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Abstract We are often presented with choices that differ in their more immediate versus future consequences. Interestingly, in everyday-life, ambiguity about the exact timing of such consequences frequently occurs, yet it remains unknown whether and how time-ambiguity influences decisions and their underlying neural correlates. We developed a novel intertemporal fMRI choice task in which participants make choices between sooner-smaller (SS) versus later-larger (LL) monetary rewards with systematically varying levels of time-ambiguity. Across trials, delay information of the SS, the LL, or both rewards was either exact (e.g., in 5 weeks), of low ambiguity (4 week range: e.g., in 3–7 weeks), or of high ambiguity (8 week range: e.g., in 1–9 weeks). Choice behavior showed that the majority of participants preferred options with exact delays over those with ambiguous delays, indicating time-ambiguity aversion. Consistent with these results, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex showed decreased activation during ambiguous versus exact trials. In contrast, intraparietal sulcus activation increased during ambiguous versus exact trials. Furthermore, exploratory analyses suggest that more time-ambiguity averse participants show more insula and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex activation during subjective value (SV)-coding of ambiguous versus exact trials. Lastly, the best-fitting computational choice models indicate that ambiguity impacts the SV of options via time perception or via an additive ambiguity-related penalty term. Together, these results provide the first behavioral and neural signatures of time-ambiguity, pointing towards a unique profile that is distinct from impatience. Since time-ambiguity is ubiquitous in real-life, it likely contributes to shortsighted decisions above and beyond delay-discounting. Highlights • We investigate time-ambiguity: uncertainty about when an outcome will occur. • Time-ambiguity is aversive, impacting choice behavior and reducing subjective value. • Time-ambiguity shows a neurobehavioral signature distinct from that of impatience. • Time-ambiguity is associated with increased IPS and decreased vmPFC activation. • Individual time-ambiguity preferences appear to modulate dlPFC and insula activity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although many neuroimaging studies have investigated adolescent risk taking, few studies have dissociated between decision-making under risk (known probabilities) and ambiguity (unknown probabilities). Furthermore, which brain regions are sensitive to individual differences in task-related and self-reported risk taking remains elusive. We presented 198 adolescents (11–24 years, an age-range in which individual differences in risk taking are prominent) with an fMRI paradigm that separated decision-making (choosing to gamble or not) and reward outcome processing (gains, no gains) under risky and ambiguous conditions, and related this to task-related and self-reported risk taking. We observed distinct neural mechanisms underlying risky and ambiguous gambling, with risk more prominently associated with activation in parietal cortex, and ambiguity more prominently with dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (PFC), as well as medial PFC during outcome processing. Individual differences in task-related risk taking were positively associated with ventral striatum activation in the decision phase, specifically for risk, and negatively associated with insula and dorsomedial PFC activation, specifically for ambiguity. Moreover, dorsolateral PFC activation in the outcome phase seemed a prominent marker for individual differences in task-related risk taking under ambiguity as well as self-reported daily-life risk taking, in which greater risk taking was associated with reduced activation in dorsolateral PFC. Together, this study demonstrates the importance of considering multiple risk-taking measures, and contextual moderators, in understanding the neural mechanisms underlying adolescent risk taking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People often make decisions in the face of ambiguous information, but it remains unclear how ambiguity is represented in the brain. We used three types of ambiguous stimuli and combined EEG and fMRI to examine the neural representation of perceptual decisions under ambiguity. We identified a late positive potential, the LPP, which differentiated levels of ambiguity, and which was specifically associated with behavioral judgments about choices that were ambiguous, rather than passive perception of ambiguous stimuli. Mediation analyses together with two further control experiments confirmed that the LPP was generated only when decisions are made (not during mere perception of ambiguous stimuli), and only when those decisions involved choices on a dimension that is ambiguous. A further control experiment showed that a stronger LPP arose in the presence of ambiguous stimuli compared to when only unambiguous stimuli were present. Source modeling suggested that the LPP originated from multiple loci in cingulate cortex, a finding we further confirmed using fMRI and fMRI-guided ERP source prediction. Taken together, our findings argue for a role of an LPP originating from cingulate cortex in encoding decisions based on task-relevant perceptual ambiguity, a process that may in turn influence confidence judgment, response conflict, and error correction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The balance between automatic and controlled processing is essential to human flexible but optimal behavior. On the one hand, the automation of habitual behavior and processing is indispensable, and, on the other hand, strategic processing is needed in light of unexpected, conflicting, or new situations. Using ultra-high-field high-resolution functional magnetic resonance imaging (7T-fMRI), the present study examined the role of subcortical structures in mediating this balance. Participants were asked to judge the congruency of sentences containing a semantically ambiguous or unambiguous word. Ambiguous sentences had three possible resolutions: dominant meaning, subordinate meaning, and incongruent. The dominant interpretation represents the most habitual response, whereas both the subordinate and incongruent options clash with this automatic response, and, hence, require cognitive control. Moreover, the subordinate resolution entails a less expected but correct outcome, while the incongruent condition is simply wrong. The current results reveal the involvement of the anterior dorsomedial striatum in modulating and resolving conflict between actual and expected outcomes, and highlight the importance of cortical and subcortical cooperation in this process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: We report experiments designed to learn whether different kinds of perceptually unstable visual images engage different neural mechanisms. 21 subjects viewed two types of bi-stable images while we scanned the activity in their brains with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI); in one (intra-categorical type) the two percepts remained within the same category (e.g. face–face) while in the other (cross-categorical type) they crossed categorical boundaries (e.g. face–body). The results showed that cross- and intra-categorical reversals share a common reversal-related neural circuitry, which includes fronto-parietal cortex and primary visual cortex (area V1). Cross-categorical reversals alone engaged additional areas, notably anterior cingulate cortex and superior temporal gyrus, which have been posited to be involved in conflict resolution. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Both self-motion and objects moving in our visual field generate visual motion by displacing images on the retina. Resolving this ambiguity may seem effortless but large-field visual-motion stimuli can yield perceptual rivalry between the real percept of object-motion and the illusory percept of self-motion (vection). We used functional magnetic resonance imaging to record brain activity in human observers exposed to constant-velocity roll-motion. This stimulus induced responses in areas reaching from calcarine to parieto-occipital and to ventral and lateral temporo-occipital cortex and the anterior insula. During vection, early motion-sensitive visual areas and vestibular parieto-insular cortex deactivated, whereas higher-order parieto- and temporo-occipital areas known to respond to optical flow retained identical activity levels. Within this sustained response, these latter areas displayed transient activations in response to each perceptual switch as identified in event-related analyses. Our results thus show that these areas are responsive to the type of visual motion stimulus and highly sensitive to its perceptual bistability. The only region to be more active during perceived self-motion was in, or close to, the cerebellar nodulus. This activation may correspond to the gain increase of torsional optokinetic nystagmus during vection and/or to changes in sensory processing related to the rotational percept. In conclusion, we identified neural correlates of perceiving self-motion from vision alone, i.e., in the absence of confirmatory vestibular or proprioceptive input. These functional properties preserve the organism''s ability to move accurately in its environment by relying on visual cues under conditions when the other spatial senses fail to provide such information. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The brain is organized into distinct, flexible networks. Within these networks, cognitive variables such as attention can modulate sensory representations in accordance with moment-to-moment behavioral requirements. These modulations can be studied by varying task demands; however, the tasks employed are often incongruent with the postulated functions of a sensory system, limiting the characterization of the system in relation to natural behaviors. Here we combine domain-specific task manipulations and ultra-high field fMRI to study the nature of top-down modulations. We exploited faces, a visual category underpinned by a complex cortical network, and instructed participants to perform either a stimulus-relevant/domain-specific or a stimulus-irrelevant task in the scanner. We found that 1. perceptual ambiguity (i.e. difficulty of achieving a stable percept) is encoded in top-down modulations from higher-level cortices; 2. the right inferior-temporal lobe is active under challenging conditions and uniquely encodes trial-by-trial variability in face perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]