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The human malaria parasite Plasmodium vivax is responsible for 25-40% of the approximately 515 million annual cases of malaria worldwide. Although seldom fatal, the parasite elicits severe and incapacitating clinical symptoms and often causes relapses months after a primary infection has cleared. Despite its importance as a major human pathogen, P. vivax is little studied because it cannot be propagated continuously in the laboratory except in non-human primates. We sequenced the genome of P. vivax to shed light on its distinctive biological features, and as a means to drive development of new drugs and vaccines. Here we describe the synteny and isochore structure of P. vivax chromosomes, and show that the parasite resembles other malaria parasites in gene content and metabolic potential, but possesses novel gene families and potential alternative invasion pathways not recognized previously. Completion of the P. vivax genome provides the scientific community with a valuable resource that can be used to advance investigation into this neglected species.

The human microbiome project (HMP) reflects the fact that we are supraorganisms composed of human and microbial components. This international effort emanates from a confluence of ongoing technical and computational advances in the genome sciences, an evolving focus of microbiology on the properties and operations of microbial communities, and the notion that rapid, and marked, transformations in human lifestyles are not only affecting the health of the biosphere, but possibly our own health as a result of changes in our microbial ecology. HMP is designed to understand the microbial components of our genetic and metabolic landscape, and how they contribute to our normal physiology and disease predisposition. It is a global and interdisciplinary project that promises to break down the artificial barriers between medical and environmental microbiology. Here, we discuss some the challenges that HMP faces and options for addressing them.

Members of the US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity explain its recommendations on the communication of experimental work on H5N1 influenza.