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This paper reconsiders the work of the Scottish biologist, sociologist, and town planner Patrick Geddes and his most famous intellectual disciple: the American independent scholar Lewis Mumford. It is argued that existing interpretations of their work, ranging from a dismissal of the two men as eccentric polymaths to the speculative emphasis on the importance of psychological theories in Mumford's oeuvre, are fundamentally flawed. Examining their writings and the letters they exchanged during their 17-year correspondence, this paper shows that the only way we can appreciate the scholarly conventions underpinning Geddes's and Mumford's work, as well as the context in which it was produced, is by looking to the principles of classical sociological theory. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper looks at the program for social psychology presented by Floyd Allport in his Social Psychology of 1924. It contextualizes Allport's program in terms of intellectual currents of the time and the views of his teachers at Harvard University, specifically the philosopher Ralph Barton Perry and the psychologists Edwin B. Holt and Hugo Münsterberg. Finally, the paper analyzes responses to Allport's program at the time and later, retrospective responses. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the disciplinary status of social psychology through an analysis of the history of the boundary relations of psychology, sociology, and social psychology. After outlining some research on the nature of scientific disciplines, on the role of rhetoric in the constitution of disciplines, and on “boundary work,” I consider the singular importance of social psychology as a discipline for the analysis of boundary relations, examining its units of analysis and its “disciplining.” The boundaries of the disciplines of social psychology were seen as fluid, contingent, local, and contestable, reflecting the thematic preoccupations, disciplinary origins, and meta-theoretical commitments of social psychologists, of the parent disciplines, and of those who represent disciplinary practices. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An increase in interest for German scientific psychology followed the rise of liberalism in late nineteenth-century Spain. This paper deals with Spanish scholars' endeavors to participate in German psychology: It outlines the intellectual and institutional background of Spanish preoccupation with German philosophy and psychology, and deals with the personal experience and testimony of two Spanish philosophers, Eloy Luis André and Juan Vicente Viqueira López, who traveled to Leipzig, Berlin, and Göttingen between 1909 and 1914 to gain firsthand experience in the nascent science of psychology in Germany at that time. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates three conflicting reconstructions of the historical relationship between personality and social psychology and addresses questions they raise regarding the subdisciplinary status of personality in the 1920s and the way in which the field gradually emerged as a separate area of psychology. Contesting claims that Floyd Allport first connected social psychology to a separate “branch” of personality psychology in the 1920s, I argue that he drew upon earlier work of psychologists and sociologists who treated personality as a central topic of social psychology. I compare Floyd Allport's views with those of Gordon Allport, who endeavored to establish personality as a separate subdiscipline. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reports developments related to behavioral science as of October 1993. Calls for papers announced by the American Association for the History of Medicine for the 1994 Annual Meeting; Venue of the World Congress of Sociology; Schedule of the meeting of the Society for the History of Alchemy and Chemistry.

Presents updates on several organizations related to behavioral sciences as of June 2000. Information on the September 2000 issue of the "Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences"; Organization of the Franz Brentano Society at the University of Würzburg; Information on the Leo P. Chall Dissertation Fellowship in the History of Sociology.

Comments on a symposium on the history of behavioral and social sciences arranged by the Program Committee of the International Society for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. Remarks on the issues addressed by the symposium panelists; Focus of the symposium on the growth of scholarship in the behavioral and social science field; Role of intellectual history in behavioral and social sciences.

In the drive to establish a naturalistic psychology in France, anthropological assumptions about a hierarchy of physically determined racial groups with inherent psychological characteristics and about the nearly insurmountable retardation of primitive cultures permeated the work of the founder of French empirical psychology, Théodule Ribot. Assumptions about the correlation of brain mass and head size with intelligence affected Alfred Binet. The rise of sociology and challenges to existing theories of inheritance led Ribot to surrender fitfully some hereditarian assumptions. Binet's experimental caution and contemporary critiques of anthropometry tempered, but did not fully extinguish, his enthusiasm for psychophysical correlations. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A textual analysis of post–World War II social psychology methodology manuals and handbook chapters on “methods” indicates that the introduction of the experimental method was enforced and gradually strengthened through the use of scientific rhetoric and the minimization of alternative research strategies. As a consequence, by the 1960s experimentation had become such an established identifying feature of psychological social psychology that the acceptability of ideas in the field came to depend largely on the ability of authors to couch them in the language of the experiment. Text writers continually shored up the defenses of scientific legitimacy and denigrated all other types of argument. We explore three sources of tension or strains evident as contradictions in these texts: (1) between a rational experimenter's carefully following prescribed, logic-generated scientific practices and the investigator's artfully or intuitively designing research; (2) between social psychologists' missionary activities of proselytizing the experiment as the primary research method and social psychologists' apologies and insecurities expressed about using experiments; and (3) between the treatment of participants as docile and submissive versus portraying them as underhanded and damaging to the outcome of the research. In addition, we briefly reexamine the strain (4) between sober scientific experimentation and a playful “fun and games” approach to experimentation (Lubek & Stam, 1995). © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In successive editions of the Handbook of Social Psychology (Lindzey, 1954), the focus of the history of the field shifted from the substantive ideas of nineteenth-century thinkers to the successful emergence of a psychological experimental social psychology in the twentieth. Countering this whiggish account, the dominant themes in the present issue involve attempts to portray two parallel paradigm shifts: from a “social” to an “asocial” social psychology, and from a broad-ranging theoretical-philosophical subject to a narrow experimental (psychological) science—changes initiated by Floyd Allport. But such a formulation may be called into question as another version of retrospective history—with inverted, anti-Whig valuations. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Weber dealt—in contrast to the textbook image of his method—with rational and nonempathetic explanatory interpretation. His ideal-type for social action emerged in a very formative period, as a mediation between history and theory and can be characterized as releasing what was inherent in a historicist tradition in crisis. Theoretical elements from Austrian marginalism provided Weber with the prototype for developing contrafactual schemes into ideal-types. Weber as a scholar at the crossroads resolved the problem of uncontrolled value-intrusion in a way that provided rational evidence and limited objectivity, in the form of instrumental means–end analysis. His methodology was coherent over time but gradually emerged when contemporary polemics called for his voice to be heard. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]