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This paper aims to extend the focus of ethnic minority research in two ways: first, by introducing the notion of constitutive representation of ethnicity and second, by operationalizing accountability for empirical research of minority representation in accordance with the constructivist representative turn. The paper suggests that the analysis of ethnic minority representation would be significantly refined if it adopted a more constructivist understanding of representation. Consequently, we need to move beyond traditional understanding of accountability as reelection. As a response, previous research has introduced more discursive and plural ways of understanding accountability. This paper contributes to these theoretical advancements by developing methodological tools for evaluating minority representation. The paper suggests that there are three systemic conditions necessary for the accountability of minority representatives: publicity, competition, and outlets for objection. Based on them, the paper develops 18 indicators for evaluating minority representation. The system accountability indicators allow us to extend our research beyond the identification of minority claims and try to explain the differences among those who claim to represent minorities.

This paper aims to extend the focus of ethnic minority research in two ways: first, by introducing the notion of constitutive representation of ethnicity and second, by operationalizing accountability for empirical research of minority representation in accordance with the constructivist representative turn. The paper suggests that the analysis of ethnic minority representation would be significantly refined if it adopted a more constructivist understanding of representation. Consequently, we need to move beyond traditional understanding of accountability as reelection. As a response, previous research has introduced more discursive and plural ways of understanding accountability. This paper contributes to these theoretical advancements by developing methodological tools for evaluating minority representation. The paper suggests that there are three systemic conditions necessary for the accountability of minority representatives: publicity, competition, and outlets for objection. Based on them, the paper develops 18 indicators for evaluating minority representation. The system accountability indicators allow us to extend our research beyond the identification of minority claims and try to explain the differences among those who claim to represent minorities.

Nostalgia for the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, yugonostalgia, has become widespread throughout the former Yugoslavia. It takes various forms and expressions, but it represents a selective and largely embellished remembrance, influenced by the need of those who engage in it to escape from the unsatisfying present they live in. In most cases, yugonostalgia is a bittersweet craving for the past – passive, static, and restricted. The paper argues that the actions inspired by yugonostalgia not only can have an active, dynamic, and progressive face, but can also serve as an important factor in the reconciliation process among former Yugoslavs. With its focus on positive and inclusive aspects of the common socialist past, yugonostalgia has the potential to (re)connect the nostalgic subjects throughout the former Yugoslav space, helping them to overcome the alienation that resulted from the violent dissolution of the common state.

Nostalgia for the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, yugonostalgia, has become widespread throughout the former Yugoslavia. It takes various forms and expressions, but it represents a selective and largely embellished remembrance, influenced by the need of those who engage in it to escape from the unsatisfying present they live in. In most cases, yugonostalgia is a bittersweet craving for the past – passive, static, and restricted. The paper argues that the actions inspired by yugonostalgia not only can have an active, dynamic, and progressive face, but can also serve as an important factor in the reconciliation process among former Yugoslavs. With its focus on positive and inclusive aspects of the common socialist past, yugonostalgia has the potential to (re)connect the nostalgic subjects throughout the former Yugoslav space, helping them to overcome the alienation that resulted from the violent dissolution of the common state.

Aging is the subject of various studies by the scientific community and monitoring by responsible institutions. The intensity of aging and the proportion of age groups among various communities differ due to different socio-economic conditions and characteristics. This article researches the impact of the war in Croatia 1991–1995 and postwar living conditions on the divergence of population aging in the ethnically heterogeneous Banija region. The first postwar census in 2001 recorded population decline by 44.9% compared to the 1991 census. We analyze the effects of the war on changes in ethnic and age structure, as well as their interrelations. The quantitative and qualitative magnitude of these demographic changes in the inter-census period had a decisive influence on the correlation of age and ethnic structure. The article examines whether the relative share of Serbs or Croats in the total population of a settlement affects the average age of the settlement. The results confirmed that the Serbs are older than the Croats, as well as the Serbs are in the phase of the most advanced demographic age. These changes raise the question of the demographic future and the biological viability of the Serbs, who were the majority in the region before the war.

Popular protest, which repeatedly occurred in Communist regimes, turned into massive mobilizational waves in the late Communist period. Why did some protests result in state cooptation and particularist nationalism (Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union), and others in state-society polarization (Poland) and protest containment (China), when these states shared important historical, political, and institutional legacies? Political regimes with origins in indigenous popularly-based revolutionary movements are more resilient to popular protests and other major crises than other authoritarian regimes. Protracted ideological armed struggle largely overlaps with broader patriotic causes, such as liberation wars or struggles against foreign intervention. The revolutionary regimes thus acquire patriotic credentials, while boundaries between partisan and patriotic identities become blurred, which strengthens their elite unity and popular base. Popular protests thus facilitate a complex political game of old and new actors that may result in regime survival or transformation. In other regimes, popular unrest tends to produce state-society polarization and, ultimately, regime delegitimation and breakdown. Popular contention in complex multinational institutional settings, if there is no major external threat, highlights old and triggers new conflicts along these structural and institutional divides and, where dual political identities prevail, facilitates identity shifts in particularist direction.

Popular protest, which repeatedly occurred in Communist regimes, turned into massive mobilizational waves in the late Communist period. Why did some protests result in state cooptation and particularist nationalism (Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union), and others in state-society polarization (Poland) and protest containment (China), when these states shared important historical, political, and institutional legacies? Political regimes with origins in indigenous popularly-based revolutionary movements are more resilient to popular protests and other major crises than other authoritarian regimes. Protracted ideological armed struggle largely overlaps with broader patriotic causes, such as liberation wars or struggles against foreign intervention. The revolutionary regimes thus acquire patriotic credentials, while boundaries between partisan and patriotic identities become blurred, which strengthens their elite unity and popular base. Popular protests thus facilitate a complex political game of old and new actors that may result in regime survival or transformation. In other regimes, popular unrest tends to produce state-society polarization and, ultimately, regime delegitimation and breakdown. Popular contention in complex multinational institutional settings, if there is no major external threat, highlights old and triggers new conflicts along these structural and institutional divides and, where dual political identities prevail, facilitates identity shifts in particularist direction.