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Using the sample of A-share listed firms in China from 2008 to 2019, we empirically test the spillover effect of violation punishment on the total factor productivity of director-interlocked firms. We find that violation punishment can significantly aggravate the violation of director-interlocked firms and preliminarily verify the spillover effect of violation punishment among director-interlocked firms. We also find that violation punishment will significantly reduce the total factor productivity of director-interlocked firms. The result is still stable after replacing the measurement method of total factor productivity, and its impact has a certain continuity, which can affect for two consecutive years. Further research shows that the R&D investment plays a mediation role between the violation punishment and the total factor productivity of the director interlocked firms. The violation punishment can reduce the R&D investment of the director-interlocked firms and then reduce the total factor productivity of the director-interlocked firms. In addition, after distinguishing the type of firm ownership, we find that compared with state-owned enterprises, violation punishment has a more significant inhibitory effect on the total factor productivity of private enterprises' director-interlocked firms. Based on the perspective of the director network, we investigate the spillover effect of violation punishment on the total factor productivity of director-interlocked firms, which provides a new theoretical perspective for the in-depth understanding of the economic consequences of violation punishment, improves the total factor productivity of listed firms, and has important theoretical and practical significance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How the macro-external environment, i.e., the uncertainty of economic policies, affects the peer effect of corporate investment and whether the ability of managers, as the main decision of corporate investment, affects the peer effect of enterprise investment is worthy of further study. This paper uses Baker's economic policy uncertainty index to obtain China's economic policy uncertainty index and uses the DEA-Tobit two-stage model to measure the ability of managers, combined with the relevant data of China's A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2020, to study the impact of economic policy uncertainty and managers' ability on corporate investment peer effect. We found that China's economic policy uncertainty increases the information acquisition cost of micro-firms and deepens the degree of information asymmetry, and firms are strongly motivated to learn or even imitate the investment decisions of enterprises in the same industry, thus intensifying the peer effect of investment. For enterprises of different nature, the economic policy uncertainty has a more significant impact on the investment peer effect of non-state-owned enterprises than state-owned enterprises. Compared with large enterprises, the impact of economic policy uncertainty on the investment cohort effect of small enterprises is more significant. Then, through group regression according to the median of managerial ability, we found that the investment peer effect is more obvious in enterprises with low management ability and the effect of economic policy uncertainty on investment peer effect is more significant in the sample with low management ability. Based on the empirical research conclusions, this paper puts forward the following suggestions: improve the corporate governance mechanism and the management ability of managers. In issuing economic policies, the government should be cautious and stable to reduce the uncertainty of economic policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The data of new urban investment bonds in cities from 2011 to 2021 to represent the growth of local government debt is used in this article. This paper studies the relationship between the increase of local government debt and the underinvestment of A-share listed enterprises, which are nonfinancial companies in China. The research finds that the increase in local government debt will crowd out the debt financing of enterprises and then significantly the degree of underinvestment of enterprises, which is represented non-state-owned enterprises, enterprises with high financing constraints, and enterprises with nonlocal debt invested in the industry. As for listed enterprises with relatively low fixed assets, the increase in local debt will further lead to the degree of underinvestment. The above conclusions remain unchanged after a series of robustness tests in this paper. Further research shows that the increase in local government debt will weaken the stimulus effect of loose monetary policy and thus affect the underinvestment of enterprises. This paper expands the research on the factors affecting the underinvestment of enterprises and deepens the research on the consequences of the influence of local government debt on the economic activities of microsubjects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

State-owned enterprise (SOE) reforms may play a vital role in R&D investment. This paper investigates the impact of mixed ownership reform of SOEs in China on R&D investment. Using a large sample of Chinese SOEs for the 2009–2018 period, we find that the reform has a positive effect on R&D investment. The result is robust to a battery of robustness tests and more prominent for firms with non-state-owned large shareholders holding more shares relative to state-owned large shareholders, and for firms with less stress from local officials pursuing political promotion. Furthermore, we find that to compensate for the adverse impact of R&D on the political promotion of the CEO, non-state-owned large shareholders allow the CEO to increase perk consumption. Our study suggests that the ongoing mixed ownership reform in China improves the SOEs' efficiency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People's daily life heavily depends on energy. The core business of electric power enterprises is commercial energy sales. In the daily work of power enterprises, energy marketing is the most important field which will directly affect the development of enterprises. Although national macro-control exists as a useful way to control the energy market, it also increases the risk of the energy market. Nowadays, the development of the energy market is affected with the adjustment of industrial structure. In the energy market, China's power companies are state-owned enterprises and have their unique advantages for developing, but there are still some problems in risk awareness, which require us to take measures to control and prevent the impact risk. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Green innovation is an important way for enterprises to achieve high-quality economic development, and it is also the way to achieve the goal of double carbon. Green innovation has therefore become a research hotspot. With the acceleration of the digitalization process in equipment enterprises, intelligent manufacturing equipment enterprises located at the top of the industrial chain are in urgent need of green core technology innovation activities. In order to explore the internal mechanism of core green technology innovation, this research introduces reputation theory into the evolutionary game analysis process. By constructing an evolutionary game model between the government and intelligent manufacturing equipment enterprises, this research analyzes the dynamic factors that affect the selection and evolution of the main strategies of the players in the evaluation game. The results show that corporate reputation, core green technology innovation profit, government subsidies, government reputation, and the cost for the government to support core technology, among other factors, importantly affect the game between the government and the enterprises. At the same time, since both the government and the enterprises are affected by the initial state and the maximization of the interests of both sides of the game, it is difficult for them to spontaneously reach an ideal stable and balanced state through a virtuous circle. The greater the profits and the reputation premium the core green technology innovation brings to the enterprises, the more favorable it is for the enterprises to choose core green technology innovation; government subsidies within a certain range will also drive enterprises to choose core green technology innovation. When the value of enterprise core green technology innovation is low, the cost for the government to support core green technology innovation is lower, enterprises will lose more opportunities and decline in global competitiveness, and it will become more favorable for the government to evolve towards supporting core green technology innovation. On the contrary, the government will gradually transfer its tangible hand to the intangible hand of the market based on the consideration of subsidies, innovation costs, and reputation. The results of this research are intended to provide a theoretical basis and practical reference for Chinese intelligent manufacturing equipment enterprises to better achieve green core technology innovation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public finance plays an important role in the development and construction of the country. Public finance is derived from and used by the people. On the one hand, public finance mainly comes from national taxes and the income of some state-owned enterprises or state-owned assets. On the other hand, public finance is used for national infrastructure, military investment, scientific and technological research and development, national daily operation, and other expenses. Therefore, the state of public finance is closely related to people's lives, and it is also one of the basic symbols of a country's prosperity and strength. How to ensure that the country's public finance is in a good state, grasp the leverage balance of public finance revenue and expenditure, and avoid the situation of national "bankruptcy" is additional attention that the public finance department should pay in the process of operation. Therefore, we urgently need a set of public finance monitoring and early warning system that matches China's public finance operation mechanism and conforms to China's basic national conditions. At present, previous studies rely on the existing detailed data on public finance to measure the situation of China's public finance, but this method refers to fewer data and is not forward-looking enough. Therefore, this paper adopts a BP neural network algorithm to monitor and warn the situation of China's public finance based on computer big data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Technological innovation is the source of generating new momentum. In the context of the financing constraints generally existing in China, it is particularly important to explore the impact of technological innovation investment on corporate financial risk, which also provides a risk identification perspective and development direction for enterprises. Based on the data of China's small and medium-sized listed companies from 2010 to 2019, and from the perspective of moderating effect of financing constraints, this paper uses multiple regression analysis method to test the impact mechanism of technological innovation investment on corporate financial risk and the moderating effect of financing constraints in both. The results show that technological innovation investment can significantly reduce corporate financial risk, while financing constraints can significantly improve the level of financial risk. Financing constraints play a moderating role in technological innovation investment and financial risk. Heterogeneity test found that, compared with large-scale enterprises, small-scale enterprises' technological innovation investment has a more significant impact on financial risk, and the moderating effect of financing constraints is also greater. Compared with private enterprises, state-owned enterprises' technological innovation investment has less impact on financial risk, and the moderating effect of financing constraints is not significant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

High-tech enterprises, as the key subjects that can stimulate innovation vitality and promote innovation-driven development strategies in China, require government guidance for their innovative activities. However, the existing research has not answered the issue of how the government behavior activates the innovation ability of high-tech enterprises and what is the internal mechanism. As such, this paper takes government participation in high-tech enterprises as its research object, constructs an evolutionary game model of government participation in enterprise innovation, analyzes the internal mechanism of improvements to high-tech enterprises' innovation ability under government tax and fee policy incentives and regulatory measures, and uses MATLAB numerical simulation to verify the results. The research shows that (1) increasing the general corporate income tax rate and reducing the high-tech corporate income tax rate can promote the transformation of general enterprises into high-tech enterprises and encourage enterprises to engage in scientific and technological innovation activities. However, when the high-tech corporate income tax rate is lower than 0.1, the marginal effect will be reduced. (2) Increasing the deduction coefficient and amortization coefficient can make high-tech enterprises more motivated to participate in innovation activities and thus render enterprise innovation more lucrative. (3) Increasing administrative penalties from regulatory authorities can promote the development of innovative activities in high-tech enterprises, but their intensity must be controlled within a reasonable range. The presented results have reference value for the adjustment of tax and fee policies among high-tech enterprises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]