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The paper describes the growing human rights gap between China on one side and the US and Taiwan on the other side and analyses its impact on cross-strait relations. Since Xi Jinping's ascent to power in the People's Republic of China in 2012/2013 and the elections of Donald Trump in the US and Tsai Ing-wen in Taiwan in 2016, the relationship between China and the other two countries has worsened. The US and Taiwan have a similar view on human rights in the PRC. The increasing repression and authoritarianism of the PRC leads to a human rights gap in the Taiwan Strait that increases the divide and the tensions between both sides. The failure of the PRC to address in its proposal for a peaceful unification the concerns of the Taiwanese for their democracy and human rights pushes Taiwan further away. The similar assessment of the PRC's authoritarian threat by the US and Taiwan strengthens the bond between both, based on the shared values of democracy and human rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party won the 2016 election in Taiwan, Beijing's Taiwan policies have witnessed some strategic and tactical adjustments. This article attempts to clarify the underlying changes and continuity in Beijing's Taiwan policy by addressing three vital questions. First, for Beijing, what is the prominent concern for its Taiwan policy making? Second, what is the top priority for its 'great rejuvenation' ambition? And third, what is Beijing's guideline for dealing with Taipei's reluctance to accept reunification? This paper argues that, firstly, how to prevent Taiwan's de facto independence from perpetuating has become the primary challenge for Beijing, given Taiwan's inclination to indefinitely maintain de facto independence. Second, Beijing still prioritizes the achievement of comprehensive modernization before the fulfillment of reunification within its overarching 'national rejuvenation' timetable. Third, discouraged by Taiwan's anti-China dynamics, Beijing has switched its guideline for promoting unification from 'placing hope on the Taiwanese' to 'placing more hope on the mainland itself'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last few decades, China has become one of the most important foreign investment destinations and centers of economic development in Asia. China's growing economic clout and coercive measures lead to the following empirical puzzles: how has Taiwan perceived China's increasing military capabilities and economic influence? What are the major factors that facilitate or constrain the role of a government agency of a weaker state in addressing the economic power of a stronger one? More specifically, what has been the purpose of Taiwan's economic statecraft? Based on Taiwan's official statements, regional trade data, and newspaper coverage in Chinese and English, this study investigates both positive and negative evaluations of China-Taiwan trade from 2009 to 2021. From 2009 to 2016, President Ma Ying-jeou adopted a desecuritization strategy in normalizing bilateral trade with China, and he actively promoted greater liberalization of Taiwan's financial and service sectors for China's investment. From 2016 to 2021, President Tsai Ing-wen employed a securitization strategy in light of the risks of economic reliance on China's markets. The article proceeds as follows. First, it engages the current literature on economic statecraft, China-Taiwan relations, and Asian politics. Second, this study offers a framework of desecuritization and securitization of Taiwan's trade toward China, and it highlights how the political leaders in Taiwan attempt to find a balance between trade and security. Third, it provides in-depth case studies on how Taiwan executed desecuritization and securitization strategies. Finally, it concludes with some initial thoughts on the studies of comparative economic statecraft, and provides policy implications for countries in the Asia Pacific region and beyond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan's foreign aid policy is largely a response to its China-imposed international isolation. Taiwan provides aid without stringent accountability conditions to countries in Africa, the Americas, and the South Pacific in order to maintain official diplomatic relations in the face of Chinese opposition. Often at odds with this is Taiwan's interest in seeking western support through being seen as a responsible aid donor. Domestic political constraints on Taiwan's aid budget accentuate the tension between these two interests. Taiwan's aid program can be seen as the product of these three competing and enduring pressures – maintaining the count of official diplomatic relationships, improving its international reputation, and containing aid spending. Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou's tacit ‘diplomatic truce’ with China – part of a wider warming of intergovernmental relations across the Taiwan Strait – has reduced significantly the squeeze between these three pressures on Taiwan's foreign aid policy. It has allowed the Ma administration to improve Taiwan's reputation, while maintaining or even reducing its aid expenditure, and still retain the same number of official diplomatic relationships. Nevertheless, the Ma administration has not wanted to alienate recipient governments while the prospects for the diplomatic truce with China remain uncertain. There remains considerable continuity with past practices, and the government's handling of aid as a foreign policy tool is still largely opaque and unaccountable. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

After Tsai Ing-wen was elected, both Mainland China and the United States realized that the situation in the Taiwan Strait has undergone fundamental changes. In order to curb Taiwan's independence policy, the Mainland China has strengthened its coercive threats against Taiwan while the US chose to increase its strategic commitment to Taiwan and revisit the One-China policy. This article argues the current framework between China and US on Taiwan issue is collapsing. The rising of Mainland China is the root cause for this round tension, however, Tsai Ing-wen refused to accept the 92 consensus which was the trigger. This article elaborates the argument that the delicate balance in the Taiwan Strait is declining, which both China and the United Stated have increased their deterrent threats to each other while decreased their reassurances, and regional crisis is emerging. For the leaders of China and the United States, it is urgent to manage the emerging Taiwan Strait crisis and prevent the situation from going out of control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditional analyses of Taiwan crises have relied mainly on deterrence theory for their explanatory power. This approach fails to account for China's risk-taking behavior, which can be explained by prospect theory. We suggest that Chinese leaders are more likely to use more risky military coercion against Taiwan's pro-independence movements within a domain of losses, i.e., when their regime faces serious domestic and international challenges to its security. Conversely, Chinese leaders are more likely to employ less risky political pressure to oppose Taiwan's pro-independence forces if their decision making takes place in a domain of gains, i.e., when the security of China's regime is not challenged. We conclude that maintaining a good US-China relationship is the best strategy for the United States to help prevent military crises in the Taiwan Strait. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]