavior. That works because, like operants, voluntary actions are free, in the sense of not physically constrained; they affect their environments, often resulting in positive outcomes, and are sometimes unpredictable. Rachlin, while incorporating Skinnerian methods, interprets volition within his own Teleological Behaviorism framework. For Rachlin, reinforcement of an individual response is often incompatible with voluntary control, thereby disagreeing with Skinner. Responses are voluntary only when they are members of extended response patterns. Neuringer also begins with Skinner's operants, but argues that, under the control of reinforcing consequences, both voluntary actions and operant responses are sometimes predictable and other times "truly" unpredictable. Neuringer does not assume that environments determine voluntary actions, thereby disagreeing with Skinner and Rachlin. Taken together, the agreements and disagreements among these three behaviorists may help to shed light on the relationship between operants and volition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This tribute to Howard Rachlin speculates about scholarly work that might have been. It explores how behavioral data might bear on philosophical issues, with examples that might be called case studies in experimental philosophy. In 1964, an issue of the Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society served a similar function. It was entitled "Psychology: A Behavioral Interpretation"; the papers included "Will," "Experience," "Appetite," "Humors," "Anxiety," and "Man." This presentation imagines what a contemporary project devoted to philosophical and behavior analytic perspectives on the topics of causation, freedom and volition, good and evil, time, words, and mind might have looked like. Along the way it notes how the project would have benefitted from Howard Rachlin's seminal contributions to both behavior analysis and philosophy. If ever such a project comes to pass, it will inevitably bear the stamp of his contributions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Perhaps the most popular definition of psychology is the science of mind and behavior. However, the interrelation between mind and behavior is one of continuing controversy. The present paper examines this enduring issue from the perspectives of George J. Romanes, an early comparative psychologist, Edwin G. Boring, an influential experimental psychologist, and Howard Rachlin, an estimable recent behaviorist. Their respective positions shed considerable light on both the theory and practice of behavioral psychology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through his broad perspectives and curiosity, Howard Rachlin took behaviorism, added critical perspectives and behavioral economics, and contributed substantially to developing behaviorism as an approach to addressing complex human actions and engagements. This essay describes the influence of Rachlin's work in three areas that reflect this broader growth of the field: 1) teleological behaviorism as a response to essentialist thinking about behavior, typified by Ryle's category mistake and including concepts in psychopathology; 2) self‐control as choices among rewards differing by amount and delay and the application of this model to clinical and preventive interventions; and 3) behavioral economic modeling of social support as a commodity substitutable for other commodities of interest such as nicotine. These and the body of Rachlin's work suggest a view not only of interdependencies among behaviors, patterns of behavior, and their consequences, but more broadly, of interdependencies among different settings and their effects on behavior, leading to a behaviorism of systems and contexts. Replacing essentialist discourse of individuals, individual behaviors, and discrete influences, a world view or Weltanschauung emerges of diffuse interdependencies across patterns, individuals, settings, systems, probabilities, and consequences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the research on "Translating Behavioral Science into Action". It also states the ways in which behavioral sciences addresses basic behavioral processes of human bbehavior Topics discussed includes drug use, maladaptive escape behavior, mental illness, social interaction and self-eefficacy

When Herrnstein put two levers in the box (or rather two buttons since he was studying the pecking of pigeons rather than the lever-pressing of rats) and began to formulate the matching law, he knew very well that he was following the path of Tolman. "You can be a behaviorist and still talk about the mind - as long as you don't put it into a person's head": An interview with Howard Rachlin1 Dr. Howard Rachlin was Distinguished Research Professor of Psychology at Stony Brook University. We took this term from Tolman (although our position was much more Skinnerian than Tolmanian) because it was deviating from Skinner in the direction of Tolman. [Extracted from the article]

Behavior Theory and Philosophy, masterfully edited by Lattal and Chase, is a collection of 21 papers by major behaviorists, presented and discussed at a conference on the intersection of philosophy and behavior analysis held at West Virginia University in 2000. The chapters in Part I are devoted to philosophy of science (causality, constructs, theory, explanation, reductionism) and the relations among behavior analysis and several contemporary philosophical movements (humanism, empiricism, pragmatism, selectionism, analytic philosophy). Part II examines behavior-analytic interpretations of mentalistic concepts (intention, imagination, ethics, cognition). Part III presents extensions and applications of basic research in behavior analysis (verbal behavior, creativity, development, education, disability, and corporate culture). The publication of this book signals that behaviorism has developed mature philosophical foundations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The golden anniversary of Science and Human Behavior is cause for celebration. Toward that end, the present paper is largely an historical consideration of the book, its inception and reception, both at the time of its publication and in subsequent years. The range and intensity of reactions to S&HB mark its impact and show it to be among Skinner's most important works, if not the most important. S&HB was written as an introductory psychology text—a vigorous use of the book in our teaching could do much to benefit the dissemination of behavior analysis. Key words: Science and Human Behavior; B. E Skinner; history; teaching. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Defends behaviorists' viewpoints regarding the inclusion of neuroscientific research in their study of behavior. Answers to various criticisms in a previous paper; Ability of behaviorists to entertain criticisms as a positive factor; Inclusion of brain function in conceptual schemes; Analysis of behavior-analytic philosophy; Idea of the internal state.

Reacts to J.E.R. Staddon's views as expressed in a paper published in the `Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior' dated September, 1993. Discussion of environment-based theorizing; Distinction between independent variables and state variables; Behavior-analytic environmentalism.

Criticizes J.E.R. Staddon's views as expressed in a paper published in the `Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior' dated September 1993. Staddon's misinterpretation of Charles Darwin; Misconstruction of organism-based accounts; Non-identification of major sources of current problems in behavior analysis.

Reacts to J.E.R. Staddon's views expressed in a paper published in the `Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior' dated September 1993. Staddon as confusing logical and empirical issues with philosophical topics; Definition of environmental as used within behavior analysis; Distinguishing environmental from nonenvironmental theories.

In the context of evolutionary theory, behavior is the interaction between the organism and its environment. Two implications follow: (a) behavior takes time; and (b) behavior is defined by its function. That behavior takes time implies that behavioral units are temporally extended patterns or activities. An activity functions as an integrated whole composed of parts that are themselves smaller‐scale activities. That behavior is defined by its function implies that behavior functions to change the environment in ways that promote reproductive success. Phylogenetically important events (PIEs) are enhanced or mitigated by activities they induce as a result of natural selection. Induction explains all the phenomena that have traditionally been explained by reinforcement. This multiscale view replaces discrete responses and contiguity with multiscale activities and covariance. A PIE induces operant activity as a result of covariance in the form of a feedback relation between the activity and the PIE. A signal (conditional inducer) induces PIE‐induced activities as a result of covariance between the PIE and the signal. In an ontological perspective, behavior is a process, and an activity is a process individual. For example, ontological considerations clarify the status of delay and probability discounting. A true natural science of behavior is possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Organisms that behave so as to forfeit a relatively higher overall rate of reinforcement in favor of a relatively lower rate are said to engage in suboptimal choice. Suboptimal choice has been linked with maladaptive behavior in humans. Melioration theory offers one explanatory framework for suboptimal choice. Melioration theory suggests behavior is controlled by differences in local reinforcer rates between alternatives. Vaughan (1981) arranged two experimental conditions in which maximizing the overall rate of reinforcement required behavior that was compatible, or incompatible, with melioration. Vaughan found pigeons allocated more time to a locally richer alternative even when doing so resulted in suboptimal choice. However, Vaughan did not show whether these effects could systematically reverse and did not provide within-session data to show that choice across short time spans remains under the control of differences in local reinforcer rates. The present study used pigeons to replicate and extend Vaughan's findings. We investigated shifts in overall- and within-session choice across repeated conditions, according to arranged local contingencies. Behavior systematically followed changes in local contingencies for most pigeons. Within-session data suggests that, providing differences in local reinforcer rates are discriminated, pigeons will allocate more time to a locally richer alternative, even if this leads to suboptimal choice. These findings facilitate the more confident use of similar procedures that investigate how melioration contributes to suboptimal choice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question whether talking to yourself is thinking is considered from two viewpoints: radical behaviorism and teleological behaviorism. For radical behaviorism, following Skinner (1945), mental events such as ‘thinking’ may be explained in terms of private behavior occurring within the body, ordinarily unobservable by other people; thus, radical behaviorism may identify talking to yourself with thinking. However, to be consistent with its basic principles, radical behaviorism must hold that private behavior, hence thinking, is identical with covert muscular, speech movements (rather than proprioception of those movements). For teleological behaviorism, following Skinner (1938), all mental terms, including ‘thinking,’ stand for abstract, temporally extended patterns of overt behavior. Thus, for teleological behaviorism, talking to yourself, covert by definition, cannot be thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of emitted behavior was formulated as a part of the original argument for the validity of a new kind of learning called operant conditioning. The rationale for operant conditioning contrasted it with Pavlovian or classical conditioning, which was (and remains) fundamentally based on responses to conditioned and unconditioned stimuli. Classical conditioned responses were said to be elicited. In contrast, operant behavior was viewed as emitted and controlled primarily by response consequences rather than antecedents. I argue that the distinction between emitted and elicited behavior is no longer warranted for three major reasons. First, the distinction was based on a view of Pavlovian conditioning that is no longer viable. Second, the distinction is incompatible with both empirical data and contemporary conceptualizations of operant behavior. Third, the only way to overcome these problems is to define emitted and elicited in terms of the type of conditioning (operant and classical) that produces these behaviors, but that approach makes the definitions circular and does not avoid implications of the terms that are misleading and counterproductive in light of contemporary research and thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

McDowell's evolutionary theory of behavior dynamics (McDowell, 2004) instantiates populations of behaviors (abstractly represented by integers) that evolve under the selection pressure of the environment in the form of positive reinforcement. Each generation gives rise to the next via low-level Darwinian processes of selection, recombination, and mutation. The emergent patterns can be analyzed and compared to those produced by biological organisms. The purpose of this project was to explore the effects of high mutation rates on behavioral variability in environments that arranged different reinforcer rates and magnitudes. Behavioral variability increased with the rate of mutation. High reinforcer rates and magnitudes reduced these effects; low reinforcer rates and magnitudes augmented them. These results are in agreement with live-organism research on behavioral variability. Various combinations of mutation rates, reinforcer rates, and reinforcer magnitudes produced similar high-level outcomes (equifinality). These findings suggest that the independent variables that describe an experimental condition interact; that is, they do not influence behavior independently. These conclusions have implications for the interpretation of high levels of variability, mathematical undermatching, and the matching theory. The last part of the discussion centers on a potential biological counterpart for the rate of mutation, namely spontaneous fluctuations in the brain's default mode network. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A complex system is one that generates emergent structures, usually by the repeated application of relatively simple rules. The structures are emergent in the sense that they are not specified in, and cannot be predicted from, the rules that produce them. Mitchell argues for a unified science of complexity but does not ultimately succeed in providing a coherent account. Her book is nevertheless useful as an introduction to some systems and algorithms that have been studied in complexity research and that may be applicable to natural phenomena, including the behavior of organisms. The book also contains interesting historical and biographical details about complexity research and some of the mathematicians and scientists who have contributed to it. A sample of the specific complex systems and algorithms Mitchell introduces is examined in this review, including iterated maps, cellular automata, genetic algorithms, and small world and random Boolean networks. The relevance of complexity theory for behavior analysis is also considered, including applications of simple rules, networks, cellular automata, and genetic algorithms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The acquisition of lever pressing by rats was studied under intermittent immediate and delayed conditioned reinforcement. Rats were exposed to two schedules operating concomitantly. One was a random-time schedule that delivered reinforcers on average of once per min. Each such reinforcer was paired with a 1-s illumination of a cue light located above the lever. The other was a tandem random-interval (RI) t1- s fixed-time (FT) t2- s schedule that controlled the rate and the delay of the illumination of the cue-light after a given lever press. For the RI, t1 was 7.5, 15 or 30 s. For the FT, t2 was 0, 1, 2, 4, 8, 16 or 32 s. Three rats each were exposed to each combination of RI and FT values for 40 sessions. Response rates decreased with longer response-conditioned reinforcer (Sr) delays under the three different overall rates of Sr. At most response-Sr delays, absolute response rates were higher with RI 15 s than with RI 30 s but both were similar to those obtained with RI 7.5 s. The results were similar to those from previous research on response acquisition with delayed primary reinforcement. These findings suggest that a previously neutral stimulus that has been correlated with primary reinforcement can reinforce new responses even when the conditioned reinforcer is intermittent and delayed from the responses that produce it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We have adapted a nonhuman primate model of cocaine versus food choice to the rat species. To evaluate the procedure, we tested cocaine versus food choice under a variety of environmental manipulations as well as pharmacological pretreatments. Complete cocaine-choice dose-effect curves (0-1.0 mg/kg/infusion) were obtained for each condition under concurrent fixed ratio schedules of reinforcement. Percentage of responding emitted on the cocaine-reinforced lever was not affected significantly by removal of cocaine-associated visual or auditory cues, but it was decreased after removal of response-contingent or response-independent cocaine infusions. Cocaine choice was sensitive to the magnitude and fixed ratio requirement of both the cocaine and food reinforcers. We also tested the effects of acute (0.32, 0.56, 1.0, 1.8 mg/kg) and chronic (0.1, 0.32 mg/kg/hr) d-amphetamine treatment on cocaine choice. Acute and chronic d-amphetamine had opposite effects, with acute increasing and chronic decreasing cocaine choice, similar to observations in humans and in nonhuman primates. The results suggest feasibility and utility of the choice procedure in rats and support its comparability to similar procedures used in humans and monkeys. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Psychological models of temporal discounting have now successfully displaced classical economic theory due to the simple fact that many common behavior patterns, such as impulsivity, were unexplainable with classic models. However, the now dominant hyperbolic model of discounting is itself becoming increasingly strained. Numerous factors have arisen that alter discount rates with no means to incorporate the different influences into standard hyperbolic models. Furthermore, disparate literatures are emerging that propose theoretical constructs that are seemingly independent of hyperbolic discounting. We argue that, although hyperbolic discounting provides an eminently useful quantitative measure of discounting, it fails as a descriptive psychological model of the cognitive processes that produce intertemporal preferences. Instead, we propose that recent contributions from cognitive neuroscience indicate a path for developing a general model of time discounting. New data suggest a means by which neuroscience-based theory may both integrate the diverse empirical data on time preferences and merge seemingly disparate theoretical models that impinge on time preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Lists papers presented at the New Zealand Operant Symposium, 1992, held by the Animal Behaviour Welfare and Research Centre and the Universiity of Waikato from August 28 to 29. `Educated guessing in the pigeon?' by Alsop, B. and Rowley, R.; `Teaching spelling: The elimination of selective stimulus control,' by Birnie, B. and Guerin, B.; `Timing,' by Bizo, L. and White, G.; More.