Search

The paper surveys the last 30 years of Hungarian academic psychology. Around 1989-1990, the time of the great social changes Hungarian psychology was rather Westernized, but still a relatively small scientific field and applied profession. The opening and liberalization of politics made psychology in Hungary a booming profession and a rich research field. Education of psychologists was spreading, and becoming more Westernized in textbook usage and reading materials. Entrance numbers at two universities with 80 students were replaced by 2010 by 6 university programs and about 8000 incoming students. The training system is a Bologna type BA + MA + PhD system, The educational booming has its own problems. As all university subjects, psychology training is also underfinanced, with high teaching loads and a move by university management towards applied areas, neglecting basic research. The research activity is characterized by a fivefold increase of English language publications coming from Hungary over a 20 years period. University research was strengthened, and competitive grant systems were introduced, whth good success aretes by psychologists. Here again, managerial thinking questions many aspects of basic research and liberalized science management. These factors are peculiar to psychology, but they do have an impact on it. The paper gives some details about one chapter of academic psychology, cognitive psychology. Institutionally, support by the Soros foundation in the 90s for the university cognitive programs had as one consequence that three departments of cognition are active in Budapest today. Another aspect of insitutional development was the series of multidisciplinary conferences in Hungary (MAKOG), and Hungarian involvement in international graduate training programs in cognitive science. The most successful cognitive group, at Central European University (5 ERC grants, publications in leading journals) is recently chased out of Hungary by anti-Western and antiliberal legal moves. This would certainly have a detrimental effect on Hungarian cognitive psychology for quite a time.

In the 19th and early 20th century, epilepsy was one of the most investigated disorders in forensic psychiatry and psychology. The possible subsidiary symptoms of epilepsy (such as temporal confusion, alterations of consciousness, or increased aggression) played pivotal roles in early forensic and criminal psychological theories that aimed to underscore the problematic medical, social and legal status of epileptic criminals. These criminals were considered extremely violent and capable of committing sudden, brutal acts. Although the theory of "epileptic criminality" was refuted due to 20th-century developments in medicine, forensic psychiatry, and criminal psychology, some suppositions related to the concept of epileptic personality have lingered. This paper explores the lasting influence of the theory of epileptic personality by examining the evolution of the theories of epileptic criminality both in the international and the Hungarian context. Specifically, it calls attention to the twentieth-century revival of the theory of epileptic personality in the works of Leopold Szondi, István Benedek and Norman Geschwind. The paper shows that the issue of epileptic personality still lingers in neuropsychology. In doing so, biological reductionist trends in medical-psychological thinking are traced, and attention is drawn to questions that arise due to changing cultural and medical representations.

This paper critically scrutinizes accounts of Robert Owen’s life and works focusing on his purported “utopianism” and his supposedly deficient “socialism.” It suggests that such positions have relied on questionable assertions about the potential of particular modes of social transformation, and a failure to acknowledge the distinction Owen makes between the practical arrangements necessary to begin the process of transformation, and those arrangements that would ultimately prevail in “the new moral world.” It also argues that such accounts may contribute to the development of fatalistic narratives surrounding cooperative values and projects involving strategic compromise. In response, the paper reconsiders the significance of Owen through the lens of a “strategic presentism” that considers how Owen’s ideas can be thought of as significant contributions to theorizing social transformation.

The utility of the dog as a mine detector has divided the mine clearance community since dogs were first used for this purpose during the Second World War. This paper adopts a historical perspective to investigate how, why, and to what consequence, the use of minedogs remains contested despite decades of research into their abilities. It explores the changing factors that have made it possible to think that dogs could, or could not, serve as reliable detectors of landmines over time. Beginning with an analysis of the wartime context that shaped the creation of minedogs, the paper then examines two contemporaneous investigations undertaken in the 1950s. The first, a British investigation pursued by the anatomist Solly Zuckerman, concluded that dogs could never be the mine hunter's best friend. The second, an American study led by the parapsychologist J. B. Rhine, suggested dogs were potentially useful for mine clearance. Drawing on literature from science studies and the emerging subdiscipline of "animal studies," it is argued that cross-species intersubjectivity played a significant role in determining these different positions. The conceptual landscapes of Zuckerman and Rhine's disciplinary backgrounds are shown to have produced distinct approaches to managing cross-species relations, thus explaining how diverse opinions on minedog can coexist. In conclusion, it is shown that the way one structures relationships between humans and animals has profound impact on the knowledge and labor subsequently produced, a process that cannot be separated from ethical consequence.

This paper discusses the development of mathematical psychology, decision theory, and behavioral decision research at the University of Michigan in the 1950s and 1960s. It focuses on the question how to understand the connection to economics these three psychological programs considered, and provides a background for understanding subsequent developments of Kahneman and Tversky’s work in the 1970s, and the following rise of behavioral economics from the 1980s onwards. I define the historical and organizational characteristics of the University of Michigan and its department of psychology and explain why the Institute of Social Research (ISR) is remarkably absent in the history discussed in this paper. Subsequently, I describe the background and development of mathematical psychology and show that it employed a two-faced understanding of psychology as using the human being as measurement instrument to measure human decision behavior. After this, I discuss the background and development of decision theory and behavioral decision research, which employed the same understanding of psychology and were hence closely related to mathematical psychology. I finish by reviewing the close connection between measurement theory and behavioral and decision theories in these psychological programs, and conclude that their frequent references to economics should and should not understood as a close relation to the economic discipline.

The current paper critically assesses and reflects on the ideals and realities of two major (British) child migration schemes, namely the British Home Child scheme (1869-1930) and the Kindertransport scheme (1938-1940), to add to current understandings of their place within wider international histories of child migration, moral reforms, eugenics, settlement, and identity. Specifically, we focus on constructions of "mentally and physically deficient" children/young people, informed by eugenic viewpoints and biological determinism, and how this guided inclusion and exclusion decisions in both schemes. Both schemes made judgements regarding which children should be included/excluded in the schemes or returned to their country of origin (as was the case with children in the Canadian child migration scheme) fueled by a type of eugenics oriented to transplanting strong physical and psychologically resilient specimens. By viewing the realities of the child migration schemes, including the varied experiences and narratives in relation to child migrants, in light of eugenicist narratives of difference, pathology, victimhood, and contamination, we shed a light on uneven practices, formations of power, and expectations of the times.

As queer history is often hidden, historians must look for "signs" that hint at queer lives and experiences. When psychologists use projective tests, the search for queer signs has historically been more literal, and this was especially true in the homophobic practices of Psychology in the mid-twentieth century. In this paper, I respond to Elizabeth Scarborough's call for more analytic history about the lesser known women in Psychology's history. By focusing on British projective research conducted by lesbian psychologist June Hopkins, I shift perspective and consider, not those who were tested (which has been historically more common), but those who did the testing, and position them as potential queer subjects. After briefly outlining why the projective test movement is ripe for such analysis and the kinds of queer signs that were identified using the Rorschach ink blot test in the mid-twentieth century, I then present June Hopkins' (1969, 1970) research on the "lesbian personality." This work forms a framework upon which I then consider the lives of Margaret Lowenfeld, Ann Kaldegg, and Effie Lillian Hutton, all of whom were involved in the British projective test movement a generation prior to Hopkins. By adopting Hopkins' research to frame their lives, I present the possibility of this ambiguous history being distinctly queer.

This paper challenges the historiographical discontinuity established between earlier "anthropometric testing" and the arrival of "psychological testing" with Binet and Simon's intelligence test in 1905. After some conceptual clarifications, it deals with "word association": a kind of psychological experimentation and testing which became popular over the last two decades of the 19th century. First Galton's exploration are presented, followed by experiments performed at the Leipzig laboratory by Trautscholdt, and then Cattell and Bryant's collective testing. Additionally, I document the use of this method for the study of mental difference through the works of Munsterberg, Bourdon, Jastrow, Nevers and Calkins. The cases I present show how the method gave rise to various measurements and classifications. I conclude that the word association technique triggered reflection on mental "uniqueness", gender traits and the influence of education, among other topics. Moreover, it prepared the terrain and anticipated some basic attractions and problems intelligence testing would later encounter.

This paper proposes a new approach to the study of sociological classics. This approach is pragmatic in character. It draws upon the social pragmatism of G. H. Mead and the sociology of texts of D. F. McKenzie. Our object of study is Norbert Elias's On the Process of Civilization. The pragmatic genealogy of this book reveals the importance of taking materiality seriously. By documenting the successive entanglements between human agency and nonhuman factors, we discuss the origins of the book in the 1930s, how it was forgotten for 30 years, and how in the mid-1970s it became a sociological classic. We explain canonization as a matter of fusion between book's material form and its content, in the context of the paperback revolution of the 1960s, the events of May 1968, and the demise of Parsons' structural functionalism, and how this provided Elias with an opportunity to advance his model of sociology.

The use of animals as experimental organisms has been critical to the development of addiction research from the nineteenth century. They have been used as a means of generating reliable data regarding the processes of addiction that was not available from the study of human subjects. Their use, however, has been far from straightforward. Through focusing on the study of alcoholism, where the nonhuman animal proved a most reluctant collaborator, this paper will analyze the ways in which scientists attempted to deal with its determined sobriety and account for their consistent failure to replicate the volitional consumption of ethanol to the point of physical dependency. In doing so, we will see how the animal model not only served as a means of interrogating a complex pathology, but also came to embody competing definitions of alcoholism as a disease process, and alternative visions for the very structure and purpose of a research field.

Bayesian rationality is the paradigm of rational behavior in neoclassical economics. An economic agent is deemed rational when she maximizes her subjective expected utility and consistently revises her beliefs according to Bayes's rule. The paper raises the question of how, when and why this characterization of rationality came to be endorsed by mainstream economists. Though no definitive answer is provided, it is argued that the question is of great historiographic importance. The story begins with Abraham Wald's behaviorist approach to statistics and culminates with Leonard J. Savage's elaboration of subjective expected utility theory in his 1954 classic The Foundations of Statistics. The latter's acknowledged fiasco to achieve a reinterpretation of traditional inference techniques along subjectivist and behaviorist lines raises the puzzle of how a failed project in statistics could turn into such a big success in economics. Possible answers call into play the emphasis on consistency requirements in neoclassical theory and the impact of the postwar transformation of U.S. business schools.

This paper explores the attempt of social scientists associated with Unesco to create a system of knowledge production to provide the international perspective necessary for democratic governance of a world community. Social scientists constructed a federal system of international associations that institutionalized American disciplines on an international scale. An international perspective emerged through the process of interdisciplinary international research. I call this ideal of coordinating multiple subjectivities to produce objectivity the “view from everywhere.” Influenced by social psychological “action-research,” collaborative research was group therapy. The attempt to operationalize internationalists’ rallying slogan, “unity in diversity,” illuminated tensions inherent in the mobilization of science for social and political reform. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

In the 1930s, some psychologists began to study and discuss the normal and pathological mental abilities of old age. This paper explores this research and its implications for an emerging definition of old age in the 1930s and 1940s. The argument is that these psychologists explained old age in terms of tests they had performed on children and young adults. In addition, these professionals projected their culturally bound assumptions onto their study of old age. In the process, psychologists helped to define old age as a problem that required a professional solution.

Starting out as a newsletter for radical psychologists, the Dutch journal Psychologie & Maatschappij (Psychology & Society) moved in the past decade toward the theoretical mainstream within psychology. In this paper, the major changes in the journal are described and analyzed, as well as the features that did not change: an emphasis on theory and history, an interdisciplinary approach, and an emphasis on discussion. The main transformations were from psychology as instrumental toward the goals of the progressive movement in the Netherlands, then to extreme criticism of all scientific and professional psychological activities, and finally to adherence to the most advanced approaches within academic psychology. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

The increasing prevalence of attention-deficit disorder among American school children was a source of significant controversy in the 1990s. This paper looks at the social and historical contexts in which ADD evolved in order to understand its emergence as a coherent and widespread entity. Changes in expert models of child behavior interacted with the formation of new identities around disability to shape a milieu in which the disorder could thrive. The pattern of affect control, of what must and what must not be restrained, regulated, and transformed, is certainly not the same in this stage as in the preceding one of court aristocracy. In keeping with its different interdependencies, bourgeois society applies stronger restrictions to certain impulses, while in the case of others aristocratic restrictions are simply continued and transformed to suit the changed situation (Elias, 1994, p. 125). © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

A full account of the social production of knowledge requires an understanding of how schools of thought fail, as well as succeed. This paper offers a sociology of knowledge analysis of the collapse of neo-Freudianism as a separate school of psychoanalysis and influential intellectual current. While the existing literature stresses personal conflicts between Karen Horney, Erich Fromm and Harry Stack Sullivan as a major cause of the failure of cultural psychoanalysis, my analysis highlights the sect-like nature of Freudian institutes, the professionalizing dynamics of American psychoanalysis, the contribution of the celebrity-dominated book market and culture, and the highly controversial nature of Erich Fromm's writings and intellectual activity. Neo-Freudianism is conceptualized as a hybrid system that is a combination of a literary phenomena, intellectual movement, faction of a sect, theoretical innovation and therapy. This analysis of hybrid intellectual systems raises larger sociology of knowledge questions about schools of thought and intellectual movements. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Around the end of the 1920s, Vygotsky introduced his integrative framework for psycho-logical research to the Soviet Union. This framework was not abandoned and forgotten until its rediscovery in Russia and America in the 1950s, as some claim. In fact, even after his untimely death in 1934, Vygotsky remained the spiritual leader of a group of his for-mer students and collaborators, who became known as the Kharkov School. This paper reconstructs the early intellectual history of Vygotskian psychology, as it emerged, around the time of Vygotsky's death, in the research program of the Kharkov School.