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The conceptual resources of '4E' music cognition – i.e. the embodied, embedded, extended, and enactive paradigms – have offered a rich set of tools to explore the nature of musical experience. Among these four approaches, the extended mind perspective has heretofore received less overall attention. In this paper we focus on further developing the musically extended mind - especially in regards to musical performance - drawing on recent third wave developments. After exploring the main tenets of first wave (parity between internal and external components), second wave (complementarity between internal and external components), and third wave (dynamically changing internal and external components, as well as extended and decentralized agency) accounts of the extended mind, we turn to introducing existent first and second wave positions on music cognition. While they offer important insights, we suggest that elements of the third wave, especially focused on decentralized agency, are needed to capture the complexities of musical performance. We apply the third wave tools to the case of music performance in order to show, first, the specific limitations of the first two waves focus on parity and complementarity and, second, how a third wave account may be developed by applying it within this particular context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper the long-established Gestalt laws of cognitive organisation are employed as a tool to map the complex realm of rhetorical tropes, which have been organised in a number of other ways since the days of Aristotle's pioneering treatise on rhetoric. By mapping rhetorical tropes in this manner, this paper substantiates the claim that Gestalt psychology can work qua descriptive science of cognitive phenomena at large, for such a mapping provides an exemplary and extensive application of Gestalt laws within a field of investigation, i.e. rhetorical tropes, that is relevant to all forms of human communication, scientific ones included. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cognitive accounts of creativity generally assume that novel ideas originate in the head and precede the actual materialization of them. Over the last decades, this cognitive view has been criticized by, among others, proponents of a sociocultural perspective. In the present paper, we aim to further this critique by developing a genuine ecological approach to creativity in making. We do so by incorporating Ingold's theory of making into the ecological perspective that was initiated by Gibson. It is argued that because action is not preplanned but continuously unfolds over time, creativity is to be found in the process of making. Indeed, creativity can be conceived of as the discovery and creation of unconventional affordances (action possibilities) of objects and materials. Discussing the primacy of exploratory actions in this process, we argue that the concepts and research tools of ecological psychology may help to deepen the understanding of the creative process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the relationship between technology and technique in the use of computers as tools and how it is leading cognitive sciences into to an era of “webs.” Ernst Kapp suggested that it is humans who determine the “appropriate form” of any tool through the way they use and think about it; Douglas Engelbart, a pioneering computer researcher suggested that tools change to meet our expectations pushing us to understand the world in different ways. These two interrelated observations about technology are especially salient for our burgeoning information age. The current intersection of technologies leads to two competing visions of the computer – both deeply influenced by the concept of human–computer symbiosis – and to very different conceptions of human thinking. The vision of computer as recreation of human thinking, heavily influenced by the development of tools such as the personal computer and object-oriented programming, leads to viewing ideal human thinking as efficiently designed, well organized, and locally regulated by executive functions. The second vision of computers, as augmenting the human mind by extending brain activity out into the information universe, leads to web or trails related themes that focus on non-linear, non-hierarchical inter-linking of information into cohesive patterns. This paper suggests that because of the pace of tool development in these two computer capabilities the theme of the central processing unit dominated early, but we are now entering a new, more complex “age of webs.” [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The present paper argues for the essential relationship between discourse and the human mind. Drawing upon the critical insights from a range of social sciences including Cultural Psychology and Discourse Studies, I outline in the first part of the paper a discursive account of the mind—of cognition, emotion, self and consciousness and the like: the human mind is constituted in text and talk which are situated in cultural and historical context. The discursive account is based on a social constructionist view of the human cultural world as meanings constructed primarily through linguistic communication in order to accomplish interactional purposes. The central argument here will be that our thinking and feeling are discursive by nature and in origin. Specifically, our minds are (a) derived from, (b) constrained by, (c) utilized in (d) modelled upon, (e) distributed through, and (f) begun with discourse. In the second part, I try to show how, in modern Western linguistics, metaphors from the natural sciences have come to define, and become part of, “the human mind” itself. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Recent changes in views on cognition underscore its embodied, situated and distributed character. These changes are compatible with the conceptual framework of ecological psychology. However for ecological psychology to propose explanations for a broad range of cognitive phenomena, including language, it needs an account of how to link the dynamics of coupling between the organism and the environment with the apparent symbolicity of informational structures. In this paper it is proposed that a theory of information in biological systems, advocated by Howard Pattee, may help forge this link. By treating informational structures as constraints on dynamics this approach helps to identify which processes, in which systems and on what time-scales are needed for structures to ‘become messages’. I will illustrate how these processes might work on developmental time-scale in the domain of language, building on the work by Edward Reed (1995, 1996) and extending it using the view of linguistic structures as constraints. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The idea that concepts play a significant role in some perceptions is widespread but everybody seems to differ as to where to draw the line. Some researchers say that the difference between direct and indirect, concept driven acts of perception manifests itself whenever we perceive abstract or general properties. Others point at second order properties or causal properties. I call this inability to precisely differentiate between acts of direct and indirect perception “The Division Problem”. Furthermore there is always a question as to how widespread indirect perceptions are. Can we attribute them to prelingual cognitive systems? I call this second problem “The Distribution Problem”. The main aim of the paper is providing a solution to both problems by proposing a naturalistic explication of the notion of “concept”. I propose to identify the role concepts were supposed to play in perception with a mechanism of “soft detection”. Unlike hard detectors which react to a specific target in virtue of their constitution and placement in the system, soft detectors are understood as dynamic categorization devices enabling the cognitive system to selectively react to an undetectable property via flexible exploitation of data from hard detectors. I conclude by showing how the notion of soft detection retains some of the aspects traditionally attributed to concepts and how does it differ from similar accounts known from contemporary literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper critically examines Apperly and Butterfill's parallel ‘two systems’ theory of mindreading and argues instead for a cooperative multi-systems architecture. The minimal mindreading system (system 1) described by Butterfill and Apperly is unable to explain the flexibility of infant belief representation or fast and efficient mindreading in adults, and there are strong reasons for thinking that infant belief representation depends on executive cognition and general semantic memory. We propose that schemas, causal representation and mental models help to explain the representational flexibility of infant mindreading and give an alternative interpretation of evidence that has been taken to show automatic, fast and efficient belief representation in adults. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Several frameworks exist to help science in organizing known information, connecting previously disparate phenomena, promoting understanding, and identifying gaps in knowledge. This paper integrates previous frameworks that have been used in the behavioral sciences to produce a more comprehensive, specific, and complete framework, consonant with the process of scientific discovery as based on multiple, independent, and converging lines of evidence. This multi-level convergence framework is designed specifically for the analysis and understanding of human cognitive/behavioral traits, in contrast to more general frameworks that are designed to be applied relatively widely (such as across all information processing systems or across all biological organisms). This integrated framework overcomes gaps in prior frameworks, provides a more complete picture of the interrelationships between various aspects of the behavioral sciences, and can aid in evaluating theories, both for comparison and identifying gaps in evidentiary support. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: To gain a better understanding of the functionality of representation and categorization in action and interaction, it is fundamental that researchers understand how movements are represented in long-term memory. It is our position that human motor control requires that our actions be planned and represented in terms of intended perceptual effects and future task demands, and that the individual has a well-structured mental representation of the task so that the movement can be carried out successfully. Basic Action Concepts (BACs) are identified as major building blocks of cognitive representation in long-term memory, which are cognitive tools used to master the functional demands of movement tasks. In this paper, we consider relevant issues in research methodology and present an experimental method that can be used to assess action-relevant representational structures. This method permits us to observe the strong relationship between cognitive representation and performance in manual action. For example, the specific differences in the mental representations of participants are strongly related to skill level, as well as biomechanical and task constraints. We then discuss results from our learning experiments, where we have examined the development and changes in cognitive representation over time. From these experiments we have found that cognitive reference structures include task-specific spatial information, which provides the basis for action control in skilled voluntary movement. We have implemented these results on various robotic platforms. We argue that the insights gained from various experimental approaches in the field of cognitive psychology and motor control enable researchers to explore the possibilities and limitations of artificial control architectures in robot systems. Finally, we argue that this is not a unidirectional process. Researchers from the field of cognitive psychology and motor control can profit from the advances in technological systems, which enhance the understanding of human motor control in skilled voluntary action. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Tools are important mediators between our bodies and the world surrounding us. They can substantially change the usual relationship between our body movements and the effects that ensue in the environment. Given the ease with which we learn to apply new tools, the question arises how our motor system flexibly adapts to specific tool transformations. There are two basic possibilities. One consists of incorporating the tool into one's body by updating one's body schema. Movement planning can then proceed in the same manner as it did without the tool. In the present paper I argue for a second view, that tool use involves representations of the tool-specific mappings between body movements and environmental effects at a central level. I present evidence for this view from several research areas including stimulus–response compatibility, bimanual coordination, and action observation. Finally, I discuss the degree of abstractness of these central representations of tool-use interactions. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Embodied cognition comes in many variants. Yet, in most if not all of these variants the notion of agency, or more precisely autonomous agency, occupies center stage. However, whereas in its original context of application autonomy applies strictly to the human sphere, cognitive theory must needs generalize this concept so as to render it applicable to a much wider range of entities and processes. Theorists of embodied cognition must therefore strive to articulate a valid sense of minimal autonomy applicable to animals and, arguably, to artificial agents as well. In this paper I discuss two major attempts to articulate a conception of minimal autonomy which I describe, respectively, as the adaptive-behavior approach (ABA) and the systemic-constructivist approach (SCA). The differences between these two leading views on minimal autonomy reveal fundamental disagreements not only with respect to the nature of autonomous agency but also with respect to embodiment and the relevance of biological life to the making of mental life. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we provide a methodological pathway from theories of situated, embodied cognition to simulations with an eye to empirical evidence, and suggest a possible cross-fertilization between cognitive robotics and psychology. Psychological theories, in particular those formulated at an abstract level, include models which are often severely underspecified at the level of mechanisms. This is true in the synchronic, constructive perspective (how can the effects observed in experiments be concretely generated by the model''s mechanisms?) and in the diachronic, developmental perspective (how can such mechanisms be learned and developed?). The synthetic method of artificial cognitive systems research, and in particular of cognitive robotics, can complement research in psychology (and neurosciences) by exploring the constructive and developmental aspects of theories. Our second aim is to provide an example of such a methodology by describing simulations aiming at developing a perceptual symbol system (PSS) (). We then describe the two main theoretical constructs of the PSS, perceptual symbols and simulators, illustrate their development in an artificial system, and test the system in prediction, categorization, and abstraction tasks. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: From the perspective of cognitive robotics, this paper presents a modern interpretation of reasoning and suggestions for why and how cognitive psychologists should develop models of cognitive phenomena. We argue that the shortcomings of current cognitive modelling approaches are due in significant part to a lack of exactly the kind of integration required for the development of embodied autonomous robotics. Moreover we suggest that considerations of embodiment, situatedness, and autonomy, intrinsic to cognitive robotics, provide an appropriate basis for the integration and theoretic cumulation that Newell argued was necessary for psychology to mature. From this perspective we analyse the role of embodiment and modes of situatedness in terms of integration, cognition, emotion, and autonomy. Four complementary perspectives on embodied and situated cognitive science are considered in terms of their potential to contribute to cognitive robotics, cognitive science, and psychological theorizing: minimal cognition and organization, enactive perception and sensorimotor contingency, homeostasis and emotion, and social embedding. In combination these perspectives provide a framework for cognitive robotics, not only wholly compatible with the original aims of cognitive modelling, but as a more appropriate methodology than those currently in common use within psychology. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Cognitive Robotics can be defined as the study of cognitive phenomena by their modeling in physical artifacts such as robots. This is a very lively and fascinating field which has already given fundamental contributions to our understanding of natural cognition. Nonetheless, robotics has to date addressed mainly very basic, low-level cognitive phenomena like sensory-motor coordination, perception, and navigation, and it is not clear how the current approach might scale up to explain high-level human cognition. In this paper we argue that a promising way to do that is to merge current ideas and methods of ‘embodied cognition’ with the Russian tradition of theoretical psychology which views language not only as a communication system but also as a cognitive tool, that is by developing a Vygotskyan cognitive robotics. We substantiate this idea by discussing several domains in which language can improve basic cognitive abilities and permit the development of high-level cognition: learning, categorization, abstraction, memory, voluntary control, and mental life. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: This position paper explores the possible contributions to the science of psychology from insights obtained by building and experimenting with cognitive robots. First, the functional modeling characteristic of experimental psychology is discussed. Second, the computational modeling required for cognitive robotics is described, and possible experiments with them are illustrated. Next, we argue that cognitive developmental robots, robots that “live” through a development phase where they learn about their environments in several different modes, can provide additional benefits to the science of psychology. Finally, the reciprocal interactions between computational modeling/cognitive robotics and functional modeling/experimental psychology are explored. We conclude that each can contribute significantly to the other. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Recent research in neuroscience has tried to understand human action from two different but converging perspectives: the cognitive and the volitional. On one side, cognitive studies analyze how action is planned and controlled in response to environmental conditions. On the other side, volitional studies analyze how action is planned and controlled by a subject''s needs, motives and goals. In this paper we suggest that the notion of presence may be the missing link between these two approaches, explaining how can we differentiate between perception, action and concepts. In particular, a consideration of presence can explain how can we distinguish between a perceived action, a planned or an executed one. We argue that the evolutionary role of presence is the control of agency through the unconscious separation of “internal” and “external” and the enaction/reenaction of intentions. The model makes sense in terms of evolutionary psychology and is beginning to be supported by evidence of the neural and other physical correlates of action, imitation and self-monitoring. Another strength of this model is that it provides testable predictions about how to improve the experience of presence in media: maximal presence in a mediated experience arises from an optimal combination of form and content, able to support the intentions of the user. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: In a phylogenetic perspective, the phenomenal and the functional aspects of consciousness cannot be separated because consciousness, as a phenomenal experience, must be causally effective. The hypothesis I propose is that the fundamental property of consciousness consists of a self-organizing process: the differentiation of a content. The differentiation of a content occurs on the basis of the relations internal to a representational whole, which behaves like a field and tends towards a condition of equilibrium. This hypothesis can be somehow considered an extension of Gestalt visual perceptual theory. Unlike neurocomputational processes, which are non-conscious and extrinsic to the representation, conscious processes are intrinsic to the representational whole. Consciousness, as an intrinsically self-organizing process interwoven with its phenomenal aspects, can be more than epiphenomenal and it can be involved in mental function. The paper then discusses the implications of this hypothesis for subjectivity and the explanatory gap. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: This paper explores the relevance of Wittgenstein''s philosophical psychology for the two major contemporary approaches to the relation between language and cognition. As Pinker describes it, on the ‘Standard Social Science Model’ language is ‘an insidious shaper of thought’. According to Pinker''s own widely–shared alternative view, ‘Language is the magnificent faculty that we use to get thoughts from one head to another’. I investigate Wittgenstein''s powerful challenges to the hypothesis that language is a device for communicating independently constituted (or individuated) thoughts. I argue that Wittgenstein offers instead a subtle version of the thesis that language determines thought. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: In this paper, I survey the impact on neuropsychology of Wittgenstein''s elucidations of memory. Wittgenstein discredited the storage and imprint models of memory, dissolved the conceptual link between memory and mental images or representations and, upholding the context-sensitivity of memory, made room for a family resemblance concept of memory, where remembering can also amount to doing or saying something. While neuropsychology is still generally under the spell of archival and physiological notions of memory, Wittgenstein''s reconceptions can be seen at work in its leading-edge practitioners. However, neuroscientists, generally, are finding memory difficult to demarcate from other cognitive and noncognitive processes, and I suggest this is largely due to their considering automatic responses as part of memory, termed nondeclarative or implicit memory. Taking my lead from Wittgenstein''s On Certainty, I argue that there is only remembering where there is also some kind of mnemonic effort or attention, and, therefore, that so-called implicit memory is not memory at all, but a basic, noncognitive certainty. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Cognitive Science originated in reactions against behaviorism that were motivated in significant part by the example of the computer. The computer raised the exciting possibility that mind could be understood almost entirely independently of brain: if the operations of the mind are akin to the execution of a program, then almost all the relevant aspects of mind would be captured by that program, independently of whatever was running it, be it transistors or neurons. This presumed independence of cognitive science from biology has waned considerably in recent decades, but in this paper, I argue that there is at least one crucial aspect of biology that has yet to be appreciated for its relevance to mental and other normative processes—the thermodynamics of living systems. In particular, I argue that the emergence of normativity in general—and normative function and representation in particular—depends on special systems that are far from thermodynamic equilibrium; these form the interface between the factual world of atoms and molecules and the normative world of mind. The nature of that emergence, in turn, imposes strong constraints on how the central nervous system functions, and, therefore, on how cognition is realized. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Traditional theories of cognition concentrate on the problem of stability, how it is that people perform the same cognitive act over and over despite different task pressures and varying circumstances. We suggest a different approach that focuses on the flexible and the inventive. From a dynamic systems perspective, intelligence is the adaptive flexibility that integrates the stability of past experience with the idiosyncrasies of the moment. In this paper we demonstrate the value of this perspective in the context of children''s novel noun generalizations. We describe D-ALA, a dynamic systems model that embodies the principles of the account and use this model to explain the findings of three different experiments that show how young children flexibly and smartly adapt to novel circumstances in the task of learning new words. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: What causes children to categorize distinct utterances they hear into a constructional generalization? That is, what makes subjects create a constructional category instead of treating each utterance as a distinct unrelated idiom? One simple factor that encourages the learning of abstract categories is shared concrete similarity. When instances share concrete attributes, learners are more likely to categorize them together, and moreover are more likely to attend to their abstract commonalities [. Similarity and the development rules. Cognition, 66, 236–297; Markman, A.B., & Gentner D. (1993). Splitting the difference: A structural alignment view of similarity. Journal of Memory and Language, 32, 517–535]. This paper reports results that confirm the prediction that presentation of items with concrete shared similarity early in training enhances language learning in adults. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Normal aging is associated with deficits in both memory and executive control. While a number of theories of cognitive aging have proposed that decrements in frontally mediated executive control processes can account for many of the age-related changes observed, the models proposed to date have not adequately accounted for age changes in processing speed, intra-individual variability and automaticity of information processing. These basic aspects of information processing efficiency may be of central importance for our understanding of age-related cognitive changes and more elaborate neurological models are needed that incorporate explanatory mechanisms which account for their influence. In this paper, it is proposed that the dual role played by frontal and cerebellar degeneration and the disruption of fronto-cerebellar feedback and feedforward control loops may be of central importance for a model of age-related changes in processing speed, intra-individual variability, automaticity, and higher level cognitive functions like memory and executive control. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Universal Selection Theory claims that the increases in the fit of a system to its environment are achieved through a process of blind variation and cumulative selection that is analogous to evolution by natural selection. The process is proposed to occur in many domains, including the gene, behavior, cognition, and culture (meme). This paper reviews the background for the theory and explains how it may contribute to clinical psychology and psychiatry. It is suggested that the theory provides: A framework for integrating biological, psychological and cultural perspectives; an account for why problem-solving and cognitive reappraisal prove to be effective interventions; and an understanding of why psychological disorders can be resistant to change. Implications for psychological treatments, theoretical integration, and future research are discussed. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: The paper states the goal of this special issue and briefly summarizes the topics of the papers addressed in this issue. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]