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With the global climate problem becoming increasingly severe, governments have adopted policies to encourage enterprises to invest in low-carbon technologies. However, the opacity of the carbon emission reduction process leads to incomplete consumer trust in low-carbon products as well as higher supply chain transaction costs. Based on this, this paper constructs Stackelberg game models with and without blockchain under different power structures and compares the impact of these models on low-carbon emission reduction decisions. The results show that: (1) blockchain does not necessarily improve enterprise profits and can only help enterprises maintain optimal profits within a certain range when the carbon emission cost is low; (2) when consumers' environmental awareness is high, the blockchain can incentivize manufacturers to enhance carbon emission reduction, and it has an obvious promotional effect on retailers' profits; and (3) the profit gap between enterprises in the supply chain is larger under different power structures, and the implementation of blockchain can coordinate profit distribution and narrow the gap between enterprises. Compared with the manufacturer-dominated model, the emission reduction in products is maximized under the retailer-dominated model. Our study provides theoretical support for the government to regulate greenhouse gas emissions as well as for the optimization of enterprises' decision-making supported by blockchain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers a fresh food supply chain with a supplier who takes responsibility for the cold chain and a retailer who needs to reprocess the fresh food. Carbon emissions will be produced in the processes of production, transportation, processing, etc. We consider the four-stage game, obtain the function expressions of optimal market prices with respect to carbon emission reduction level (CERL), analyze the best responses of the supplier and the retailer regarding their CERLs, and obtain the 25 optimal CERLs under competitive equilibrium. In 24 of the 25 equilibrium cases, the supplier or the retailer either do nothing to reduce carbon emissions, or make the most effort to reduce carbon emissions. Excluding these special cases, we focused on a non-trivial case where the increasing consumer preferences for low-carbon products will encourage the supplier and the retailer to reduce carbon emissions. Interestingly, we find that when the consumer preference for low-carbon products is low, the retailer's and supplier's equilibrium carbon reduction levels are low, so that the potential market size is small such that the competition for two kinds of customers is fierce. Then, an increase in the sale cost will reduce the retail price. However, when the consumer preference for low-carbon products is high, the potential market size is large such that the competition is not fierce. Then, an increase in the sale cost will advance the retail price. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The greening trend in consumer markets and the marketization and financialization of carbon emission rights have begun to revitalize carbon assets. However, solitary efforts and the spillover of environmental protection effects still hamper enterprises' enthusiasm for carbon emission reduction. To tackle this challenge, two vertical cooperation mechanisms, cost cooperation and alliance cooperation, are proposed. The mathematical models and solutions are developed for both of the two mechanisms, and their values and applicability are explored, respectively. In addition, the impact of fluctuations in consumer markets, financial markets, and carbon markets on cooperation is examined. The results show that both cooperation models effectively motivate enterprises to enhance carbon reduction and boost market demand. However, cost cooperation may result in inflated product prices and even weaken the profitability of the supply chain. In contrast, alliance cooperation can enhance product price performance and effectively increase supply chain profits. Concerning environmental performance, the initial market is better suited for alliance cooperation, whereas cost cooperation fits the mid-to-late market. The higher financing costs of the financial market and the trading price of the carbon market will strengthen the applicability of cost cooperation. This study offers managerial insights for collaborative decision-making in the context of a multi-market cross-section. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]