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This paper examines the relationship between trust and economic growth. Taking panel data and using a fixed-effects estimation for a 41-country sample over the time period from 1980 to 2004 and with a total of 129 observations, the paper points out that economic growth is negatively related to an increase in trust. This negative finding is in contrast to most empirical findings using a cross-sectional design. The common knowledge which has governed the nature of discussions in social science and economics for the last ten years, that trust is generally positively related to economic performance, must be seriously questioned. From a policy point of view an increase in trust is crucial for countries with low levels of trust, but can likely be neglected by countries with sufficient levels of trust and may even hamper economic performance in countries with high levels of trust. The relationship is tested in the context of EU countries, OECD countries and developing countries. Interpersonal trust and systemic trust is differentiated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The theory of optimal currency areas states that a currency union may succeed if the participating countries have complementary industry structures. If this is not the case a currency union does not, inevitably, have to fail because market forces will induce adjustments of the industry structures that will eventually lead to a successful currency union. This optimism is, however, not warranted for the euro. The euro has now been in a crisis for more than three years and a self-correcting mechanism leading out of the crisis is not in sight. The reason is that the euro union does not suffer from unadjusted industries, but from unadjusted governments. While industries adjust under the command of the invisible hand of the market in a currency union, this is not necessarily the case for governments. The general point of this paper is that countries with incompatible governments remain inimical in a currency union. They generate externalities and crises which cannot be eliminated as well in a political union. Assume that two countries traditionally cooperate in an economic union. Their governments are financially independent. They 'go Dutch'. A currency union, such as the euro union, is different. It opens not only the option of a closer economic cooperation, but it also allows for a joint cash management so that each government has the temptation to live on the other's costs and hence to generate negative externalities on the other. The governments may be aware of this trap. They conclude a Treaty in order to prevent their mutually destructive behavior. But the Treaty turns out to be non-enforceable and therefore unable to stop the infringements by mutual externalities, this being the essence of the euro crisis. Therefore the governments should withdraw and return to an economic union without externalities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper empirically analyzes whether large governments in Europe reflect efficient responses to a changing social and economic environment (‘welfare economic view’) as opposed to wasteful spending (‘public choice view’). To this end, the effect of government size on subjective well-being is estimated in a combined survey and country-level dataset covering 153,268 respondents from twelve EU countries over the 1990–2000 period. The first finding is an inversely U-shaped relationship between government size and well-being. In addition, the analysis suggests that given the high institutional quality as compared to other parts of the world there might be scope for a further enlargement of governments in the EU from a well-being perspective. However, one must acknowledge that the effect on well-being may be quite small and that democratic societies in Europe have no experience with even larger governments. The investigation also reveals that the impact of government size on well-being depends negatively on levels of corruption and positively on the extent of decentralization. Moreover, left-wing voters and low-income earners are the main beneficiaries of a large public sector. Finally, in all twelve EU countries included in the sample higher levels of well-being could have been achieved by allocating a higher share of public resources to education, while Finland and Germany could have given an additional boost to well-being by cutting expenditures on social protection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a growing interest in the academic and policy making communities in understanding the effects of sectoral specialisation on labour market performance. The existing empirical evidence, mainly based on US data, generally finds a positive correlation between sectoral specialisation and labour market indicators such as wages and unemployment. The policy implication one can draw from these results is that fostering sectoral diversification may reduce unemployment. However, this lesson may not hold for all countries. In particular, in the case of Europe, the diversity of labour market institutions may play a distinct role in shaping the relationship between sectoral specialisation and labour market performance. In this paper, we investigate the relationship between regional sectoral specialisation and regional unemployment rate in the context of different collective bargaining institutions in the EU countries. We find that collective bargaining institutions do play a role in shaping the unemployment rate differentials across regions belonging to the same country. Furthermore, the relationship between regional specialisation and the regional unemployment rate is stronger in countries with intermediate and decentralised collective bargaining institutions in comparison to countries with centralised collective bargaining institutions. Our results suggest that labour market institutions are likely to influence the outcome of policies aiming at fostering regional diversification. While such policies may result in reducing regional unemployment in countries with decentralised and intermediate levels of collective bargaining, they may not make a big difference in countries with centralised collective bargaining institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article describes and analyzes the Euro cash changeover process. The European Monetary Union, EMU, is a unique event in history, although other monetary unions were formed and existed long before. Still, this giant experiment makes it possible to study changes in the monetary environment from a unique and new position. The article tries to find factors that can help to explain the different pace of transition between the countries participating in the third stage of the EMU. Even though it was common knowledge that the national currency would lose its status as legal tender at a predetermined point in time, the speed of acceptance of the new monetary standard could not be directly controlled by the relevant authorities. Hence, the whole changeover process was formed as much by the authorities as by the public. The paper focuses on four types of factors that may help to explain the differences in the pace of transition pattern between the countries: network related reasons, technical and logistic reasons, characteristics of the financial and payment systems and psychological reasons. It is found that the initial supply of Euro bank notes (so-called frontloading), the size of the population of the country, the length of the period when the national currency and Euro bank notes were used side by side, and the number of bank branches (per capita) together can help to explain a large part of the variation in the pace of adoption of the new monetary standard across the countries. The first two of these factors support the idea that currency is a network good. Psychological factors, such as nationalism, have not been found to significantly influence the outcome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper explores the relationship between FDI and economic growth in eight transition countries - EU candidates - in the period 1994-2001. Surprisingly, statistically robust negative causal relationship between FDI and growth emerged implying that FDI hampered their real convergence with EU. This result can be explained by the form of FDI. In the observed period, acquisitions were the predominant form and the proceeds of the sales were spent on consumption and imports rather than enhancing productive assets. Indeed, current account and FDI were strongly linked; the bigger the inflow of FDI into a country, the higher its current account deficit and foreign debt. Small size of the host countries and concentration of FDI in trade and finance could weaken productivity spillovers while increased efficiency of the acquired firm could be more than offset by the reduction of economic links with local firms. FDI would also not automatically increase competition as it could force small emerging local competitors out of business. While foreign trade increased through FDI, multinationals contributed more to imports than to exports. Finally, while FDI might support human capital formation, this type of spillovers simply does not seem to be very relevant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]