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The main idea embedded in the hypothesis of the extended mind is that the mind is not confined to the body or the nervous system. This hypothesis asserts that contrary to the traditional (physicalist) view, according to which the boundaries of the mind correspond to the boundaries of the brain (or the body), mental and cognitive states can be extended beyond the boundaries of the nervous system (or the body). In this paper, I will try to deal with the hypothesis and the arguments in its favor. Also, I will try to focus on some of its problems and limitations. An objection raised in this paper against this thesis is inspired by a widelyknown argument called “epistemic argument”. According to this objection, phenomenal states cannot be attributed to “hybrid systems”, systems constituted by both the nervous system and environmental components. I will argue that the hypothesis of the extended mind, at best, conceptually excludes conscious states. Consequently, it is not obvious at all that, given this substantial conceptual limitation, to what extent the advocates of this hypothesis are entitled to claim that their application of the term “mind” still semantically overlap with the referent of traditional view’s proponents sufficiently. Another objection appeals to the fact that, regarding scientific explanation and prediction, the traditional concept of the mind has shown fruitful whereas the concept of extended mind is unlikely to readily yield numerous law-like regularities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present paper analyzes and evaluates Michael J. Zimmermann's view on the relationship between moral luck and moral responsibility. In moral philosophy, this relationship is considered from conceptual and subjective aspects. Conceptually, in moral luck, people’s moral judgments about each other are based on involuntary and chancy actions while the moral responsibility of these judgments are based on free actions. Moral luck, concerning its subject, faces a problem that involves old discussions about the conflict between determinism and free will and moral responsibility that goes beyond that problem. By accepting freedom as having volition and desire in action and initiating a difference between the degree and scope of moral responsibility, Zimmermann, a well-known philosopher, denies moral luck and defends moral responsibility. He also claims to have solved the problems of moral luck and moral responsibility. This paper, after exploring the meaning and relationship between responsibility and moral luck, explains Zimmerman's view on moral responsibility, freedom, and rejection of moral luck. Ultimately, an assessment of this view will show that, despite Zimmerman's innovations, his extremism in defending moral responsibility has made it difficult to accept his view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Husserl's reflections on art and aesthetics can be discussed in four parts. First, a comparison of the phenomenological and aesthetical attitudes focusing on existential disinterestness and the suspension of the external world is drawn. Second, there are Husserl's views on imageconsciousness which play a prominent role in understanding the work of art as a work of art, as well as its differences from other types of consciousness and its three-layer nature namely the physical substrate, the image-object, and the image subject. The third part concerns the division of art into the realistic, idealistic, and philosophical art. And the fourth part deals with the capabilities of Husserl's phenomenology to formulate a phenomenological theory of art. The concepts ‘artworld’ and ‘life-world’ as a framework or context play a crucial role in this regard. In this paper, it has been tried to point out some of these capabilities according to the basic elements of phenomenology such as opposition to reductionism, presuppositionless investigation, anti-psychologism and anti-naturalism, descriptive method and “going back to the things themselves”. Accordingly, the phenomenological aesthetics emphasizes more than anything the intentionality of aesthetic consciousness and the relationships between the subjects of the artworld, and seeks the foundation of art and the work of art in these intentionalities and relations. It can serve as a basis and framework for traditional aesthetical theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Heidegger’s critique of Aristoteles’ definition of mankind as ζώον λόγον έχον is a long and still attractive chapter in his philosophy. We see often in Heidegger’s works that he appeals to the Latin translation (or the Latin interpretation, as he says) of animal rationale as a way to criticize western metaphysics. The conception of mankind in western metaphysics, culture, and thought is based on the Aristotelian definition. This paper aims to discuss the role and importance of this definition in Heidegger's thought. Broadly speaking, he has two kinds of discussion about it: there is a question concerning human beings, but in so far as it is the Being-question; and there is a question concerning language. Here we restrict ourselves to the latter. Firstly, in the introduction part, we will justify posing a question about the human being and will show that such a question is a kind of Being-question. After that, in the first part, based on Heidegger’s lecture The Ground Problems of Metaphysics (1929/30) we will explore those language-problems which are arisen from the Aristotelian definition. Heidegger's starting point is λόγος, i.e. speech or language, which is taken from ζώον λόγον έχον. Finally, in the second part, we will explore the same problem in Heidegger’s Being and Time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relation of wholes to their parts is one of the fundamental themes of metaphysics of composition. Are wholes nothing over and above their parts? Are wholes and their parts identical? The thesis so-called “composition as identity” is a positive answer to the two last equivalent answers. However, there are two versions of the theses: the weak version and the strong version. According to the weak version, the relation of wholes to their parts is not the identity in a strict and logical sense. But that relation is similar to identity. According to the strong version, the relation of wholes to their parts is identity in a strict and logical sense. In this paper, we first formulate these theses, then we criticize the argument based on ontological parsimony. Both weak and strong versions of the thesis of composition as identity claim that they are more parsimonious than the rival thesis-the thesis that wholes and their parts are not identical. Therefore, if their explanatory power is equal, they are rationally preferred to their rival. We showed that both versions of the thesis of composition as identity suffered from abundant ontological-semantic problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After his so-called period of Kehre, Heidegger sought to pursue his thought of truth of being in a poetic or thinking-led mode of thought. The outcome of this effort was the development of some concepts and terms that are considered illogical in contemporary philosophical discourses and are described as mystical notions. Geviert or Fourfold is one of these terms that has played a key role in the philosophy of Later Heidegger. In 1950 and 1951 Heidegger delivered two lectures entitled "Das Ding" and "Bauen, Wohnen, Denken". In these lectures, he seeks to reflect on Geviert focusing on two notions of Das Ding and Wohnen and casts light on their relationship with the discussion of the Truth of Being. In this paper, we try to provide an analysis of Geviert and its place in Later Hiedegger's being-historical thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]