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This paper argues that even Crane's modified account of belief doesn't do justice to all varieties of religious belief. Particularly beliefs associated with ritual behavior don't seem to match the criteria of Crane's alternative account. So, the question remains whether these beliefs should still be called beliefs, or whether the standard model of belief is even more false than Crane suspects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article replies to criticism of my article, "Is Religious Belief a Kind of Belief?" by Sebastian Gäb, Eva Schmidt and Michael Scott. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are religious commitments beliefs or some other kind of mental state? Do religious affirmations express beliefs or other non-doxastic attitudes? These questions have been prominent in philosophical research on the language and psychology of religion since the mid-twentieth century, but the history of interest in these topics traces back to late antiquity. In a recent paper, Tim Crane approaches these questions from the perspective of research on theories about the nature of belief. According to some accounts, he argues, the attitudes that we call religious "beliefs" do not exhibit the properties requisite for belief. He raises grounds for dissatisfaction with the proposed account of belief and cognate debates about cognitivism and non-cognitivism, and concludes by setting out a more descriptive approach as the basis for an understanding of religious attitudes. This paper argues that Crane's argument relies on an unduly demanding theory of belief. However, the concerns that he raises about the belief status of religious commitment can be motivated – and are extensively debated – in recent research on religious faith. Crane's characterisation of the cognitive/non-cognitive debate is also disputed. The paper concludes by raising concerns about Crane's description of the scope of the field of religious language. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a counterpoint to demonstrative proofs in metaphysics, Robert Nozick presented the case for God's existence based on the value of personal experiences. Personal experiences shape one's life, but this is even more evident with extraordinary experiences, such can be religious ones. In the next step, says the argument, if those experiences can be explained only by invoking the concept of the Supreme Being, then God exists. The second step mirrors scientific explanation constituting what Nozick calls the "argument to the best explanation." The argument is set against the background of Nozick's methodology which rejects demonstrative proofs in metaphysics. Its purpose is threefold. It aims to establish a certain sort of experience (religious/spiritual) as a legitimate basis for the argumentation; it aims to show that it is not philosophically blasphemous to explain such experiences by introducing a concept of divinity. Finally, it seeks to showcase the non-dogmatic, investigative nature of the argument. By exploring the merits of Nozick's proposal, I will try to elucidate all three components, which should pave the way for a broader discussion on the role of non-demonstrative arguments in metaphysics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the potential of Christoph Schwöbel's relational theology for a reexamination of the Christian faith. Faith is considered as a phenomenon of relationships that is inspired and confronted by changing human expectations. Theology reflects on the interface between human expectations and God's self-communication. It also argues for a new concept of the soul as the relational center of the human being. The text discusses various theological approaches to understanding God's creation and reconciliation project, as well as the relationship between humans and sin. It emphasizes that the relationship between God and humans should be characterized by love and trust. The goal of the Christian faith is the reconciliation of all relationships between God and humans. The power of God lies in his love and reconciliation, and justification should be accepted solely through faith. The Kingdom of God aims to restore the capacity for relationships in humans and promote the community of saints. The theological views of Christoph Schwöbel and Werner G. Jeanrond are discussed, with both agreeing that God's power establishes and limits human power. Schwöbel emphasizes the importance of God's love for creation and reconciliation, while Jeanrond emphasizes the significance of the human soul as a center of relationships and the necessity of a relational theology. [Extracted from the article]

This paper aims at elaborating non-classically on the very classic relation between believing and hoping. For this purpose, the program of modalizing faith will be sketched (I), in order to offer a conceptual topography in which believing and hoping in line with other pertinent concepts are integrated (II). Thereby, it turns possible to concretize the relation between a hopeful faith and a hope within faith as modes of localizing hope and qualifying faith (III). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]