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We assess the relative importance of fiscal and monetary policy shocks in explaining macroeconomic fluctuations in the United States. Using a Bayesian structural vector autoregressive model, we identify fiscal and monetary policy shocks based on a penalty function approach. We find that monetary policy shocks are relatively more important than fiscal policy shocks in explaining key macroeconomic variations and especially inflation variations. Our results provide evidence in support of a monetarist explanation of US business cycles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the beginning of 2010, the fiscal situation of Greece was unsustainable, and an ambitious but costly adjustment plan had to be put in place under a consortium of the International Monetary Fund, the European Commission and the European Central Bank. It took three consecutive adjustment programmes, including debt-relief through private sector involvement, to restore confidence in the economy and achieve a budget surplus. In this paper, we provide a theoretical analysis of the Greek Crisis starting from 2010. We build a series of counterfactuals using the National Institute General Econometric Model (NIGEM) to analyse why the cost of the adjustment in terms of GDP loss and increase in debt-to-GDP ratio turned out to be much worse than expected. In doing so, we analyse three scenarios: (i) one in which we simulate a much more conservative cut in public investment by the Greek central government; (ii) a second scenario of a lower risk-premium, signalling, e.g., lower political and re-denomination risks, had the European Central Bank guaranteed its lending of last resort role earlier than 2012; (iii) finally, a similar financial envelope as the one adopted during the first Greek adjustment programme but over a longer period, moving beyond the standard IMF three-year duration programmes. We find that the mix of expenditure cuts and loss of confidence among households and firms explain a large part of the unanticipated costs of the adjustment in the Greek crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates spillovers to the Irish economy from a fiscal expansion in the rest of the euro area. We examine spillovers for government consumption and government investment, each conditional on active or passive monetary policy. Moreover, we compare these across two different classes of models, a DSGE model and a traditional structural model. We find that expansionary fiscal spending shocks in the rest of the euro area can lead to non-negligible spillovers to the Irish economy. This result is robust across models and spending instruments, but is conditional on the monetary stance being passive. When monetary policy is active, the spillover is smaller, depending on the extent of crowding out of private activity. When monetary policy is passive, spillovers increase the fiscal space of the country with positive spillovers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper sheds new light on the degree of international fiscal-financial spillovers by investigating the effect of domestic fiscal policies on cross-border bank lending. By estimating the dynamic response of U.S. cross-border bank lending towards 45 recipient countries to exogenous domestic fiscal shocks (both measured by spending and revenue) between 1990Q1 and 2012Q4, we find that expansionary domestic fiscal shocks lead to a statistically significant increase in cross-border bank lending and the size of the effect is comparable to an exogenous decline in the federal funds rate by about 25 bp (50 bp) for spending (revenue) shocks. The fiscal-financial spillovers we find are independent of changes in monetary policy or financial conditions measured by the VIX. The effects also depend on the sign of the fiscal shocks and the underlying economic conditions of a source country. While capital controls seem to play some moderating role, we do not find systematic and statistically significant differences in the spillover effects across recipient countries, depending on their exchange rate regime. The extension of the analysis to fiscal shocks for a panel of 16 small open economies largely confirms the U.S. economy's findings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the relationships between inequality, political pressure, populism and central bank independence (CBI). If there is financial inequality across citizens, monetary policies yield distributional consequences. Political pressure on central bank will increase. A populist wave fuelled by large demand for redistribution with no regard to long term consequences may undermine actual CBI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the key deep underlying fundamental for the growing international imbalances leading to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system between 1971 and 1973 was rising U.S. inflation since 1965. It was driven in turn by expansionary fiscal and monetary policies ---the elephant in the room. What was kept in the background at the Camp David meeting on August 15, 1971 when President Richard Nixon closed the U.S. gold window, as well as imposing a 10 % surcharge on all imports and a ninety day wage price freeze—was that U.S. inflation, driven by macro policies, was the main problem facing the Bretton Woods System, and that for political and doctrinal reasons was not directly addressed. Instead President Nixon blamed the rest of the world rather than correcting mistaken U.S. policies. In addition, at the urging of Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur F. Burns, Nixon adopted wage and price controls to mask the inflation, hence punting the problem into the future. This paper revisits the story of the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the origins of the Great Inflation. Based on historical narratives and conversations with the Honorable George P. Shultz, a crucial player in the events of the period 1969 to 1973, I argue the case that the pursuit of sound monetary and fiscal policies could have avoided much of the turmoil in the waning years of Bretton Woods. Moreover, I point out some of the similarities between the imbalances of the 1960s and 1970s—especially fiscal and the use of tariff protection as a strategic tool, as well as some differences—relatively stable monetary policy and floating exchange rates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we study the taxes vs. debt choice for public funding when spending is in large part predictable due to entitlement programs, but the necessary fiscal corrections may not be instantly and indefinitely elastic as usually assumed. We study fiscal behavior in a large sample of countries to determine what fiscal regimes have been used in practice, and what they reveal about the trade-off between raising taxes vs. issuing debt. Unsurprisingly, we find that fiscal discipline and the aims of fiscal rules have varied over the past 50 years. Discipline has generally weakened and there has been a greater tendency to use debt. But governments are no less forward looking than they were. Perhaps more surprising, the high debt countries were more disciplined than low debt economies—but with worse outcomes because of their poor starting positions and more persistent public spending. The low debt countries have exploited their stronger initial position to allow less discipline; a "resting on one's laurels" approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes a regime-dependent model to estimate fiscal multipliers in the US. Output, consumption and investment are assumed to respond to tax and spending changes in a nonlinear manner. Fiscal multipliers are time-varying because their size and sign depend upon the state of the economy (upturns and downturns). Keynesian effects appear essentially during downturns, while anti-Keynesian effects are observed during expansions. Transfer payments contributes to a higher private consumption when they are given to consumers in bad times. Reducing taxes boosts consumption in good times. Investment responds positively to lower taxes during downturns, but negatively in the upturn regime. Our results thus suggest that Keynesian effects have been associated to expansionary policies during recessions, while anti-Keynesian effects were observed during expansions illustrating situations of expansionary fiscal consolidation. The effectiveness of fiscal positive impulses increases in downturns relative to upturns. A corollary is therefore that austerity measures during recessions would have detrimental effects on the GDP and its components. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper assesses the effect of fiscal decentralization on government consumption volatility using data for 97 developed and developing countries from 1971 to 2010. The results suggest that a higher degree of fiscal decentralization leads to lower government consumption volatility. This result holds for the sub-sample of advanced economies, while it is not confirmed for those less-developed. This mechanism seems to work mainly through a lower volatility of the non-discretionary spending, which typically belongs to the central government's policy. We also confirm existing findings according to which country size lowers government spending volatility. Thus, given a minimum level of development, fiscal decentralization reforms can reduce spending volatility by distributing power to sub-central governments, particularly in smaller countries which are usually more prone to volatility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I estimate the effect of U.S. government spending and tax shocks on Canada and the U.K. from 1975 to 2014, and on Japan from 1979 to 2014. Spending and tax shocks are identified using sign restrictions on the impulse responses from a vector autoregression (VAR). I find that spillover effects of expansionary fiscal shocks are not uniform across countries, though for all three countries they result in economically significant GDP increases in the short run. In addition, government spending shocks have larger effects than net tax shocks. Altogether, the results support the idea that some countries may benefit significantly from expansionary U.S. fiscal policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study relates to the literature on the exchange rate pass-through effect on inflation for developing economies under inflation targeting. The novelty concerns the investigation of the effect of both monetary and fiscal credibility on pass-through. The article addresses empirical evidence, based on the Brazilian experience, regarding the idea that high credibility might reduce the exchange rate pass-through on inflation. The findings suggest that although monetary credibility is relevant only for pass-through on inflation of market prices, fiscal credibility is an important tool to reduce the pass-through on both inflation and inflation expectations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Large external imbalances and fragile fiscal positions have emerged as major policy challenges for the euro area in the financial crisis. The paper analyses whether shifting government purchases between tradable and non-tradable goods could help reduce external fluctuations without large swings in the overall fiscal stance. The policy rules considered are budgetary-neutral in the sense that the overall level of government expenditure is kept constant. We compare the policy rules to fiscal devaluation as a strategy to reduce external imbalances and find that state-dependent changes in the composition of government purchases between tradables and non-tradables can stabilise excessive fluctuations in the event of economy-wide supply and demand shocks. Contrary to fiscal devaluation, the expenditure-shifting rule faces a trade-off between stabilising domestic activity and enhancing household welfare, on the one hand, and reducing excessive fluctuations in external positions, on the other hand. The excess volatility of domestic variables associated less volatility in the external position implies welfare losses for standard specifications of household utility. The adverse welfare effect is absent in the case of fiscal devaluation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper puts forward an intertemporal model of a small open economy which allows for the simultaneous analysis of the determination of endogenous growth and external balance. The model assumes infinitely lived, overlapping generations that maximize lifetime utility, and competitive firms that maximize their net present value in the presence of adjustment costs for investment. Domestic securities are assumed perfect substitutes for foreign securities and the economy is assumed small in the sense of being a price taker in international goods and assets markets. It is shown that the endogenous growth rate is determined solely as a function of the determinants of domestic investment, such as the world real interest rate, the technology of domestic production and adjustment costs for investment and is independent of the preferences of domestic households and budgetary policies. The preferences of consumers and budgetary policies determine the savings rate. The current account and external balance are functions of the difference between the savings and the investment rates. The world real interest rate affects growth negatively but has a positive impact on external balance. The productivity of domestic capital affects growth positively but causes a deterioration in external balance. Population growth, government consumption and government debt affect the current account and external balance negatively, but do not affect the endogenous growth rate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the empirical effects of fiscal policy in Denmark since the adoption of a fixed exchange rate policy in 1982. Denmark's fixed exchange rate implies that the nominal interest rate remains fixed after a fiscal expansion, facilitating a substantial impact of the fiscal stimulus on the real economy. On the other hand, the large degree of openness of the Danish economy means that a sizeable share of the fiscal stimulus will be directed towards imported goods. Our results suggest that the 'monetary accomodation channel' dominates the 'leakage effect' in the short run. We demonstrate that fiscal stimulus has a rather large impact on economic activity in the very short run, with a government spending multiplier of 1.1 on impact in our preferred specification. We also find that the effects of fiscal stimulus are rather short-lived in Denmark, with the effect on output becoming insignificant after around two years. The fiscal multiplier is above 1 only in the first quarter, and drops to 0.6 one year after the shock. We also find that in the short run, the government spending multiplier is larger than the tax multiplier. Finally, we demonstrate that exogenous shocks to government spending account for less than 10 % of the movements in output over the business cycle in Denmark. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We use a two-sector neoclassical open economy model with traded and non-traded goods to investigate the effects of unanticipated and anticipated tax reforms. First, an unanticipated tax reform produces an expansion of GDP, labor, and investment, while an anticipated tax reform has opposite effects before the implementation of the labor tax cut. Quantitatively, if the traded sector is more capital intensive, GDP increases by 1.6 percentage points or declines by 2.7 percentage points after three years, depending on whether the tax cut is unanticipated or anticipated. Second, we find that GDP change masks a wide dispersion in sectoral output responses. As long as investment is both traded and non traded, a tax reform substantially raises the relative size of the non-traded sector after three years while traded output always drops. Third, a tax reform improves welfare in all scenarios, more so if the markup is endogenous, but less so if the shock is anticipated. Importantly, we find that welfare gains in a two-sector economy with capital accumulation and perfect access to external borrowing are between 39 % and 89 % higher than those in an economy without physical capital. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper analyses the stabilising potential of simple fiscal policy rules for a small open economy in monetary union in a 2-region DSGE model with nominal and real rigidities. We consider simple fiscal instrument rules for government purchases, transfers, and consumption, labour and capital taxes in analogy to interest rate rules in monetary policy. The paper finds a dichotomy in the welfare effects of fiscal policy for liquidity-constrained and intertemporal optimising households, i.e. policies enhancing the welfare of one group tend to reduce the welfare of the other one. The moderate average welfare gains from optimal policy contrast with potentially large welfare losses from non-optimal policy. Fiscal rules that respond to employment fluctuations may be preferred to fiscal rules responding to indicators of price competitiveness, because optimal policy corresponds more closely to the idea of countercyclical stabilisation in the former case. The simulations also emphasise the crucial impact of the budgetary closure rule on the welfare consequences of fiscal business-cycle stabilisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The global financial and economic crisis has revived the debate in the academic literature and in policy circles about the size and effectiveness of automatic fiscal stabilisers. Especially in the euro area where monetary policy is centralised and discretionary fiscal policy making is constrained by the EU fiscal rules, knowing the size and the effectiveness of automatic stabilisers is crucial. While automatic stabilisers are a fairly established concept in the fiscal policy literature, there is still no consensus about their actual nature and their effectiveness. This paper shows that differences in opinion mirror a deeper disagreement over how the budget would look like without automatic stabilisers. This issue is addressed by defining two types of counterfactual budgets giving rise to two different interpretations about the nature of automatic stabilisation. Simulations with a structural model confirm that the degree of smoothing is conditional on how the counterfactual budget, i.e. the budget without automatic stabilisers, is defined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to assess the impact of financial integration on fiscal policy. Using an unbalanced panel of 31 OECD countries from 1970 to 2009, the paper shows that financial integration has significant disciplinary effects by reducing fiscal deficits and (discretionary) spending volatility. In addition, we find that financial integration affects the composition of government debt and enhances risk-sharing by increasing the share of foreign debt to the total. The results are robust to both de jure and de facto measures of financial integration, different measures of budget balance, and different estimation strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The world economy has had a heart attack and the Keynesian ambulance has come to the rescue. How are the present and the future affected by debt-financed fiscal stimuli policies? What are the practical problems? Seven arguments against fiscal stimuli are critically examined, including Ricardian equivalence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the impact of shocks to different types of government spending on the sectoral composition of output for a panel of EMU member countries. We find that fiscal shocks lead to an increase in the relative size of the nontraded sector, with the impact varying across the different spending categories. There is typically no significant impact on the level of production in the tradables sector but the level of imports increases and the level of exports declines in most cases. Overall, the results show that fiscal shocks matter not only for aggregate variables but also for the sectoral composition of output. The sectoral output results are consistent with previous work concerning the impact of fiscal shocks on the real exchange rate and the relative price of nontradables. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the domestic and international effects of “public competition policies” aimed at improving the efficiency of public spending. Such measures are modeled as an increase in the price elasticity of public consumption. The paper finds that public competition policies significantly affect macroeconomic interdependence across countries, both through the impact of the international elasticity of substitution and of mark-up effects. The paper also develops an extension in which fiscal shocks are stochastic. In welfare terms, countries with a larger government sector have an incentive to promote global public competition policies regardless of whether fiscal policy is modeled as deterministic or stochastic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We analyze the role of fiscal-monetary policy interactions and fiscal coordination in EMU under the assumption of strategic wage setting in unionized labour markets. We find that production subsidies and real wage distortions are strategic complements. The literature on macroeconomic stabilisation policies and policy games usually neglects this point and reaches overoptimistic conclusions about the desirable effects of accommodating fiscal policies. Central bank preferences also affect the desirability of fiscal coordination in a monetary union. In fact, contrary to Beetsma and Bovenberg (), we find that fiscal coordination improves outcomes in the case of a conservative central banker, whereas it leads to worse outcomes with a populist one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We explore the interactions between exchange rate and fiscal policy, and default on external debt. Exchange rate policy affects the supply of short-term debt facing the government. Under a conventional soft peg, it can be optimal for the government to set the exchange rate at a level in which partial default occurs. In this case multiple equilibria exist, with one featuring high interest rate, overvalued exchange rate, low level of output, and default. Default is also an equilibrium under a hard peg, precisely because devaluation is not an option. Under a hard peg, however, there is a unique equilibrium. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]