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Haemophilus influenzae (Hi) can cause meningitis and other serious invasive disease. Encapsulated Hi is classified into six serotypes (a-f) based on chemical composition of the polysaccharide capsule; unencapsulated strains are termed nontypeable Hi (NTHi). Hi serotype b (Hib) was the most common cause of bacterial meningitis in children in the pre-Hib vaccine era, and secondary transmission of Hi among children (e.g., to household contacts and in child care facilities) (1,2) led to the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) recommendation for antibiotic chemoprophylaxis to prevent Hib disease in certain circumstances.* High Hib vaccination coverage since the 1990s has substantially reduced Hib disease, and other serotypes now account for most Hi-associated invasive disease in the United States (3). Nevertheless, CDC does not currently recommend chemoprophylaxis for contacts of persons with invasive disease caused by serotypes other than Hib and by NTHi (non-b Hi). Given this changing epidemiology, U.S. surveillance data were reviewed to investigate secondary cases of invasive disease caused by Hi. The estimated prevalence of secondary transmission was 0.32% among persons with encapsulated Hi disease (≤60 days of one another) and 0.12% among persons with NTHi disease (≤14 days of one another). Isolates from all Hi case pairs were genetically closely related, and all patients with potential secondary infection had underlying medical conditions. These results strongly suggest that secondary transmission of non-b Hi occurs. Expansion of Hi chemoprophylaxis recommendations might be warranted to control invasive Hi disease in certain populations in the United States, but further analysis is needed to evaluate the potential benefits against the risks, such as increased antibiotic use.

Competing Interests: All authors have completed and submitted the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors form for disclosure of potential conflicts of interest. No potential conflicts of interest were disclosed.

Competing Interests: All authors have completed and submitted the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors form for disclosure of potential conflicts of interest. No potential conflicts of interest were disclosed.

Competing Interests: All authors have completed and submitted the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors form for disclosure of potential conflicts of interest. Ruth Lynfield reports participation on the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE) Executive Board, the National Foundation of Infectious Diseases (NFID) Executive Board, the Program Committee for ID Week, and serving as associate editor of the American Academy of Pediatrics Red Book (the fee for which was donated to the Minnesota Department of Health), and receipt of support from these groups to attend CSTE, American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Infectious Diseases, NFID, and ID Week meetings. Samuel R. Dominguez reports institutional support from Pfizer and Biofire Diagnostics, unrelated to the current work, and consulting fees (paid to his institution) from Biofire Diagnostics and Karius. Jennifer Zipprich reports that her spouse is employed by Pfizer. No other potential conflicts of interest were disclosed.

The risk for monkeypox transmission to health care personnel (HCP) caring for symptomatic patients is thought to be low but has not been thoroughly assessed in the context of the current global outbreak (1). Monkeypox typically spreads through close physical (often skin-to-skin) contact with lesions or scabs, body fluids, or respiratory secretions of a person with an active monkeypox infection. CDC currently recommends that HCP wear a gown, gloves, eye protection, and an N95 (or higher-level) respirator while caring for patients with suspected or confirmed monkeypox to protect themselves from infection † (1,2). The Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE) evaluated HCP exposures and personal protective equipment (PPE) use in health care settings during care of patients who subsequently received a diagnosis of Orthopoxvirus infection (presumptive monkeypox determined by a polymerase chain reaction [PCR] DNA assay) or monkeypox (real-time PCR assay and genetic sequencing performed by CDC). During May 1-July 31, 2022, a total of 313 HCP interacted with patients with subsequently diagnosed monkeypox infections while wearing various combinations of PPE; 23% wore all recommended PPE during their exposures. Twenty-eight percent of exposed HCP were considered to have had high- or intermediate-risk exposures and were therefore eligible to receive postexposure prophylaxis (PEP) with the JYNNEOS vaccine § ; among those, 48% (12% of all exposed HCP) received the vaccine. PPE use varied by facility type: HCP in sexually transmitted infection (STI) clinics and community health centers reported the highest adherence to recommended PPE use, and primary and urgent care settings reported the lowest adherence. No HCP developed a monkeypox infection during the 21 days after exposure. These results suggest that the risk for transmission of monkeypox in health care settings is low. Infection prevention training is important in all health care settings, and these findings can guide future updates to PPE recommendations and risk classification in health care settings., Competing Interests: All authors have completed and submitted the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors form for disclosure of potential conflicts of interest. Rachel K. Herlihy reports support from the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists for travel to their annual conference. No other potential conflicts of interest were disclosed.

Monkeypox, a zoonotic infection caused by an orthopoxvirus, is endemic in parts of Africa. On August 4, 2022, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services declared the U.S. monkeypox outbreak, which began on May 17, to be a public health emergency (1,2). After detection of the first U.S. monkeypox case), CDC and health departments implemented enhanced monkeypox case detection and reporting. Among 2,891 cases reported in the United States through July 22 by 43 states, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia (DC), CDC received case report forms for 1,195 (41%) cases by July 27. Among these, 99% of cases were among men; among men with available information, 94% reported male-to-male sexual or close intimate contact during the 3 weeks before symptom onset. Among the 88% of cases with available data, 41% were among non-Hispanic White (White) persons, 28% among Hispanic or Latino (Hispanic) persons, and 26% among non-Hispanic Black or African American (Black) persons. Forty-two percent of persons with monkeypox with available data did not report the typical prodrome as their first symptom, and 46% reported one or more genital lesions during their illness; 41% had HIV infection. Data suggest that widespread community transmission of monkeypox has disproportionately affected gay, bisexual, and other men who have sex with men and racial and ethnic minority groups. Compared with historical reports of monkeypox in areas with endemic disease, currently reported outbreak-associated cases are less likely to have a prodrome and more likely to have genital involvement. CDC and other federal, state, and local agencies have implemented response efforts to expand testing, treatment, and vaccination. Public health efforts should prioritize gay, bisexual, and other men who have sex with men, who are currently disproportionately affected, for prevention and testing, while addressing equity, minimizing stigma, and maintaining vigilance for transmission in other populations. Clinicians should test patients with rash consistent with monkeypox, † regardless of whether the rash is disseminated or was preceded by prodrome. Likewise, although most cases to date have occurred among gay, bisexual, and other men who have sex with men, any patient with rash consistent with monkeypox should be considered for testing. CDC is continually evaluating new evidence and tailoring response strategies as information on changing case demographics, clinical characteristics, transmission, and vaccine effectiveness become available. § ., Competing Interests: All authors have completed and submitted the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors form for disclosure of potential conflicts of interest. Mary-Margaret A. Fill reports Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE) travel support to attend annual CSTE conference and uncompensated membership on the University of Tennessee’s One Health Initiative board. No other potential conflicts of interest were disclosed.

On May 17, 2022, the Massachusetts Department of Public Health (MDPH) Laboratory Response Network (LRN) laboratory confirmed the presence of orthopoxvirus DNA via real-time polymerase chain reaction (PCR) from lesion swabs obtained from a Massachusetts resident. Orthopoxviruses include Monkeypox virus, the causative agent of monkeypox. Subsequent real-time PCR testing at CDC on May 18 confirmed that the patient was infected with the West African clade of Monkeypox virus. Since then, confirmed cases* have been reported by nine states. In addition, 28 countries and territories, † none of which has endemic monkeypox, have reported laboratory-confirmed cases. On May 17, CDC, in coordination with state and local jurisdictions, initiated an emergency response to identify, monitor, and investigate additional monkeypox cases in the United States. This response has included releasing a Health Alert Network (HAN) Health Advisory, developing interim public health and clinical recommendations, releasing guidance for LRN testing, hosting clinician and public health partner outreach calls, disseminating health communication messages to the public, developing protocols for use and release of medical countermeasures, and facilitating delivery of vaccine postexposure prophylaxis (PEP) and antivirals that have been stockpiled by the U.S. government for preparedness and response purposes. On May 19, a call center was established to provide guidance to states for the evaluation of possible cases of monkeypox, including recommendations for clinical diagnosis and orthopoxvirus testing. The call center also gathers information about possible cases to identify interjurisdictional linkages. As of May 31, this investigation has identified 17 § cases in the United States; most cases (16) were diagnosed in persons who identify as gay, bisexual, or men who have sex with men (MSM). Ongoing investigation suggests person-to-person community transmission, and CDC urges health departments, clinicians, and the public to remain vigilant, institute appropriate infection prevention and control measures, and notify public health authorities of suspected cases to reduce disease spread. Public health authorities are identifying cases and conducting investigations to determine possible sources and prevent further spread. This activity was reviewed by CDC and conducted consistent with applicable federal law and CDC policy. ¶ ., Competing Interests: All authors have completed and submitted the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors form for disclosure of potential conflicts of interest. No potential conflicts of interest were disclosed.

In January 2017, the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE) identified four epidemiologically linked cases of mumps among persons from a Marshallese community who were members of the same church in the Denver metropolitan area. During 2016-2017, sizable outbreaks of mumps reported in Arkansas, Hawaii, and Washington also affected the Marshallese population (1). CDPHE, the Tri-County Health Department (TCHD), and Denver Public Health collaborated to conduct an outbreak investigation during January-March 2017 using active and passive surveillance that identified 17 confirmed and 30 probable cases. Public health actions included conducting measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) vaccination clinics at local Marshallese churches; these resulted in the vaccination of 126 persons with ≥1 doses of MMR vaccine. Implementation of active surveillance and support from local Marshallese church leaders in promoting vaccination programs likely contributed to interruption of the outbreak., Competing Interests: All authors have completed and submitted the ICMJE form for disclosure of potential conflicts of interest. No potential conflicts of interest were disclosed.

On April 26, 2015, a case of meningococcal disease in a woman aged 75 years was reported to the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE). As part of routine public health investigation and control activities, all seven family contacts of the patient were advised to receive appropriate postexposure prophylaxis (PEP) to eradicate nasopharyngeal carriage of meningococci and prevent secondary disease (1), although it is not known whether the family contacts complied with PEP recommendations. Fifteen months later, on June 6, 2016, CDPHE was notified that the grandchild of the first patient, a male infant aged 3 months who lived with the first patient, also had meningococcal disease. The infant's immediate family members (parents and one sibling) were among family contacts for whom PEP was recommended in 2015. Neisseria meningitidis isolates from both patients were found to be serogroup C at the CDPHE laboratory. Whole genome sequence (WGS) analysis at CDC found that both isolates had the same sequence type, indicating close genetic relatedness. These cases represent a possible instance of meningococcal disease transmission within a family, despite appropriate PEP recommendations and with a long interval between cases., Competing Interests: No conflicts of interest were reported.

During July 2016-January 2017, two unrelated measles cases were identified in the Denver, Colorado area after patients traveled to countries with endemic measles transmission. Each case resulted in multiple exposures at health care facilities and public venues, and activated an immediate and complex response by local and state public health agencies, with activities led by the Tri-County Health Department (TCHD), which serves Adams, Arapahoe, and Douglas counties. To track the economic burden associated with investigating and responding to single measles cases, personnel hours and supply costs incurred during each investigation were tracked prospectively. No secondary cases of measles were identified in either investigation. Postexposure prophylaxis (PEP) was administered to 31 contacts involving the first case; no contacts of the second case were eligible for PEP because of a delay in diagnosing measles disease. Public health costs of disease investigation in the first and second case were estimated at $49,769 and $18,423, respectively. Single measles cases prompted coordinated public health action and were costly and resource-intensive for local public health agencies.

Before the current Ebola epidemic in West Africa, there were few documented cases of symptomatic Ebola patients traveling by commercial airline, and no evidence of transmission to passengers or crew members during airline travel. In July 2014 two persons with confirmed Ebola virus infection who were infected early in the Nigeria outbreak traveled by commercial airline while symptomatic, involving a total of four flights (two international flights and two Nigeria domestic flights). It is not clear what symptoms either of these two passengers experienced during flight; however, one collapsed in the airport shortly after landing, and the other was documented to have fever, vomiting, and diarrhea on the day the flight arrived. Neither infected passenger transmitted Ebola to other passengers or crew on these flights. In October 2014, another airline passenger, a U.S. health care worker who had traveled domestically on two commercial flights, was confirmed to have Ebola virus infection. Given that the time of onset of symptoms was uncertain, an Ebola airline contact investigation in the United States was conducted. In total, follow-up was conducted for 268 contacts in nine states, including all 247 passengers from both flights, 12 flight crew members, eight cleaning crew members, and one federal airport worker (81 of these contacts were documented in a report published previously). All contacts were accounted for by state and local jurisdictions and followed until completion of their 21-day incubation periods. No secondary cases of Ebola were identified in this investigation, confirming that transmission of Ebola during commercial air travel did not occur.