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This article examines US covert operations toward Iran from February until November 1979. It focuses especially on whether the CIA was trying to undermine or overthrow Iran's nascent Islamic regime, as many Iranians believed. The article details the extensive covert contacts the CIA and other US personnel established in this period with Iranian officials and various Iranian opposition factions. Its main conclusion is that US officials established these contacts for the purpose of gathering intelligence about the rapidly changing situation in Iran, rather than to undermine the Islamic regime. Indeed, US personnel never encouraged these Iranian contacts to plot against the regime and often explicitly discouraged them from doing so. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

While dealing with the human rights issue, the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO), which used to be the main opposition group that fought the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), did not realize that this sensitive struggle would cost it a ‘triple exclusion’. The MKO wished to use international agencies and diplomatic bodies, such as the European Union, the European Parliament, the UN and others, in order to raise the issue of human rights violations in Iran. In general, the aim was to topple the IRI by putting pressure on it through international sanctions and by gathering diplomatic support to replace the IRI with a democratic MKO government. The use of the human rights issue as a tool to gain support resulted in the opposite of what they wished. They became discriminated against by the IRI and excluded from the Iranian and international political spheres. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The primary aim of this article is to examine the policies of the elite in Iran in relation to political parties and organizations that have emerged between 1979 and 2009. It also attempts to argue that the politics of factionalism has proven to be incapable of creating a viable political system. On the other hand, it has been difficult to anticipate the emergence of a system based on party politics in Iran more than three decades after the revolution. The findings of this article demonstrate how determined the elite were in shaping politics in Iran, and will also show that the move away from factionalism to a system based on party politics between 1997 and 2009 faced stiff opposition from the conservative elite. The situation polarized politics in Iran and further increased intra-elite factionalism. This article relies mostly on Iranian primary sources, accessing opinions that have not yet been published or discussed. The focus is on examining the relationship between high-ranking members of the elite and organizations representing different interests within the system that came to existence either before or immediately after the revolution in 1979. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]