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The use of animals as experimental organisms has been critical to the development of addiction research from the nineteenth century. They have been used as a means of generating reliable data regarding the processes of addiction that was not available from the study of human subjects. Their use, however, has been far from straightforward. Through focusing on the study of alcoholism, where the nonhuman animal proved a most reluctant collaborator, this paper will analyze the ways in which scientists attempted to deal with its determined sobriety and account for their consistent failure to replicate the volitional consumption of ethanol to the point of physical dependency. In doing so, we will see how the animal model not only served as a means of interrogating a complex pathology, but also came to embody competing definitions of alcoholism as a disease process, and alternative visions for the very structure and purpose of a research field.

Eleanor Gibson and Richard Walk's famous visual cliff experiment is one of psychology's classic studies, included in most introductory textbooks. Yet the famous version which centers on babies is actually a simplification, the result of disciplinary myth-making. In fact the visual cliff's first subjects were rats, and a wide range of animals were tested on the cliff, including chicks, turtles, lambs, kid goats, pigs, kittens, dogs, and monkeys. The visual cliff experiment was more accurately a series of experiments, employing varying methods and a changing apparatus, modified to test different species. This paper focuses on the initial, nonhuman subjects of the visual cliff, resituating the study in its original experimental logic, connecting it to the history of comparative psychology, Gibson's interest in comparative psychology, as well as gender-based discrimination. Recovering the visual cliff's forgotten menagerie helps to counter the romanticization of experimentation by focusing on the role of extrascientific factors, chance, complexity, and uncertainty in the experimental process.

Magda Arnold (1903-2002), best known for her pioneering appraisal theory of emotion, belonged to the second generation of women in psychology who frequently experienced institutional sexism and career barriers. Following her religious conversion, Arnold had to contend with the additional challenge of being an openly Catholic woman in psychology at a time when Catholic academics were stigmatized. This paper announces the discovery of and relies upon a number of previously unknown primary sources on Magda Arnold, including approximately 150 letters exchanged by Arnold and Father John Gasson. This correspondence illuminates both the development of Arnold's thought and her navigation of the career challenges posed by her conversion. I argue that Gasson's emotional and intellectual support be considered as resources that helped Arnold succeed despite the discrimination she experienced. Given the romantic content of the correspondence, I also consider Arnold and Gasson in the context of other academic couples in psychology in this period and argue that religious belief ought to be further explored as a potential contributor to the resilience of women in psychology's history.

The first sample surveys in the latter parts of the 19th century were an intellectual social movement. They were motivated by the intention to improve the economic and political conditions of workers. The quantitative survey was considered an ideal because it would present data about the workers as facts, i.e. establish a scientific authoritative truth. In a case study from Denmark, the paper shows how the first survey - a study of seamstresses - was carried out by bringing several cognitive and organizational elements together: a network of researchers, a method for sampling, the construction of a questionnaire, a procedure for coding, and analyzing the data. It was a trial and error process where the researchers lacked relevant concepts and methods but relied on their intuition and on inspiration from abroad.

After its foundation, the Laboratory for Experimental Psychology at Leipzig University became an international center for psychological research, attracting students from all over the world. The Russian physiologist and psychiatrist Vladimir Bekhterev (1857-1927) was one of Wilhelm Wundt's students in 1885, and after returning to Russia he continued enthusiastically his experimental research on mental phenomena. However, he gradually distanced himself from Wundt's psychological project and developed a new concept of psychology: the so-called Objective Psychology or Psychoreflexology. The goal of this paper is to analyze Bekhterev's position in relation to Wundt's experimental psychology, by showing how the former came to reject the latter's conception of psychology. The results indicate that Bekhterev's development of a philosophical program, including his growing interest in establishing a new Weltanschauung is the main reason behind his divergence with Wundt, which is reflected in his conception of scientific psychology. Despite this, Wundt remained alive in Bekhterev's mind as an ideal counterpoint.

This essay provides a fresh account of the break between Oswald Külpe and his master Wilhelm Wundt. Kurt Danziger's reconstruction of the "repudiation" of Wundt, which has become the canon for this significant episode of history of psychology, focused on the supposed influence of Ernst Mach on this set of events, overshadowing the other exponent of Empiriocriticism: Richard Avenarius. Analyzing archival documents and examining anew the primary sources, the paper shows that Avenarius was himself a member of Wundt's circle, and that his "repudiation" of the master paved the way for Külpe. The essay points out the original anti-Wundtian aspects of Avenarius' notion of psychology, thus showing how they were then adopted by Külpe.

The concept of evidence has become central in Western healthcare systems; however, few investigations have studied how the shift toward specific definitions of evidence actually occurred in practice. This paper examines a historical case in psychiatry where the debate about how to define evidence was of central importance to nosological decision making. During the fourth revision of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders a controversial decision was made to exclude postpartum depression (PPD) as a distinct disorder from the manual. On the basis of archival and interview data, I argue that the fundamental issues driving this decision were related to questions about what constituted suitable hierarchies of evidence and appropriate definitions of evidence. Further, although potentially buttressed by the evidence-based medicine movement, this shift toward a reliance on particular kinds of empirical evidence occurred when the dominant paradigm in American psychiatry changed from a psychodynamic approach to a research-based medical model.

Late nineteenth-century psychologists and aestheticians were fascinated by the study of psychological and physiological aspects of aesthetic response, and the British intellectual and aesthete Vernon Lee was a major participant in this venture. Working outside the academy, Lee conducted informal experiments with Clementina Anstruther-Thomson, recording changes in respiration, balance, emotion, and body movements in response to aesthetic form. In fashioning her aesthetics of empathy, she mined a wealth of psychological theories of the period including motor theories of mind, physiological theories of emotion, evolutionary models of the usefulness of art, and, most prominently, the empathic projection of feeling and movement into form. Lee distributed questionnaires, contributed to scientific journals, carried out her own introspective studies, and debated aesthetics with leading psychologists. This paper critiques the prevailing view of Lee's aesthetics as a displaced sign of her gender or sexuality, and questions her status as simply an amateur in the field of psychology. Instead, I argue that Lee's empirically based empathy theory of art was a significant contribution to debates on psychological aesthetics at the outset of the twentieth century, offering a synthesis of Lipps's mentalistic Einfuhlung and sensation-based imitation theories of aesthetic response. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

What has been missing in previous historical accounts of Clark L. Hull is a view of his life's work as an integrated whole. This paper contributes to that end by relating his hypnosis research and theory during the years 1921 to 1933 to the developing behavioral orientation of his learning theory. In addition, this paper relates his work historically and conceptually to the theory of ideomotor actin endorsed by William James and a number of other nineteenth-century psychologists, and transmitted by Hull into the stimulus-response terminology of the 1930s.

In line with the growing concern with the unexamined reliance upon the concept of "experience" in anthropology, this article explores in some detail the various usages and definitions of the concept in the work of three of early French anthropology's most influential theorists: Emile Durkheim (1858-1918), Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1857-1939), and Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908-). With its important influence on both British and American anthropology, the early French anthropological tradition, as epitomized in the writings of these three thinkers, has indeed played a pivotal role in shaping many current taken-for-granted understandings of the concept of experience in the discipline of anthropology as a whole. In the process of exploring how experience is viewed by these three scholars, this paper will thus take some initial steps toward the historical contextualization of many of the unquestioned assumptions underpinning current understandings of experience in the discipline of anthropology and the social sciences more generally.

Schizophrenia is a serious mental illness with a remarkably short recorded history. Unlike depression and mania, which are recognizable in ancient texts, schizophrenia-like disorder appeared rather suddenly in the psychiatric literature of the early nineteenth century. This could mean that the illness is a recent disease that was largely unknown in earlier times. But perhaps schizophrenia existed, embedded and disguised within more general concepts of madness and within the arcane languages and cultures of remote times. Both possibilities present major challenges to historical and psychiatric scholarship. These challenges are explored in this paper by presenting two "new" cases of schizophrenia, one from the eighteenth and one from the fourteenth century. The cases suggest that the illness may have existed as early as the medieval period. However, establishing the population prevalence of schizophrenia in earlier times--and therefore resolving the permanence-recency debate--may not be a feasible enterprise.

In the 1930s, some psychologists began to study and discuss the normal and pathological mental abilities of old age. This paper explores this research and its implications for an emerging definition of old age in the 1930s and 1940s. The argument is that these psychologists explained old age in terms of tests they had performed on children and young adults. In addition, these professionals projected their culturally bound assumptions onto their study of old age. In the process, psychologists helped to define old age as a problem that required a professional solution.

The emergence of neurology as an autonomous, prestigious field in late-nineteenth-century Paris is well known. Less appreciated is the role that neurologists played vis-a-vis the cognate older field of psychiatry. Taking Jean-Martin Charcot, the most influential neurologist of his time, as a test case, this paper contrasts his attitudes and practice in the public setting of teaching and hospital work with his private practice. A staunch defender of a clear distinction between his field and psychiatry, Charcot's private practice displayed more flexibility. Treating hysteria and neurasthenia created a middle ground of nervous diseases for him to cultivate. Unpublished case histories and other materials, especially from the Charcot library, support the conception of neurologists as active agents in constituting a new psychological medicine.

This paper examines Greenwood's (2000) evidence for incompatibility between the early and later American social psychologists on the social conception of cognition, emotion, and behavior. The notion of the autonomy of the individual may offer the key to finding a degree of compatibility between them. Both generations, I argue, fundamentally accept the notion of individual persons as autonomous agents who are able to decide and choose to act and, hence, be responsible for their actions. Philosophical analysis can perhaps inform historians of social psychology on how carefully and critically to reexamine evidence for traditional claims of generational, paradigmatic, and/or foundational splits.

This paper investigates three conflicting reconstructions of the historical relationship between personality and social psychology and addresses questions they raise regarding the subdisciplinary status of personality in the 1920s and the way in which the field gradually emerged as a separate area of psychology. Contesting claims that Floyd Allport first connected social psychology to a separate "branch" of personality psychology in the 1920s, I argue that he drew upon earlier work of psychologists and sociologists who treated personality as a central topic of social psychology. I compare Floyd Allport's views with those of Gordon Allport, who endeavored to establish personality as a separate subdiscipline.

This paper examines Floyd and Gordon Allport's early work on “personality” psychology. In the early 1920s, personality was an unorthodox topic, and for the Allports it initially served as an intellectual and personal bond. Floyd proposed the subject to his brother as a dissertation topic, and the two worked closely on developing personality tests. By 1924, however, “personality” had become the site of a dispute between the two brothers over the intellectual and methodological character of American psychology. The present study examines the origins of this dispute, while gauging the personal and professional ramifications of the dispute. On a larger level, this essay explores the role and meaning of “personality” in the academic culture of 1920s America. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

In this paper it is argued that the “cognitive revolution” in psychology is not best represented either as a Kuhnian “paradigm shift,” or as a movement from an instrumentalist to a realist conception of psychological theory, or as a continuous evolution out of more “liberalized” forms of behaviorism, or as a return to the form of “structuralist” psychology practiced by Wundt and Titchener. It is suggested that the move from behaviorism to cognitivism is best represented in terms of the replacement of (operationally defined) “intervening variables” by genuine “hypothetical constructs” possessing cognitive “surplus meaning,” and that the “cognitive revolution” of the 1950s continued a cognitive tradition that can be traced back to the 1920s. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

This paper describes the founding of the Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger by Théodule Ribot (1839-1916) in 1876. Like the English journal Mind, which was launched the same year, this journal introduced the new scientific psychology to France. Its founding increased Ribot's scientific credibility in psychology and led him to be regarded as the most distinguished French specialist in the field. First, we review the state of French philosophy at the time of the journal's founding, focusing on the three main French schools of thought in philosophy and on their relations with psychology. Second, after analyzing the preface written by Ribot in the first issue of the Revue Philosophique, we examine how the journal was received in French philosophical circles. Finally, we discuss its subsequent history, highlighting its founder's promotion of new ideas in psychology.

This paper discusses the influence of Jean-Martin Charcot's views on Sigmund Freud's early theory of hysteria and the notion of psychical trauma. We consider the early history of both psychical trauma and male hysteria, for in Charcot's view traumatic hysteria and male hysteria are identical. Freud's two 1886 lectures on male hysteria, delivered after his return from Paris, are crucial to the subject because they present Freud's first impressions of Charcot and his teaching. Some of the ideas presented in the two lectures foreshadow Freud's later generalization of the etiological role of trauma and his theory of the role of psychical trauma in the genesis of hysteria; that is, each hysterical symptom is due to a psychical trauma reviving an earlier traumatic event--the so-called principle of deferred action (Nachtraglichkeit). Several arguments substantiate the thesis that Freud's notion of psychical (sexual) trauma was developed in reference to Charcot's notion of traumatic hysteria, and that the early psychoanalytic theory of psychical trauma is clearly indebted to Freud's encounter with Charcot's male traumatic hysterical patients. The discussed Freudian development points out the major role of (physical) traumata in eliciting psychopathological pictures and in this way is of definite historical relevance for the present-day discussion on the traumatic nature of the so-called multiple personality syndrome and other dissociative disorders, and post-traumatic stress disorders.

The rise of the institutionalist school of economics, in the 1910s and 1920s, has recently been given the historical attention it deserves. However, historical studies of the school have left two questions unanswered. First, to what extent was the institutionalist's interest in academic psychology (frequently declared in their meta-economic writings) realized in their economic writings? Second, what evidence of a fruitful collaboration with institutional economics can be found in the work of psychologists? In this paper I consider the meta-economic statements of three key institutionalists, Wesley C. Mitchell, John M. Clark, and Walton H. Hamilton, and two key economic works by Mitchell and Clark. I contend that these works show little systematic engagement of academic psychology. A study of psychological literature of the period yields the same conclusion; in particular, industrial psychology did not come into fruitful contact with institutional economics, despite the parallel interests of the two fields and their parallel rise after World War I. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

An increase in interest for German scientific psychology followed the rise of liberalism in late nineteenth-century Spain. This paper deals with Spanish scholars' endeavors to participate in German psychology: It outlines the intellectual and institutional background of Spanish preoccupation with German philosophy and psychology, and deals with the personal experience and testimony of two Spanish philosophers, Eloy Luis Andre and Juan Vicente Viqueira Lopez, who traveled to Leipzig, Berlin, and Gottingen between 1909 and 1914 to gain firsthand experience in the nascent science of psychology in Germany at that time.

This paper explores the founding of psychology as a discipline in New Zealand, giving particular emphasis to its connections with psychology in the United Kingdom. Erik Erickson's psychosocial crises provide a convenient metaphor for stages in the development of psychology in New Zealand as it has vascillated between British and North American traditions and as the academic vision of the discipline has accommodated itself to the more recent professional and applied outlook.

A first cooperative research program in developmental psychology was established in the Clark questionnaire studies. The program was not meant to be free-standing but to elaborate an evolutionary conception of child development synthesized from findings of several scientific fields. The short-lived program had some serious faults, but an examination of its research papers suggests that it produced some worthwhile work. The child-study researchers gathered information about children's social and emotional reactions in everyday settings; one or two of their studies were replicated; they found pattern and order; they elaborated a meaningful social-biological view of child development.

Clark psychology in the post-Hallian era has attracted little attention from scholars. The only general account, Carl Murchison's “Recollections of a Magic Decade at Clark” (1959), is both partisan and limited in scope. This paper examines the “second cycle” of the Clark department in a period of unusual productivity in research, publication, and graduate training from the mid-twenties to the mid-thirties, as well as the internal tensions and constraints that led the department to self-destruct in 1936 and lose its scholarly leadership and professional visibility until the post-World War II era.

Reid's opposition to the representational view of mind is accompanied with some other conceptual changes in the Cartesian conceptual framework. These changes, however, fail to provide a comprehensive alternative to this framework. This is especially disturbing with respect to the causal view of mind. This paper suggests the paradigm of emergent properties as an alternative to the causal paradigm. Although this paradigm is not present in Reid's writings, it is compatible with his opposition to the representational view of mind.

This paper describes the context in which the teaching of psychology as an autonomous discipline was introduced in France, and reproduces the first psychology lecture given in France by Théodule Ribot on 9 April 1888 at The Collège de France. In France, this recognition was delayed because of the negative influence of spiritualist philosophy. It took both the acknowledged status of a man (Ribot) and a minister's decision for this new type of teaching to be accepted in France. After describing the events that took place at the Collège de France and at the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences, we reproduce in full Ribot's inaugural lecture at the Collège, an important document for the history of French psychology. We conclude by describing the circumstances in which this teaching came to its end in 1901.

Between 1905 and 1910, several Dutch scholars independently "discovered" the rapidly growing psychology of religion. The "empirical" character of this psychology as developed in America provoked very diverse reactions, the differences in which arose from the very different mentalities existing within religiously different segments of Dutch society. This paper focuses on an illustrative example: a dissertation by Johannes G. Geelkerken (1879-1960), which remains one of the best sources of information on the presuppositions and foundations of the early empirical psychology of religion. The ideological, institutional, and national context of Geelkerken's work is discussed. Although the pattern of early development of psychology of religion in The Netherlands was atypical for Europeanized cultures, it has persisted into the present.

This paper examines Floyd and Gordon Allport's early work on "personality" psychology. In the early 1920s, personality was an unorthodox topic, and for the Allports it initially served as an intellectual and personal bond. Floyd proposed the subject to his brother as a dissertation topic, and the two worked closely on developing personality tests. By 1924, however, "personality" had become the site of a dispute between the two brothers over the intellectual and methodological character of American psychology. The present study examines the origins of this dispute, while gauging the personal and professional ramifications of the dispute. On a larger level, this essay explores the role and meaning of "personality" in the academic culture of 1920s America.

According to traditional French historiography, French scientific psychology was born when it differentiated itself from philosophy. This split between the two disciplines is attributed to Taine and Ribot, who, consequently, are considered to be the "founding fathers" of French psychology. In this paper we shall examine the case of Pierre Janet, who, at the turn of the century, was recognized worldwide as the most important French psychologist. It is generally said that he was the follower of Ribot and of Charcot. However, he was also Paul Janet's nephew. Paul Janet was a very well known and influential philosopher of the so-called French "spiritualistic" school, for which psychology was central to philosophy. In 1889, Pierre Janet published his doctoral dissertation, L'Automatisme psychologique, which was immediately considered to be a classic in psychology. We shall argue that this book is as much indebted to the old spiritualistic psychology, which claimed the substantial unity of the self, as to the new psychology at the time, which questioned it. With Pierre Janet, the split between psychology and philosophy in France was reconsidered. It would be more accurate to speak in terms of a compromise between philosophy and the "new" physiological and pathological psychology.

Starting out as a newsletter for radical psychologists, the Dutch journal PsychologieMaatschappij (PsychologySociety) moved in the past decade toward the theoretical mainstream within psychology. In this paper, the major changes in the journal are described and analyzed, as well as the features that did not change: an emphasis on theory and history, an interdisciplinary approach, and an emphasis on discussion. The main transformations were from psychology as instrumental toward the goals of the progressive movement in the Netherlands, then to extreme criticism of all scientific and professional psychological activities, and finally to adherence to the most advanced approaches within academic psychology.

Automatic writing has been of interest to psychologists, clinicians and theoreticians of the mind both as a phenomenon in its own right and as a technique for exploring aspects of dissociation and normal and pathological consciousness. This paper follows the course of experimental investigations of automatic writing in psychology; beginning with the early work of Frederic Myers and Edmund Gurney and continuing with that of Alfred Binet, Pierre Janet, William James and Morton Prince, it centers on the 1896 experiments of Leon Solomons and Gertrude Stein, but also examines later laboratory studies. The conceptual and methodological challenges posed by automatic writing persist in such contemporary concerns as divided attention, implicit memory, and dissociations of awareness and intentionality.

A first cooperative research program in developmental psychology was established in the Clark questionnaire studies. The program was not meant to be free-standing but to elaborate an evolutionary conception of child development synthesized from findings of several scientific fields. The short-lived program had some serious faults, but an examination of its research papers suggests that it produced some worthwhile work. The child-study researchers gathered information about children's social and emotional reactions in everyday settings; one or two of their studies were replicated; they found pattern and order; they elaborated a meaningful social-biological view of child development.

During the decade surrounding the Second World War, an extensive literature on the biological and psychological basis of aggression surfaced in America, a literature that in general emphasized the significance of learning and environment in the origins of aggressive behavior. Focusing on the animal behavior research of Warder Clyde Allee and John Paul Scott, this paper examines the complex interplay among conceptual, institutional, and societal forces that created and shaped a discourse on the subjects of aggression, dominance, and leadership within the context of World War II. The distinctions made between sexual and social dominance during this period, distinctions accentuated by the threat of totalitarianism abroad, and the varying ways that interpretations of behavior could be negotiated attests to the multiplicity of interactions that influence the development of scientific research.

This paper examines the relations between Gestalt psychology and gestalt therapy, as presented in the writings of Fritz Perls, who claims that his perspective derives from Gestalt psychology. Intellectual traditions, philosophical assumptions, and specific theories and concepts are considered. It is concluded that the two approaches have nothing in common.

The Enlightenment brought with it a greater scientific interest in and attention to a wider range of human behavior. In 1789, there emerged during the French Revolution a case of what would be today called multiple personality disorder which came under the care of a local physician, Dr. Eberhard Gmelin. Gmelin had only recently become interested in mesmerism and tried this procedure with this patient. So started an ongoing and gradually increasing exploration of the role of hypnosis in multiple personalities. This paper contributes to the historical background of such psychodynamic concepts as dissociation, splitting, repression, consciousness, subconscious, and unconscious.

Despite opposition from professional groups such as the American Psychiatric Association and the American Bar Association, "Guilty But Mentally Ill" (GBMI) statutes now exist in at least 12 states and are being considered in others. This paper reviews the development of the GBMI alternative to the insanity defense from a historical perspective, focusing especially on the reasons for its development in Michigan, the first state to pass GBMI legislation over 9 years ago. Using the Michigan experience, the GBMI statute is reviewed in terms of its perceived purpose and its success in accomplishing that purpose. Then recommendations for future changes are made. Language: en

Cocaine use in the United States has currently reached epidemic proportions. This has resulted in syndromes of intoxication, overdose, and withdrawal, meeting all DMS-III criteria for a substance that can cause dependence as well as abuse syndromes. This paper reviews the current epidemiology of cocaine, its history and pharmacology with major focus on clinical syndromes. This is followed by a review of the current knowledge of the relationship between cocaine and violence and the forensic-psychiatric issues surrounding cocaine. Language: en

The paper describes the design and use of a machine, the "Psychograph," which automatically measured the size and shape of the skull and provided evaluations of mental traits according to phrenological principles. Developed in 1930, the psychograph was billed as a diagnostic tool capable of providing suitable vocational guidance to the thousands of unemployed as a result of the Depression. Its appearance prompted a vigorous opposition from the Psychology Department at the University of Minnesota, especially in the person of Donald L. Paterson. Subsequently, the psychograph was merely exploited for its entertainment value and disappeared after the 1933 World's Fair in Chicago.

The paper takes issue with the traditional view of Darwin's influence on psychology; namely, that it is he who passed on to psychology the concept of individual adaptation. Three arguments are presented: a) that Darwin, qua scientist, was only interested in species adaptation, an entirely different concept from that of individual adaptation, b) that Darwin's writings on individual adaptation are so unexceptional that it is inconceivable that psychologists should have been influenced by them and c) that the two concepts are logically incompatible since species adaptation presupposes a strict hereditary determinism, while individual adaptation conceives of the organism either as free and undetermined or else as determined by the environment.

Researchers dealing with necrophilia over the past century have conducted their investigations using a great variety of methodological strategies and theoretical formulations. The multiplicity of approaches has been partially responsible for the diverse nature of speculations on the etiology, essence, and evolution of necrophilia, and for the accumulation of case histories and an aggregation of data from which it is exceedingly difficult to draw generalizations. There are only two assumptions on which most of the investigators agree. One is that necrophilia is exceedingly rare. The other is that the literature on the subject is severely limited. This paper not only questions the first assumption but establishes that the second is demonstrably false. It also attempts to locate some measure of constancy among the several theoretical lines on necrophilia that have emerged since the time of Krafft-Ebing, to evaluate their effect on scholarship, and to provide some sense of the directions taken by more recent investigators.

This paper outlines some types of psychological disturbances found to occur in narcotics agents who use undercover investigative methods. Research results and other clinical findings dismiss popular notions of multiple personalities as a mental injury caused by prolonged role played pseudoidentities. Coping strategies for dealing with certain paranoid reactions are seen as potential sources of contamination in the gathering of evidence of criminal activity. Issues related to questions of health versus operative talents in selecting for personal suitability for undercover work are presented. Language: en

In response to the dilemma of management of mentally ill persons who commit crimes, Oregon has created the Psychiatric Security Review Board (PSRB) to administrate the supervision and treatment of insanity acquittees. This paper presents an overview of the PSRB structure and examines the quasi-criminal justice features of Oregon's Insanity Sentence. The primary goal of the PSRB is the protection of societý. The maximum sentence, had the individual been found guilty, becomes the PSRB's jurisdictional period for that former defendant. A review of the administrative rules for conditional release and revocation of release that the PSRB is now in the process of adopting are described. The authors conclude that the PSRB is a promising approach which offers better community protection and better treatment for mentally ill offenders (NGRIs) than does the present prison parole system. Language: en

Social scientists generally, and political scientists in particular, are nowadays apt to think of power relations as causal ones: to exercise power is to cause someone to do something that he would not otherwise do. This might be unexceptionable enough, except that political scientists then go on to make two rather more questionable moves. The first is to picture causal relations, and hence “power,” in narrowly mechanistic terms; the second is to claim originality for their efforts. My aim in this paper is to counter the second move. This I do by showing that the mechanistic-causal model of power is three centuries old, being traceable to Hobbes, Locke and Hume. The moral of my tale is that social scientists wishing to disentangle their “models” from philosophers' metaphors, should begin by acquainting themselves with the history of their science.

The paper takes issue with the traditional view of Darwin's influence on psychology; namely, that it is he who passed on to psychology the concept of individual adaptation. Three arguments are presented: a) that Darwin, qua scientist, was only interested in species adaptation, an entirely different concept from that of individual adaptation, b) that Darwin's writings on individual adaptation are so unexceptional that it is inconceivable that psychologists should have been influenced by them and c) that the two concepts are logically incompatible since species adaptation presupposes a strict hereditary determinism, while individual adaptation conceives of the organism either as free and undetermined or else as determined by the environment.

My chief mentor in graduate school at Chicago was Harvey Carr, who spent most of his professional life at The University of Chicago as professor of experimental psychology. He was admired and loved by his graduate students not only as a masterly teacher and for his accumen in directing research, but also as a man of personal integrity. On the assumption that he is not as well known as he should be by the present generation of psychologists, this essay is presented. The paper reports on the testimonials of his many students on the occasion of his retirement, some reminiscences on the part of the essayist, and an analysis of Carr's systematic position.

This paper discusses the Golden Age (1920-1940) of the Columbia University psychology department and analyzes some of the sources of its strengths and weaknesses. Much of the credit goes to Robert S. Woodworth, the dean of American experimental psychology, who set up the objective eclectic orientation of the department, recruited a remarkable group of competent faculty members, and above all kept up a cooperative unified spirit in the department. Because the Columbia University psychology department was so influential during its Golden Age, its organization, staffing and departmental characteristics are analyzed. Probably the key to its success was the capability of a guiding genius, Robert S. Woodworth, who gathered a remarkable group of scholars about him. Woodworth's objective eclectic orientation provided the broadest possible approach within a rigorous experimental-statistical orientation. Woodworth's scholarly approach pervaded the department so that many of his colleagues also wrote pioneering encyclopedic works in their particular fields of specialization. The writings of the Columbia psychologists truly shaped the field.