155 results
Search Results
2. Truthmaking. Are Facts Still Really Indispensable?
- Author
-
Mzyk, Błażej
- Subjects
SKEPTICISM ,CRITICISM ,ONTOLOGY - Abstract
In recent years there has been a lot of skepticism about the existence of facts. It seems that one of the last places for their application is in truthmaking theory. In this paper I discuss two approaches to the use of facts in truthmaking. The first, categorial, holds that facts are entities that belong to one of three ontological categories (true propositions, truth of propositions, instantiations of universals). The second, deflationary, holds that a fact is merely a functional concept denoting any entity that performs a truthmaking function. I argue that in the face of significant criticism of categorial facts as truthmakers, a defender of facts may resort to the deflationary concept. Nevertheless, even in this case we can do without facts as truthmakers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
3. Constitutionalism, Cheap Indeterminism and the Grounding Problem.
- Author
-
Campdelacreu, Marta
- Subjects
CONSTITUTIONALISM ,INDETERMINISM (Philosophy) ,FREE will & determinism ,ONTOLOGY - Abstract
Thomas Sattig has argued recently that
constitutionalism rendersdeterminism about the actual world false, just in virtue of ordinary facts about ordinary middle-sized material objects. However, it seems that, ifdeterminism about the actual world is false, this should be so for reasons of physics rather than in virtue of ordinary facts about ordinary objects. This is theproblem of cheap indeterminism . Sattig also claims, however, that constitutionalists can solve this problem if they abandon an attractive and promising solution to the classicalgrounding problem affecting their view. In this paper I argue that, against his claims, constitutionalists can solvethe problem of cheap indeterminism andthe grounding problem simultaneously. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]- Published
- 2018
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
4. Can Non-Causal Explanations Answer the Leibniz Question?
- Author
-
Lemanski, Jens
- Subjects
EXPLANATION ,INTENTION ,ARGUMENT - Abstract
Leibniz is often cited as an authority when it comes to the formulation and answer strategy of the question "Why is there something rather than nothing?" Yet much current research assumes that Leibniz advocates an unambiguous question and strategy for the answer. In this respect, one repeatedly finds the argument in the literature that alternative explanatory approaches to this question violate Leibniz's intention, since he derives the question from the principle of sufficient reason and also demands a causal explanation to the question. In particular, the new research on non-causal explanatory strategies to the Leibniz question seems to concern this counter-argument. In this paper, however, I will argue that while Leibniz raises the question by means of the principle of sufficient reason, he even favours a non-causal explanatory strategy to the question. Thus, a more accurate Leibniz interpretation seems not only to legitimise but also to support non-causal explanations to the Leibniz question. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
5. Metaphysical Compatibilism and the Ontology of Trans-World Personhood: A Neo-Lewisian Argument for the Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge (Determinism) and Metaphysical Free Will.
- Author
-
Lenart, Bartlomiej Andrzej
- Subjects
FREE will & determinism ,AUTONOMY (Philosophy) ,ONTOLOGY ,PERSONALITY (Theory of knowledge) ,RESPONSIBILITY - Abstract
David Lewis' contemplations regarding divine foreknowledge and free will, along with some of his other more substantial work on modal realism and his counterpart theory can serve as a springboard to a novel solution to the foreknowledge and metaphysical freedom puzzle, namely a proposal that genuine metaphysical freedom is compatible with determinism, which is quite different from the usual compatibilist focus on the compatibility between determinism and moral responsibility. This paper argues that while Lewis opens the doors to such a possibility, in order to fully elucidate a genuinely metaphysical compatibilist account, Lewis' own counterpart theory must be abandoned in favour of an account of trans-world identity that is theoretically framed by a modified version of Robert Nozick's closest continuer theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
6. Inquiry & Ordinary Truthmakers.
- Author
-
Schipper, Arthur
- Subjects
SEMANTICS ,MOTIVATION (Psychology) ,GENERAL semantics - Abstract
This paper argues that accepting an ordinary approach to truthmakers and rejecting something I call "the metaphysical knowledge assumption" (MKA) allows us to account for inquiry in terms of truthmaking. §1 introduces inquiry and the potential place of truthmakers in inquiry. §2 presents the relevant ordinary notion of truthmakers. §3 presents and motivates MKA. This assumption, I argue (§4), makes a truthmaker-focused account of inquiry whose objects are not the fundamental nature of things impossible and thus should be rejected. The ordinary picture, which understands truthmakers not exclusively in terms of the objects of fundamental reality or of semantics (§5), but in terms of the relevant, intentional objects of inquiry, gives us an attractive, general, truthmaker-based view of inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
7. Ontology Generator.
- Author
-
Pelman, Alik
- Subjects
ONTOLOGY ,NOMINALISM ,REALISM ,METAPHYSICS - Abstract
The paper proposes a simple method for constructing ontological theories—an 'ontology generator'. It shows that such a generator manages to produce major existing ontological theories, e.g., Realism, Nominalism, Trope theory, Bundle theory, Perdurantism, Endurantism, Possibilism, Actualism and more. It thus turns out, surprisingly, that all these seemingly unrelated different ontological theories that were designed by thinkers hundreds of years apart, can all be generated using the same simple mechanism. Moreover, this same generator manages to produce entirely novel ontological theories, that fare no worse than existing ones in meeting the same common metaphysical challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
8. Not Just Many Worlds but Many Universes? A Problem for the Many Worlds View of Quantum Mechanics.
- Author
-
Baumann, Peter
- Subjects
WORLDVIEW ,SPECIAL relativity (Physics) ,SOCIAL problems ,UNIVERSE ,METAPHYSICAL cosmology ,ONTOLOGY - Abstract
The many-worlds view is one of the most discussed "interpretations" of quantum mechanics. As is well known, this view has some very controversial and much discussed aspects. This paper focuses on one particular problem arising from the combination of quantum mechanics with Special Relativity. It turns out that the ontology of the many-worlds view – the account of what there is and what branches of the universe exist – is relative to inertial frames. If one wants to avoid relativizing ontology, one has to argue either that there is an additional source of branching due to Special Relativity and thus additional branches or worlds. Or one has to argue that there are not only many worlds but also many universes (sets of worlds or world-branches); there is thus not only one tree of many world-branches but many frame-specific trees, a "forest" of many world-trees. The main problem here is how one can understand all or any of this. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
9. Can Causal Powers Cause Their Effects?
- Author
-
Raimondi, Andrea
- Subjects
CAUSATION (Philosophy) ,ESSENTIALISM (Philosophy) ,ONTOLOGY - Abstract
Causal Dispositionalism provides an account of causation based on an ontology of causal powers, properties with causal essence. According to the account, causation can be analysed in terms of the interaction of powers and its subsequent production of their effect. Recently, Baltimore, J. A. (2022. "Dispositionalism, Causation, and the Interaction Gap." Erkenntnis 87: 677–92) has raised a challenge against two competing approaches, the compositional view (CV) and the mutual manifestation view (MMV), to explain what makes powers interactive – the interaction gap. In this paper, we raise the challenge of explaining what makes powers productive – the production gap. While Baltimore's verdict is tentatively favouring (MMV), we find both approaches wanting. Our conclusion is that Causal Dispositionalists should take Baltimore's and our critique seriously. Powers cannot cause their effects just by bearing the name "causal". To deserve their names, more metaphysical details are needed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
10. An Ontology for 'The Universe of Being'.
- Author
-
Frizzera, Glauco
- Subjects
ONTOLOGY ,DEFINITIONS - Abstract
Attempting to provide an ontological framework for the notion of the non-personal Universe of Being proposed elsewhere, this paper – after some basic definitions – focuses on substances, one pillar of that notion. It recognizes only to individual substances a material (vs. formal) existence, viewed as the entire complex of the properties instantiated in each of them. It then examines features of the general essence of substances (in primis their independence). While such essence can be comprehended via abstract definitions, their individual essence ('this-ness') cannot, I argue, because it is not a concept but a reality, which I refer to as Being. This manifests powers, is inexhaustible growth and is one, although expressed differently in each individual. The possible connection of the human being with this reality is the second pillar of the notion of the non-personal Universe of Being, which I summarize and compare to other scenarios at the end. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
11. Contra Static Dispositions.
- Author
-
Buckareff, Andrei A., Andrews, Marc, and Brennan, Shane
- Subjects
ONTOLOGY - Abstract
Work on dispositions focuses chiefly on dispositions that are manifested in dynamic causal processes. Williams, Neil. 2005. "Static and Dynamic Dispositions." Synthese 146: 303–24 has argued that the focus on dynamic dispositions has been at the expense of a richer ontology of dispositions. He contends that we ought to distinguish between dynamic and static dispositions. The manifestation of a dynamic disposition involves some change in the world. The manifestation of a static disposition does not involve any change in the world. In this paper, we concede that making a conceptual distinction between dynamic and static dispositions is useful and we allow that we can truthfully represent objects as manifesting static dispositions. However, we argue that the distinction is not ontologically deep. Rather, the truthmakers for our representations of static dispositions are actually dynamic dispositions to whose manifestations we may fail to be sensitive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
12. A Functional Approach to Ontology.
- Author
-
Gan, Nathaniel
- Subjects
ONTOLOGY ,REALISM ,DEFLATIONARY theory of truth - Abstract
There are two ways of approaching an ontological debate: ontological realism recommends that metaphysicians seek to discover deep ontological facts of the matter, while ontological anti-realism denies that there are such facts; both views sometimes run into difficulties. This paper suggests an approach to ontology that begins with conceptual analysis and takes the results of that analysis as a guide for which metaontological view to hold. It is argued that in some cases, the functions for which we employ a part of our conceptual scheme might give us reasons to posit ontological facts regarding certain objects. The proposed approach recommends ontological realism about an object just in case our conceptual scheme gives us reason to. This yields a mixed overall metaontological view that adopts ontological realism to some issues and ontological anti-realism to others, and that avoids the difficulties that typically arise for the two views. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
13. An Aristotelian Conception of Time(s).
- Author
-
Brook, Angus
- Subjects
BALANCE of payments ,ONTOLOGY - Abstract
In recent publications, there has been something of an emerging debate about the relationship between powers ontology and current accounts of time. It seems that if powers ontology is to have bearing on contemporary metaphysical accounts of time, some work needs to be done to show how powers ontology might overcome the apparent contradictions that have arisen in this emerging debate. One avenue to pursue is to test out the possibility of wresting a powers temporal ontology out of a re-reading of Aristotle's account of time with a specific focus on his account of motion and potency. This article will make an effort to make some headway here. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
14. Explanation in Metaphysics?
- Author
-
Persson, Johannes
- Subjects
METAPHYSICS ,PHILOSOPHY ,ONTOLOGY ,CAUSATION (Philosophy) ,NATURAL law - Abstract
Arguments from explanation, i.e. arguments in which the explanatory value of a hypothesis or premise is appealed to, are common in science, and explanatory considerations are becoming more popular in metaphysics. The paper begins by arguing that explanatory arguments in science-even when these are metaphysical explanations-may fail to be explanatory in metaphysics; there is a distinction to be drawn between metaphysical explanation and explanation in metaphysics. This makes it potentially problematic to deploy arguments from explanation in, for instance, metaphysics of science. Part of this problem has its source in that the explanatory concept differs between contexts. The paper discusses a few explanatory concepts and their corresponding arguments from explanation. Towards the end of the paper, I identify two allegedly explanatory arguments in metaphysical discourse by the concluding decisions they give rise to: the rejection of X as a metaphysical fact if X does not explain anything (the argument from explanatory inability) and the rejection of X as a metaphysical fact if X can be non-metaphysically explained (the argument from the non-metaphysically explained). I ask: What kind of concept of explanation do these arguments rely upon, and is that concept suited to the metaphysical task? Two recent examples of these arguments are used as illustration. The preliminary conclusion is that several of the strengths of arguments from explanation in science seem not to be present in metaphysical contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2011
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
15. Hume's Argument for the Ontological Independence of Simple Properties.
- Author
-
Hakkarainen, Jani
- Subjects
ONTOLOGY ,AUTONOMY (Psychology) ,TROPES (Philosophy) ,METAPHYSICS ,PHILOSOPHY of mind - Abstract
In this paper, I will reconstruct Hume's argument for the ontological (in the sense of rigid existential) independence of simple properties in A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 1 (1739). According to my reconstruction, the main premises of the argument are the real distinctness of every perception of a simple property, Hume's Separability Principle and his Conceivability Principle. In my view, Hume grounds the real distinctness of every perception of a simple property in his atomistic theory of sense perception and his Copy Principle. I will also show why Hume's argument should be seen as relevant nowadays. David Lewis and his followers in metaphysics continue Hume's line of thinking in this respect, which is opposed by power ontologists (Brian Ellis, Stephen Mumford), for example. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2011
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
16. The Nominalist Limit of Kim's Ontological Physicalism.
- Author
-
Ferrari, Francesco Maria
- Subjects
NOMINALISM ,MATERIALISM ,MODEL theory ,ONTOLOGY ,POSSIBILITY - Abstract
Kim's Ontological Physicalism (OP) presents itself as a naturalistic and monistic metaphysical framework, aligned with the causal closure of the universe and rejecting causally efficacious "exotic" properties. The foundational ontology is, in turn, monistic and materialistic, positing that the universe is composed solely of material particulars: bits of matter. In this work, we identify a notable tension between OP's intended model and the one OP specifies. Initially, we show how the theory inevitably becomes entangled with higher-order entities, not just particulars. Kim introduces the Supervenience Argument (SA) to counteract the possibility of higher-order entities being causally efficacious. While SA proves to be a plausible strategy, it is ultimately inadequate: not only SA is a petitio principii against emergence, but it is also unsound and invalid. Therefore, we propose a formal strategy to restore its ontological effectiveness. Unfortunately, at a closer look, even this strategy falls short as it unwarrantedly assumes the logicality and invariance of those equivalence relations (such as identity, similarity, and congruence) which are crucial for specifying the theory's model as composed of particulars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
17. The Question of Transcendence and Constraint in a Panartifactual Account of Being, Knowing and Making.
- Author
-
Baç, Murat and Temizler, Büke
- Subjects
HUMAN beings ,REALISM - Abstract
Barry Allen defends a highly unorthodox and compact account of humans and their evolutionary adventure, which comprises inter alia epistemological, alethic, technological, and artistic aspects. His anthropocentric view distinguishes itself from traditional forms of realism and anti-realism by virtue of its dynamic and non-reductionist character. Allen adopts a certain perspective of techno-artistic and onto-epistemic construction, which we dub "panartifactualism," claiming principally that nothing at all escapes the artifactualizing power of human beings. We maintain that, under closer scrutiny, various dimensions of Allen's account conflict and that his philosophical approach to "being" and "making" ultimately gives rise to a rather problematic ontological picture. Having pointed out its shortcomings and untenable results, we spell out the conceptual contours of a contemporary and far more attractive version of realism which suffers neither from the issues faced by views like panartifactualism nor from the obvious difficulties of noumenalist realism justifiably opposed by Allen. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2022
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
18. Truthmaker Theory and Naturalism.
- Author
-
Rowe, David
- Subjects
METAPHYSICS ,NATURALISM ,ONTOLOGY - Abstract
This paper argues that there is a heretofore unresolved tension between truthmaker-style metaphysics and a plausible version of Naturalism. At the turn of the century, George Molnar proposed four prima facie plausible principles for a realist metaphysics in order to expose truthmaker theory’s incapacity to find truthmakers for negative truths. I marshal the current plethora of attempted solutions to the problem into a crisp trilemma. Those who solve it claim that Molnar’s tetrad is consistent; those who dissolve it do away with the requirement that every truth needs a truthmaker; and those who absolve it embrace a negative ontology. I argue that one is forced to absolve the problem: all other avenues undermine the truthmaker principle itself. Absolving the problem, however, does not sit well with a version of Naturalism that most would accept. We are drawn to a simple dilemma: either embrace a negative ontology, or reject truthmaker-style metaphysics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2018
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
19. Dispositionality and Symmetry Structures.
- Author
-
Livanios, Vassilis
- Subjects
SYMMETRY ,MODAL logic ,STRUCTURAL dynamics ,REALISM ,ONTOLOGY - Abstract
A number of metaphysicians and philosophers of science have raised the issue of the modality of the fundamental structures of the world. Although the debate so far has been largely focused on the (alleged) inherent causal character of fundamental structures, one aspect of it has naturally taken its place as part of the dispositional/categorical debate. In this paper, I focus on the latter in the case of the fundamental symmetry structures. After putting forward the necessary metaphysical presuppositions for the debate to make sense, I offer an argument which undermines the plausibility of a dispositionalist account of fundamental symmetry structures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2018
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
20. Can Universals be Wholly Located where Their Instances are Located?
- Author
-
Mahlan, John Robert
- Subjects
UNIVERSALS (Philosophy) ,INDIVIDUATION (Philosophy) ,METAPHYSICS ,ONTOLOGY - Abstract
Many philosophers believe that there are both particulars and universals. Many of these philosophers, in turn, believe that universals are
immanent . On this view, universals are wholly located where their instances are located. Both Douglas Ehring and E.J. Lowe have argued that immanent universals do not exist on the grounds that nothing can be wholly located in multiple places simultaneously without contradiction. In this paper, I focus on Lowe’s argument, which has received far less attention in the literature. Using the theory of location found in Josh Parsons (2007), I show how Lowe’s argument against immanent universals can be resisted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]- Published
- 2018
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
21. In Defence of Powerful Qualities.
- Author
-
Taylor, John
- Subjects
ONTOLOGY ,CRITICISM ,CONSCIOUSNESS - Abstract
The ontology of 'powerful qualities' is gaining an increasing amount of attention in the literature on properties. This is the view that the so-called categorical or qualitative properties are identical with 'dispositional' properties. The position is associated with C.B. Martin, John Heil, Galen Strawson and Jonathan Jacobs. Robert Schroer () has recently mounted a number of criticisms against the powerful qualities view as conceived by these main adherents, and has also advanced his own (radically different) version of the view. In this paper I have three main aims: firstly, I shall defend the ontology from his critique, arguing that his criticisms do not damage the position. Secondly, I shall argue that Schroer's own version of the view is untenable. Thirdly, the paper shall serve to clear up some conceptual confusions that often bedevil the powerful qualities view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2013
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
22. Kant, Spinoza, and the Metaphysics of the Ontological Proof.
- Author
-
Basile, Pierfrancesco
- Subjects
ONTOLOGY ,ONTOLOGICAL proof of God - Abstract
This paper provides an interpretation and evaluation of Spinoza’s highly original version of the ontological proof in terms of the concept of substance instead of the concept of perfection in the first book of his Ethics. Taking the lead from Kant’s critique of ontological arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason, the paper explores the underlying ontological and epistemological presuppositions of Spinoza’s proof. The main topics of consideration are the nature of Spinoza’s definitions, the way he conceives of the relation between a substance and its essence, and his conception of existence. Once clarity is shed upon these fundamental issues, it becomes possible to address the proof in its own terms. It is then easy to see that Kant’s objections miss their target and that the same is true of those advanced by another of the ontological argument’s most famous critics, Bertrand Russell. Finally, several interpretations of Spinoza’s proof are proposed and critically evaluated; on all of them, the argument turns out to be either invalid or question-begging. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2010
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
23. A Novel Interpretation of Plato’s Theory of Forms.
- Author
-
Monaghan, P. X.
- Subjects
PERSONAL belongings ,INTERPRETATION (Philosophy) ,PHILOSOPHY ,ONTOLOGY - Abstract
In several recent issues of this journal, I argued for an account of property possession as strict, numerical identity. While this account has stuck some as being highly idiosyncratic in nature, it is not entirely something new under the sun, since as I will argue in this paper, it turns out to have a historic precedent in Plato’s theory of forms. Indeed, the purpose of this paper is twofold. The first is to show that my account of property possession can be utilized to provide a novel interpretation of Plato’s theory of forms. And the second is to show that once it has been divorced from a variety of implausible doctrines with which it has historically been wedded, Plato’s central insight that all properties possess themselves, far from being of mere historical interest, is independently plausible, ironically enough, even from an empirical point of view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2010
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
24. Proof of the Existence of Universals—and Roman Ingarden’s Ontology.
- Author
-
Johansson, Ingvar
- Subjects
UNIVERSALS (Philosophy) ,INDIVIDUATION (Philosophy) ,EXISTENTIALISM ,ONTOLOGY ,PHILOSOPHY - Abstract
The paper ends with an argument that says: necessarily, if there are finitely spatially extended particulars, then there are monadic universals. Before that, in order to characterize the distinction between particulars and universals, Roman Ingarden’s notions of “existential moments” and “modes (ways) of being” are presented, and a new pair of such existential moments is introduced: multiplicity–monadicity. Also, it is argued that there are not only real universals, but instances of universals (tropes) and fictional universals too. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2009
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
25. Hylomorphism and the Priority Principle.
- Author
-
Skrzypek, Jeremy W.
- Subjects
SUBSTANCE (Philosophy) ,HYLOMORPHISM ,ABSOLUTE, The ,METAPHYSICS - Abstract
According to Jeffrey Brower's hylomorphic account of material substances, prime matter and substantial forms together compose material substances, and material substances and accidental forms together compose accidental unities. In a recent article, Andrew Bailey has argued that Brower's account has the counter-intuitive implication that no human person is ever the primary possessor, the primary thinker, of her own thoughts. In this paper, I consider various ways in which Brower might reply to this objection. I first consider several "invariant strategies", solutions that do not require any significant alteration to Brower's account. I argue that these strategies are unsuccessful. I then introduce two ways of modifying Brower's hylomorphic account of material substances so as to avoid Bailey's objection. I argue that these "variant strategies" are successful, but they require that Brower significantly alter one or more of the main features of his account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2017
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
26. Easy Ontology and Undecidable Sentences.
- Author
-
Jafari, Javid
- Subjects
ONTOLOGY ,METAPHYSICS ,SENSES - Abstract
According to Thomasson's Easy Ontology, all existential questions have straightforward answers and are solvable by conceptual and empirical work. So there is no need for traditional metaphysics to solve them. First, I give some counterexamples to this thesis from incomplete and undecidable theories. Then I discuss some possible responses, I consider a wider sense of conceptual analysis and argue that even in this sense Easy ontology is not able to resolve the problem and must sacrifice either easiness or answerability. Finally, I will argue that although traditional metaphysics does not make the undecidable sentences answerable, it can still make sense of them and helps us to understand why there are unanswerable questions at all. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2024
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
27. The Non-existence of Ontological Categories: A defence of Lowe.
- Author
-
Miller, J. T. M.
- Subjects
ONTOLOGY ,METAPHYSICS ,REALISM - Abstract
This paper addresses the ontological status of the ontological categories as defended within E.J. Lowe's four-category ontology (kinds, objects, properties/relations, and modes). I consider the arguments in Griffith (2015. "Do Ontological Categories Exist?" Metaphysica 16 (1):25-35) against Lowe's claim that ontological categories do not exist, and argue that Griffith's objections to Lowe do not work once we fully take advantage of ontological resources available within Lowe's four-category ontology. I then argue that the claim that ontological categories do not exist has no undesirable consequences for Lowe's brand of realism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2016
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
28. Abstract Entities in a Presentist World.
- Author
-
Filomeno, Aldo
- Subjects
METAPHYSICS ,PRESENTISM (Philosophy) ,ONTOLOGISM ,ONTOLOGY ,EXISTENTIALISM ,PLURALISM - Abstract
How can a metaphysics of abstract entities be built upon a metaphysics of time? In this paper, I address the question of how to accommodate abstract entities in a presentist world. I consider both the traditional metaontological approach of unrestricted fundamental quantification and then ontological pluralism. I argue that under the former we need to impose two constraints in the characterization of presentism in order to avoid undesired commitments to abstract entities: we have to characterize presentism as a thesis only about the concrete, and we also need to avoid the widely held distinction between tensed and tenseless senses of existence. Under ontological pluralism, instead, I argue that we can naturally accommodate any view of abstract objects in a presentist world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2016
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
29. A Neo-Armstrongian Defense of States of Affairs: A Reply to Vallicella.
- Author
-
Perovic, Katarina
- Subjects
METAPHYSICS ,ONTOLOGY ,EXISTENTIALISM - Abstract
Vallicella's influential work makes a case that, when formulated broadly, as a problem about unity, Bradley's challenge to Armstrongian states of affairs is practically insurmountable. He argues that traditional relational and non-relational responses to Bradley are inadequate, and many in the current metaphysical debate on this issue have come to agree. In this paper, I argue that such a conclusion is too hasty. Firstly, the problem of unity as applied to Armstrongian states of affairs is not clearly defined; in fact, it has taken a number of different forms each of which need to be carefully distinguished and further supported. Secondly, once we formulate the problem in more neutral terms, as a request for a characterization of the way that particulars, universals, and states of affairs stand to one another, it can be adequately addressed by an Armstrongian about states of affairs. I propose the desiderata for an adequate characterization and present a neo-Armstrongian defense of states of affairs that meets those desiderata. The latter relies on an important distinction between different notions of fundamentality and existential dependence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2016
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
30. Language and Hume's Search for a Theory of the Self.
- Author
-
Schwerin, Alan
- Subjects
THOUGHT & thinking ,CONSCIOUSNESS ,SEARCH theory ,PHILOSOPHY - Abstract
In his Treatise Hume makes a profound suggestion: philosophical problems, especially problems in metaphysics, are verbal. This view is most vigorously articulated and defended in the course of his investigation of the problem of the self, in the section 'Of personal identity.' My paper is a critical exploration of Hume's arguments for this influential thesis and an analysis of the context that informs this 1739 version of the nature of philosophical problems that anticipates the linguistic turn in philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2015
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
31. Temporal Phenomena, Ontology and the R-theory.
- Author
-
Nathan Oaklander, L.
- Subjects
ONTOLOGY ,PHILOSOPHY ,METAPHYSICS ,NECESSITY (Philosophy) - Abstract
One of the more serious criticisms of the B-theory is that by denying the passage of time or maintaining that passage is a mind-dependent illusion or appearance, the B-theory gives rise to a static, block universe and thereby removes what is most distinctively timelike about time. The aim of this paper is to discuss the R-theory of time, after Russell, who Richard Gale calls 'the father of the B-theory,' and explain how the R-theory can respond to the criticisms just raised, and others. In the course of my discussion I shall clarify differences between versions of the A-, B- and R-theories of time, and argue that McTaggart's conception of the B-series and more specifically, the B-relations that generate it, has been instrumental in misconstruing the A-/B-theory debate resulting in criticisms of the B-theory that can be seen to be fallacious when applied to the R-theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2015
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
32. Do Ontological Categories Exist?
- Author
-
Griffith, Aaron M.
- Subjects
ONTOLOGY ,SUBSTANCE (Philosophy) ,NOMINALISM - Abstract
This paper concerns the ontological status of ontological categories (e.g., universal, particular, substance, property, relation, kind, object, etc.). I consider E. J. Lowe's argument for the view that ontological categories do not exist and point out that it has some undesirable consequences for his realist ontology. I go on to argue that the main premise in Lowe's argument - that ontological categories cannot be categorized - is false and then develop a conception of ontological categories as formal ontological kinds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2015
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
33. Must Naturalism Lead to a Deflationary Meta-Ontology?
- Author
-
Haug, Matthew
- Subjects
NATURALISM ,ONTOLOGY ,METAPHYSICS ,NATURALISTS ,PHILOSOPHY - Abstract
Huw Price has argued that naturalistic philosophy inevitably leads to a deflationary approach to ontological questions. In this paper, I rebut these arguments. A more substantive, less language-focused approach to metaphysics remains open to naturalists. However, rebutting one of Price's main arguments requires rejecting Quine's criterion of ontological commitment. So, even though Price's argument is unsound, it reveals that naturalists cannot rest content with broadly Quinean, 'mainstream metaphysics,' which, I suggest, naturalists also have independent reasons to reject. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2014
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
34. Structure and Significance in Metaphysics.
- Author
-
Graham, Andrew J.
- Subjects
METAPHYSICS ,ONTOLOGY ,MODAL logic ,STRUCTURALISM ,REALITY - Abstract
This paper discusses recent attempts to defend metaphysics as a worthwhile form of inquiry. According to such views, metaphysics concerns the world's fundamental structure. I question whether this view can establish that metaphysical disputes are relevant to the rest of our theoretical activities. I take this relevance to be a criterion for whether disputes are worthwhile (or, as I call them, 'significant'). I argue that the structure approach is unsatisfactory because appropriately structural disputes need not be worthwhile disputes, and vice versa. So, the structure approach threatens to render metaphysics irrelevant to our broader theorizing, undermining many of its legitimate successes, like the role theorizing about metaphysical modality played in the development of modal logic. Thus these structure-based views provide a poor defense of metaphysics. I then offer an alternative conception of metaphysics as an attempt to understand our most ubiquitous theoretical notions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2014
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
35. Coincident Entities and Question-Begging Predicates: an Issue in Meta-Ontology.
- Author
-
Berto, Francesco
- Subjects
COINCIDENCE ,ONTOLOGY ,METHODOLOGY ,PHILOSOPHICAL analysis ,METAPHYSICS - Abstract
Meta-ontology (in van Inwagen's sense) concerns the methodology of ontology, and a controversial meta-ontological issue is to what extent ontology can rely on linguistic analysis while establishing the furniture of the world. This paper discusses an argument advanced by some ontologists (I call them unifiers) against supporters of or coincident entities (I call them multipliers) and its meta-ontological import. Multipliers resort to Leibniz's Law to establish that spatiotemporally coincident entities a and b are distinct, by pointing at a predicate F() made true by a and false by b. Unifiers try to put multipliers in front of a dilemma: in attempting to introduce metaphysical differences on the basis of semantic distinctions, multipliers either (a) rest on a fallacy of verbalism, entailed by a trade-off between a de dicto and a de re reading of modal claims, or (b) beg the question against unifiers by having to assume the distinction between a and b beforehand. I shall rise a tu quoque, showing that unifiers couldn't even distinguish material objects (or events) from the spatiotemporal regions they occupy unless they also resorted to linguistic distinctions. Their methodological aim to emancipate themselves from linguistic analysis in ontological businesses is therefore problematic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2013
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
36. The Incompleteness of the World and Its Consequences.
- Author
-
Westerhoff, Jan
- Subjects
LOGIC ,ONTOLOGY ,ANTI-realism ,REALISM ,CONTRADICTION - Abstract
In the recent literature we find various arguments against the possibility of absolutely general quantification. Far from being merely a technical question in the philosophy of logic, the impossibility of absolutely general quantification (if established) would have severe consequence for ontology, for it would imply the non-existence of the world as traditionally conceived. This paper will investigate these implications for ontology and consider some possible ways of addressing them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2013
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
37. Why so Serious? Non-serious Presentism and the Problem of Cross-temporal Relations.
- Author
-
Inman, Ross
- Subjects
METAPHYSICS ,PRESENTISM (Philosophy) ,PHILOSOPHY ,ONTOLOGY ,PHILOSOPHY of mind - Abstract
It is a common assumption in the metaphysics of time that a commitment to presentism entails a commitment to serious presentism, the view that objects can exemplify properties or stand in relations only at times at which they exist. As a result, non-serious presentism is widely thought to be beyond the bounds for the card-carrying presentist in response to the problem of cross-temporal relations. In this paper, I challenge this general consensus by examining one common argument in favor of the thesis that presentism entails serious presentism. The argument, I claim, begs the question against non-serious defenders in failing to account for their wider metaontological views concerning non-committal quantification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2012
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
38. Hume's Ontology.
- Author
-
Johansson, Ingvar
- Subjects
PHILOSOPHY ,ONTOLOGY ,METAPHYSICS ,SENSORY perception ,THEORY of knowledge - Abstract
The paper claims that Hume's philosophy contains an ontology, i.e. an abstract exhaustive classification of what there is. It is argued that Hume believes in the existence of a mind-independent world, and that he has a classification of mind-related entities that contains four top genera: perception, faculty, principle and relation. His ontology is meant to be in conformity with his philosophy of language and epistemology, and vice versa. Therefore, crucial to Hume's ontology of mind-independent entities is his notion of 'supposing relative ideas'. Entities that are referred to by means of ordinary ideas can be truly classified, whereas entities that are referred to by means of relative ideas can only be hinted at. When Hume's ontology is highlighted and systematised, his notion 'the faculty of imagination' becomes highly problematic. However, the exposition also makes it clear that Hume deserves the honorary title: the first cognitive scientist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2012
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
39. Hume on the Self.
- Author
-
Schwerin, Alan
- Subjects
MIND & body ,SENSORY perception ,ONTOLOGY ,PHILOSOPHY ,IDENTITY (Philosophical concept) - Abstract
In the Treatise Hume argues that a person is 'nothing but a bundle of perceptions'. But what precisely is the meaning of this bundle thesis of a person? In my paper, an attempt is made to articulate two plausible interpretations of this controversial view and to identify and evaluate a number of problems for this thesis that is central to Hume's account of the self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2012
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
40. On Three Arguments against Endurantism.
- Author
-
Janzen, Greg
- Subjects
WHOLE & parts (Philosophy) ,CATEGORIES (Philosophy) ,ONTOLOGY ,HISTORICAL linguistics - Abstract
Judith Thomson, David Lewis, and Ted Sider have each formulated different arguments that apparently pose problems for our ordinary claims of diachronic sameness, i.e., claims in which we assert that familiar, concrete objects survive (or persist) through time by enduring as numerically the same entity despite minor changes in their intrinsic and relational properties. In this paper, I show that all three arguments fail, in a rather obvious way-they beg the question-and so even though there may be arguments that provide grounds to fuss about whether our ordinary claims of diachronic sameness are defective, Thomson, Lewis, and Sider's arguments are not among them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2011
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
41. Substrata and Properties: From Bare Particulars to Supersubstantivalism?
- Author
-
Morganti, Matteo
- Subjects
SUBSTRATUM (Linguistics) ,IDENTITY (Philosophical concept) ,ONTOLOGY ,DIALECTS ,CRITICISM (Philosophy) - Abstract
The theory of the ontological constitution of material objects based on bare particulars has recently experienced a revival, especially thanks to the work of J.P. Moreland. Moreland and other authors belonging to this 'new wave', however, have focused primarily on the issue whether or not the notion of a 'bare' particular is internally consistent. Not much has been said, instead, about the relation holding between bare particulars and the properties they are supposed to unify into concrete particulars. This paper aims to fill this gap and, making reference primarily to Moreland's version of the theory, highlight some aspects and consequences of it that have not received due attention so far. It is argued that, given a number of seemingly plausible metaphysical assumptions, supporters of bare particulars are led to either endorse supersubstantivalism-the view that material objects are identical with regions of space-time-or abandon their theory altogether. Whatever one makes of the proposed conclusion, a dialectical structure emerges that puts precise constraints on bare particular ontologies and, therefore, will have to be taken into account in future discussion of these and related topics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2011
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
42. Naturalness, Vagueness, and Sortals.
- Author
-
Campdelacreu, Marta
- Subjects
DEFLATIONARY theory of truth ,ONTOLOGY ,REALISM ,VAGUENESS (Philosophy) ,INDETERMINACY (Linguistics) - Abstract
In the past few years, deflationary positions in the debate on the nature of composite material objects have become prominent. According to Ted Sider these include the thesis of quantifier variance, against which he has defended ontological realism. Recently, Sider has considered the possibility of rejecting his arguments against the vagueness of the unrestricted quantifiers in terms of translation functions. Against this strategy, he has presented an intuitive complaint and has argued that it can only be resisted if quantifier variance is accepted. But this is false. In this paper I argue, against Sider, that there is a coherent way to combine the rejection of quantifier variance with the vagueness of the unrestricted quantifiers. I sketch a model to show this, and then I consider, on the basis of it, several versions of the indeterminacy argument against the vagueness of the unrestricted quantifiers that Sider has formulated over the years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2010
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
43. In Defence of Pan-Dispositionalism.
- Author
-
Bostock, Simon
- Subjects
DISPOSITION (Philosophy) ,PHILOSOPHY ,METAPHYSICS ,ONTOLOGY ,NATURE - Abstract
Pan-Dispositionalism – the view that all properties (and relations) are irreducibly dispositional – currently appears to have no takers amongst major analytic metaphysicians. There are those, such as Mumford, who are open to the idea but remain uncommitted. And there are those, such as Ellis and Molnar, who accept that some properties are irreducibly dispositional but argue that not all are. In this paper, I defend Pan-Dispositionalism against this ‘Moderate’ Dispositionalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2008
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
44. The Logical vs. the Ontological Understanding of Conditions.
- Author
-
Ingthorsson, Rögnvaldur
- Subjects
LOGIC ,ONTOLOGY ,CAUSATION (Philosophy) ,TRUTH functions (Mathematical logic) ,PHILOSOPHY - Abstract
According to the truth-functional analysis of conditions, to be ‘necessary for’ and ‘sufficient for’ are converse relations. From this, it follows that to be ‘necessary and sufficient for’ is a symmetric relation, that is, that if P is a necessary and sufficient condition for Q, then Q is a necessary and sufficient condition for P. This view is contrary to common sense. In this paper, I point out that it is also contrary to a widely accepted ontological view of conditions, according to which if P is a necessary and sufficient condition for Q, then Q is in no sense a condition for P; it is a mere consequence of P. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2008
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
45. Functions and Shapes in the Light of the International System of Units.
- Author
-
Johansson, Ingvar
- Subjects
ONTOLOGY ,NATURE ,MATHEMATICS ,GEOMETRIC shapes ,MATHEMATICAL functions - Abstract
Famously, Galilei made the ontological claim that the book of nature is written in the language of mathematics. Probably, if only implicitly, most contemporary natural scientists share his view. This paper, in contradistinction, argues that nature is only partly written in the language of mathematics; partly, it is written in the language of functions and partly in a very simple purely qualitative language, too. During the argumentation, three more specific but in themselves interesting theses are put forward: first (in Section 3), there are more shapes than real numbers; second (in Section 4), the metrological notion ‘amount of substance’ can profitably be exchanged for ‘number of entities’; third (in Section 5), prototypical concepts will always be scientifically important. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2008
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
46. How to Derive a ‘Not’ from an ‘Is’: A Defense of the Incompatibility View of Negative Truths.
- Author
-
Veber, Michael
- Subjects
TRUTH ,PHILOSOPHERS ,ONTOLOGY ,METAPHYSICS ,PHILOSOPHY - Abstract
Truthmaker maximalism is the claim that every truth has a truthmaker. The case of negative truths leads some philosophers to postulate negative states of affairs or to give up on truthmaker maximalism. This paper defends a version of the incompatibility view of negative truths. Negative truths can be made true by positive facts, and thus, truthmaker maximalism can be maintained without postulating negative states of affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2008
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
47. Resembling Particulars: What Nominalism?
- Author
-
Morganti, Matteo
- Subjects
INDIVIDUATION (Philosophy) ,NOMINALISM ,RESEMBLANCE (Philosophy) ,TROPES (Philosophy) ,ONTOLOGY - Abstract
This paper examines a recent proposal for reviving so-called resemblance nominalism. It is argued that, although consistent, it naturally leads to trope theory upon examination for reasons having to do with the appeal of neutrality as regards certain non-trivial ontological theses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2007
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
48. A Novel Category of Vague Abstracta.
- Author
-
Goodman, Jeffrey
- Subjects
METAPHYSICS ,ONTOLOGY ,VAGUENESS (Philosophy) ,CONCRETE (Philosophy) ,ABSTRACTS - Abstract
Much attention has been given to the question of ontic vagueness, and the issues usually center around whether certain paradigmatically concrete entities - cats, clouds, mountains, etc. - are vague in the sense of having indeterminate spatial boundaries. In this paper, however, I wish to focus on a way in which some abstracta seem to be locationally vague. To begin, I will briefly cover some territory already covered regarding certain types of "traditional" abstracta and the ways they are currently alleged to be vague. I then wish to discuss two types of "nontraditional" abstracta and the sense in which I think some of these objects are locationally vague. I will next reexamine some of the traditional abstracta and discuss whether any of these objects are locationally vague in the novel way suggested for the nontraditional sorts. I'll finish by discussing objections, and conclude with some remarks about characterizing the abstract/concrete distinction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2007
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
49. Why Mereological Essentialism Applies to Mereological Aggregates.
- Author
-
Moreland, James Porter
- Subjects
ESSENTIALISM (Philosophy) ,WHOLE & parts (Philosophy) ,ONTOLOGY ,METAPHYSICS ,AMBIVALENCE - Abstract
This article's purpose is to defend the depiction of ordinary-sized physical objects as mereological aggregates (MAs), to clarify what the ontology of an MA is, and to show why mereological essentialism (ME) applies to MAs that seem to be ubiquitous if we are to adopt what Frank Jackson calls "Serious Metaphysics" and refuse to broaden our ontology beyond what is (allegedly) bequeathed to us by physics and chemistry. To accomplish this goal, first, I clarify certain background issues that inform what follows and I identify certain constraints that relate to the contemporary ambivalence towards ME. Second, I present a primer on Husserlian mereology that provides a superior account of parts and wholes than the inadequate approach identified in the previous section. Third, I will offer a defense of ME as the correct approach to providing an ontological account of MAs. Finally, I will evaluate two defeaters against my thesis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
50. Events and Modes.
- Author
-
Paolini Paoletti, Michele
- Subjects
ONTOLOGY ,METAPHYSICS - Abstract
I shall refine in this article Jaegwon Kim's theory of events by appealing to modes, i.e., particular properties that also depend on their 'bearers' for their identity. Events will turn out to be occurrent modes, i.e., relational modes having further modes and times as their relata. In Section 1 I shall briefly present Kim's theory and some difficulties that affect it. In Section 2, after having made some preliminary assumptions on modes and universals, I shall introduce occurrent modes. In Section 3 I shall show how my theory can deal with the difficulties discussed in Section 1. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2023
- Full Text
- View/download PDF
Discovery Service for Jio Institute Digital Library
For full access to our library's resources, please sign in.