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In this article, we investigate some qualitative properties of solutions to a class of functional differential equations with multi-delay. Using a modified approach, we first derive a number of optimized relations and inequalities that relate the solution x s to its corresponding function z s and its derivatives. After classifying the positive solutions, we follow the Riccati approach and principle of comparison, where fourth-order differential equations are compared with first-order differential equations to obtain conditions that exclude the positive solutions. Then, we introduce new oscillation conditions. With regard to previous relevant results, our results are an extension and complement to them. This work has theoretical significance in that it uncovers some new relationships that aid in developing the oscillation theory of higher-order equations in addition to the applied relevance of neutral differential equations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The primary goal of this research is to prove some new Hardy-type ∇-conformable dynamic inequalities by employing product rule, integration by parts, chain rule and (γ , a) -nabla Hölder inequality on time scales. The inequalities proved here extend and generalize existing results in the literature. Further, in the case when γ = 1 , we obtain some well-known time scale inequalities due to Hardy inequalities. Many special cases of the proposed results are obtained and analyzed such as new conformable fractional h-sum inequalities, new conformable fractional q-sum inequalities and new classical conformable fractional integral inequalities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current paper analyzes a competition of the Cournot duopoly game whose players (firms) are heterogeneous in a market with isoelastic demand functions and linear costs. The first firm adopts a rationally-based gradient mechanism while the second one chooses to share the market with certain profit in order to update its production. It trades off between profit and market share maximization. The equilibrium point of the proposed game is calculated and its stability conditions are investigated. Our studies show that the equilibrium point becomes unstable through period doubling and Neimark–Sacker bifurcation. Furthermore, the map describing the proposed game is nonlinear and noninvertible which lead to several stable attractors. As in literature, we have provided an analytical investigation of the map's basins of attraction that includes lobes regions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Bischi–Naimzada game is a market competition between two firms with the objective of maximizing profits under limited information. In this article, we study a more generalized and realistic situation that takes into account the sales constraints. we generalize the economic model suggested by Bischi–Naimzada by introducing and studying the maximization of profits based on sales constraints. Our motivation in this paper is the studying of profit and sales constraints maximization and their influences on the game's dynamics. The local stability of the equilibrium points of the proposed model is discussed. It examines how the dynamics of the proposed two-dimensional competition game model focusing on changes in both the speed of the adjustment and the sales constraint parameters. The map describing the game is proven to be noninvertible and yields many multi-stable, complex dynamics and the coexistence chaotic attractors may arise. The global behavior of the map is achieved by studying the critical curves. The numerical simulations demonstrate the coexistence of two attractors and complex structures of the attraction basins. Several examples are discussed in order to confirm all the analytical results obtained. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate the complex dynamic characteristics of a duopoly game whose players adopt a gradient-based mechanism to update their outputs and one of them possesses in some way certain information about his/her opponent. We show that knowing such asymmetric information does not give any advantages but affects the stability of the game's equilibrium points. Theoretically, we prove that the equilibrium points can be destabilized through Neimark-Sacker followed by flip bifurcation. Numerically, we prove that the map describing the game is noninvertible and gives rise to several stable attractors (multistability). Furthermore, the dynamics of the map give different shapes of quite complicated attraction basins of periodic cycles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]