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The paper describes the growing human rights gap between China on one side and the US and Taiwan on the other side and analyses its impact on cross-strait relations. Since Xi Jinping's ascent to power in the People's Republic of China in 2012/2013 and the elections of Donald Trump in the US and Tsai Ing-wen in Taiwan in 2016, the relationship between China and the other two countries has worsened. The US and Taiwan have a similar view on human rights in the PRC. The increasing repression and authoritarianism of the PRC leads to a human rights gap in the Taiwan Strait that increases the divide and the tensions between both sides. The failure of the PRC to address in its proposal for a peaceful unification the concerns of the Taiwanese for their democracy and human rights pushes Taiwan further away. The similar assessment of the PRC's authoritarian threat by the US and Taiwan strengthens the bond between both, based on the shared values of democracy and human rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through a case study of Taiwan, this paper seeks to address recent debates surrounding the transformation of developmental states in East Asia. Whilst a number of authors have cited the Taiwanese state as being both cautious and resilient in the midst of global restructuring, this paper seeks to critically engage with such arguments by highlighting the dynamic and mutually constitutive relations between the forms of social relations that underpin late development and the wider geopolitical system in which such development occurs. Specifically, Taiwanese industrialisation can be viewed as an outcome of the US intervention in the Chinese civil war and subsequent exclusion of China from the regional political economy in the period between the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The Kuomintang (KMT)'s retreat to Taiwan established the basis for the autonomous developmental state, and the US underpinned this state through military protection, aid and access to its own domestic market. However, the relative decline of US hegemony and the readmission of China into the international system have posed significant challenges to Taiwan's developmental state. The US sought to redress its trade imbalance with East Asia by placing pressure on Taiwan to liberalise its political economy. Furthermore, the very process of development itself served to undermine the autonomy of the state as it came under pressure from new social forces. Taiwan has more recently been faced with a dilemma of closer integration with the mainland or the maintenance of its de facto economic and political independence at the risk of becoming isolated from the global trading system. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The central question of this paper is whether China can go beyond simple technological transfer and toward innovation in this age of globalization. By adopting an institutionalist perspective, this paper argues that China has developed a dualist model during its economic transitional period in which the foreign sector has been isolated from domestic firms, while the domestic industrial sectors have also failed to develop organic linkages among themselves to facilitate technological learning and generate innovation. This paper discusses four major institutional arrangements that deeply influence China's technological development – the institutional logic of economic reform, the state's industrial policy, the financial system and the industrial structure. It suggests that, owing to these institutional elements, China has neither developed economies of scale, as compared with the South Korean case, nor has it built up a network-type of economy similar to its Taiwanese counterpart in order to generate the mechanisms needed for technological innovation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China and Taiwan have become important actors in South Pacific affairs due to their diplomatic rivalry. Securing the diplomatic recognition of the Pacific Islands countries is expensive for China and Taiwan. There are limits to what the rivals are willing to spend, and they attempt to reduce costs. This dynamic shapes how Taiwan and China engage Pacific Islands politicians. It also motivates their high level official visits to the region, and how they engage South Pacific regional organizations. Despite criticisms that China-Taiwan rivalry corrupts and destabilizes the South Pacific, the issue of whether China and Taiwan's diplomatic rivalry has been beneficial or detrimental to the region remains contentious. China and Taiwan appear to have recently called a truce in their decades-old rivalry. This tacit agreement is still tentative, and the involvement of China and Taiwan in the region has yet to change significantly. However, Taiwan has reportedly begun to reduce funding, and is likely to reform its aid delivery in order to satisfy demands from the South Pacific region's dominant power, Australia, and to improve its image as a humanitarian aid donor. China is also likely to reduce funding while the truce holds. However, China considers its ties with South Pacific governments more important than responding to Australian pressure, and is unlikely to reform its South Pacific aid programmes as a result of the diplomatic truce. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The issue of Taiwan and relations across the Taiwan Strait is not only of fundamental interest to China, but also crucial to peace and stability in the Asian Pacific, thereby also making it of key concern to major players such as the United States and Japan. Beijing has faced enormous challenges over how to solve its dilemma. I would like to achieve reunification with Taiwan through a peaceful path, but perceive that it must be prepared for a war scenario if Taiwan insists on breaking from the mainland for its independence. The dilemma facing Beijing in terms of war or peace with Taiwan has become more acute since the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) moved to power in 2000. This article analyses Beijing's dilemma over the above policy choices by examining five stages of Beijing's assessment toward regime change in Taiwan from late 1999 to early 2005. It also illuminates the potential impact on major power relations in East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]