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We investigate a basic premise of prospect theory: that the valuation of gains and losses is separable. In prospect theory, gain-loss separability implies that a mixed gamble is valued by summing the valuations of the gain and loss portions of that gamble. Two experimental studies demonstrate a systematic violation of the double-matching axiom, an axiom that is necessary for gain-loss separability. We document a reversal between preferences for mixed gambles and the associated gain and loss gambles—mixed gamble A is preferred to mixed gamble B, but the gain and loss portions of B are preferred to the gain and loss portions of A. The observed choice patterns are consistent with a process in which individuals are less sensitive to probability differences when choosing among mixed gambles than when choosing among either gain or loss gambles.

This paper examines the use of options contracts by firms acquiring rights to commercialize university technologies. By combining information about the sequence of licensing decisions with characteristics of the firms and technologies involved, I explore factors that shape decisions to purchase and exercise option contracts for these technologies. Decisions by firms that considered but did not purchase an option or a license are included in the sample. Consistent with the basic premise of real-options theory, I find that firms are more likely to purchase option contracts for more uncertain technologies. Also in line with theoretical predictions, I find that firms that are better able to evaluate an external technology are less likely to purchase options before licensing. The results also highlight more complex motives for exercising options in technology licensing. On the one hand, firms appear to benefit from their ability to learn about the technology during the option period. On the other hand, firms that are better able to “absorb” the technology during the contract period may have reduced incentives to subsequently license the invention.

Entry by spinoffs from incumbent firms is investigated for the laser industry. A model in which spinoffs exploit knowledge from their parents is constructed to explain the market conditions conducive to spinoffs, the types of firms that spawn spinoffs, and the relationship of spinoffs to their parents. The model is tested using detailed data on all laser entrants from the start of the industry through 1994. Our findings support the basic premise of the model that spinoffs inherit knowledge from their parents that shapes their nature at birth. Implications of our findings for organizational behavior, business strategy, entry and industry evolution, and technological change are discussed.