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Copyright of Memoria y Civilizacion is the property of Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, S.A. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Memoria y Civilizacion is the property of Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, S.A. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The studies on the American democracy promotion policy towards Francoist Spain have been many years relegated once taken for granted the propagandistic nature of the American public discourse. However, in order to assess what were Washington’s real aims and determinants in its relations with Franco and his regime, in the first part of this article we briefly examine the changes operated in American geostrategic conceptions from the 30s onwards. In the second part, in what constitutes the core of this paper, a more detailed focus is put on the examination of the Spanish case from the documentation on Spain between the years 1945-1973 preserved in the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) at College Park, Md.

Since J. Brewer's description of Britain as a fiscal-military state, the expression has become a source of inspiration for other country's studies, as well as a methodological tool to examine the relationship between military spending, the Treasure, the Central Administration’s organization and the economy of states. This methodology of study has been applied a few times to eighteenth century Spain, assuming in a way or another, that Spain was also a fiscal-military state at that time. Nevertheless, its final defeat against Britain invites us to consider not only what kind of a fiscal-military state could Spain have been, but if it really can be considered like that. As an alternative reflection, this paper argues that Spain could have not been a fiscalmilitary state, a description that in the end, can give us a better explanation of the Spanish final military and naval defeat.