Search

Typically, people rate enhancement needs as more important than security needs to their well-being. Two studies tested whether event valence and prior trauma moderate relative need importance. Traumatized (hurricane survivors) and non-traumatized (control) participants recalled the most “distressing” (security-relevant) or “satisfying” (enhancement-relevant) event they had recently experienced and rated the importance of 10 needs in defining the event. In both studies, event valence moderated relative need importance on explicit (salience) and implicit (affect) measures as enhancement needs were more important for enhancement-relevant (satisfying) events whereas security needs were more important for security-relevant (distressing) events. However, results also suggest that differences in traumatic experience across samples moderated the effect of event valence on relative need importance. Unlike non-traumatized (control) participants, traumatized (hurricane survivors) participants did not reassign greater importance to enhancement over security needs when event valence shifted to enhancement-relevant (satisfying) memories. We close by discussing implications for human motivation.

College students high and low in test anxiety attributed their performance on each of four examinations in a course to ability, test difficulty, preparation, and luck. Individuals high and low in test anxiety typically evidence systematic predispositions to account for their achievement-related behavior in different terms. The present research substantially replicated these earlier (laboratory and Intellectual Achievement Responsibility Scale) findings in an actual achievement setting. In addition, however, the present findings differed from the earlier evidence in some important respects. Specifically, (a) high test-anxiety students' attributions for failure were far less self-deprecating than in the laboratory evidence, and (b) high test-anxiety students' attributions (for both success and failure) became more personally flattering, or comforting, as the semester progressed. Results were discussed in terms of the laboratory — field distinction and of the influence of a temporal, or time of measurement, factor, hitherto ignored in the causal attribution literature.

Reactions to interpersonal evaluation were investigated among subjects chronically low and high in social anxiety, or shyness. Both groups of subjects expressed more positive affect after receiving favorable than after receiving unfavorable evaluations, supporting a “self-esteem” prediction. However, support for a “self-consistency” viewpoint was also found. In particular, low social anxiety individuals expressed more negative affect (anger) following negative than following positive feedback, while high social anxiety individuals expressed more unpleasant affect (distress) following positive than following negative interpersonal feedback. Additionally, low social anxiety subjects were alone in derogating the accuracy of negative feedback; high social anxiety individuals were indiscriminate in rating the two types of feedback as equally accurate. The role of interpersonal evaluation in the maintenance of social anxiety was discussed briefly.

The present study was designed to test whether or not the use of representativeness and causality heuristics in decision-making results from insufficient or nonvigilant information processing rather than from an inherent deficiency in human information-processing ability. It was hypothesized that subjects who were distracted while making predictions (field-dependent subjects who were continuously aware of other subjects' performance in the experimental session) would fail to use the base rate to a greater extent than would nondistracted subjects (field-dependent subjects who were not aware of the other subjects' performance, and field-independent subjects). As predicted, when other subjects' performance was public, field-independent subjects conformed more to the base rate than did field-dependent subjects. In the private condition, however, the opposite pattern emerged. The results were discussed in terms of the drive theory of social facilitation and non-vigilant information processing.

The influence of affect on causal attributions for success and failure was examined in this experiment. A positive, neurtral, or negative mood was induced in subjects who then learned they had either succeeded or failed an aptitude test taken previously. Relative to neutral mood control conditions, subjects in both positive and negative mood conditions showed a pronounced self-serving bias, particularly following success. The finding is interpreted as self-regulation of affective state. Specifically, causal attribution of success to internal factors can sustain or enhance positive affect; attribution of failure to external factors can diminish negative affect. Ancillary analyses corroborated this interpretation.