1. Strategic investment under uncertainty: why multi-option firms lose the preemption run.
- Author
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Yu, Wencheng, Wen, Xingang, Huberts, Nick F. D., and Kort, Peter M.
- Subjects
OPTIONS (Finance) ,DECISION making ,DYNAMIC programming ,GAME theory ,EQUILIBRIUM - Abstract
We consider a dynamic duopoly game where firms choose both the timing and size of their investments. The existing real options literature predominantly consists of contributions where firms have a single option to invest. This paper relaxes this assumption by giving Firm A multiple options to undertake further investments with the purpose to expand whereas Firm B only holds the option to enter the market. In this asymmetric setting we get the surprising result that, in equilibrium, Firm B invests first. If Firm A invests first, Firm A and Firm B keep on being involved in preemption games for subsequent investments until Firm B enters the market, which leads to inefficiently early investments of Firm A. When Firm B invests first, then only one preemption game is played, which leads to Firm A being free to choose its unrestricted optimal investment moments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
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