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Although the importance of non-state actors in international relations is now widely acknowledged, formal state-to-state ties remain an essential measure of a state's strength in the international community. When traditional components of sovereignty are eroded, what options remain open to states seeking to forestall international isolation? Drawing on a case study of Taiwan, this paper explores the potential and the pitfalls of using paradiplomacy as a substitute for traditional diplomacy. I argue that Taiwan uses paradiplomacy for three primary purposes: as a 'hedge' against weakness in the central-level US-Taiwan relationship; as a tool for developing long-term relationships with rising political stars; and as a performative strategy for asserting Taiwan's statehood by showing others that it acts like a state. While paradiplomacy enables Taiwan to strengthen ties to US policymakers, these efforts have become increasingly complicated as mainland Chinese influence on local US politics increases. This paper thus sheds light on paradiplomacy in the US-Taiwan relationship, but also on the ways in which American federalism can complicate US foreign policy toward East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper describes the growing human rights gap between China on one side and the US and Taiwan on the other side and analyses its impact on cross-strait relations. Since Xi Jinping's ascent to power in the People's Republic of China in 2012/2013 and the elections of Donald Trump in the US and Tsai Ing-wen in Taiwan in 2016, the relationship between China and the other two countries has worsened. The US and Taiwan have a similar view on human rights in the PRC. The increasing repression and authoritarianism of the PRC leads to a human rights gap in the Taiwan Strait that increases the divide and the tensions between both sides. The failure of the PRC to address in its proposal for a peaceful unification the concerns of the Taiwanese for their democracy and human rights pushes Taiwan further away. The similar assessment of the PRC's authoritarian threat by the US and Taiwan strengthens the bond between both, based on the shared values of democracy and human rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through a case study of Taiwan, this paper seeks to address recent debates surrounding the transformation of developmental states in East Asia. Whilst a number of authors have cited the Taiwanese state as being both cautious and resilient in the midst of global restructuring, this paper seeks to critically engage with such arguments by highlighting the dynamic and mutually constitutive relations between the forms of social relations that underpin late development and the wider geopolitical system in which such development occurs. Specifically, Taiwanese industrialisation can be viewed as an outcome of the US intervention in the Chinese civil war and subsequent exclusion of China from the regional political economy in the period between the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The Kuomintang (KMT)'s retreat to Taiwan established the basis for the autonomous developmental state, and the US underpinned this state through military protection, aid and access to its own domestic market. However, the relative decline of US hegemony and the readmission of China into the international system have posed significant challenges to Taiwan's developmental state. The US sought to redress its trade imbalance with East Asia by placing pressure on Taiwan to liberalise its political economy. Furthermore, the very process of development itself served to undermine the autonomy of the state as it came under pressure from new social forces. Taiwan has more recently been faced with a dilemma of closer integration with the mainland or the maintenance of its de facto economic and political independence at the risk of becoming isolated from the global trading system. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The central question of this paper is whether China can go beyond simple technological transfer and toward innovation in this age of globalization. By adopting an institutionalist perspective, this paper argues that China has developed a dualist model during its economic transitional period in which the foreign sector has been isolated from domestic firms, while the domestic industrial sectors have also failed to develop organic linkages among themselves to facilitate technological learning and generate innovation. This paper discusses four major institutional arrangements that deeply influence China's technological development – the institutional logic of economic reform, the state's industrial policy, the financial system and the industrial structure. It suggests that, owing to these institutional elements, China has neither developed economies of scale, as compared with the South Korean case, nor has it built up a network-type of economy similar to its Taiwanese counterpart in order to generate the mechanisms needed for technological innovation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last few decades, China has become one of the most important foreign investment destinations and centers of economic development in Asia. China's growing economic clout and coercive measures lead to the following empirical puzzles: how has Taiwan perceived China's increasing military capabilities and economic influence? What are the major factors that facilitate or constrain the role of a government agency of a weaker state in addressing the economic power of a stronger one? More specifically, what has been the purpose of Taiwan's economic statecraft? Based on Taiwan's official statements, regional trade data, and newspaper coverage in Chinese and English, this study investigates both positive and negative evaluations of China-Taiwan trade from 2009 to 2021. From 2009 to 2016, President Ma Ying-jeou adopted a desecuritization strategy in normalizing bilateral trade with China, and he actively promoted greater liberalization of Taiwan's financial and service sectors for China's investment. From 2016 to 2021, President Tsai Ing-wen employed a securitization strategy in light of the risks of economic reliance on China's markets. The article proceeds as follows. First, it engages the current literature on economic statecraft, China-Taiwan relations, and Asian politics. Second, this study offers a framework of desecuritization and securitization of Taiwan's trade toward China, and it highlights how the political leaders in Taiwan attempt to find a balance between trade and security. Third, it provides in-depth case studies on how Taiwan executed desecuritization and securitization strategies. Finally, it concludes with some initial thoughts on the studies of comparative economic statecraft, and provides policy implications for countries in the Asia Pacific region and beyond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan's foreign aid policy is largely a response to its China-imposed international isolation. Taiwan provides aid without stringent accountability conditions to countries in Africa, the Americas, and the South Pacific in order to maintain official diplomatic relations in the face of Chinese opposition. Often at odds with this is Taiwan's interest in seeking western support through being seen as a responsible aid donor. Domestic political constraints on Taiwan's aid budget accentuate the tension between these two interests. Taiwan's aid program can be seen as the product of these three competing and enduring pressures – maintaining the count of official diplomatic relationships, improving its international reputation, and containing aid spending. Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou's tacit ‘diplomatic truce’ with China – part of a wider warming of intergovernmental relations across the Taiwan Strait – has reduced significantly the squeeze between these three pressures on Taiwan's foreign aid policy. It has allowed the Ma administration to improve Taiwan's reputation, while maintaining or even reducing its aid expenditure, and still retain the same number of official diplomatic relationships. Nevertheless, the Ma administration has not wanted to alienate recipient governments while the prospects for the diplomatic truce with China remain uncertain. There remains considerable continuity with past practices, and the government's handling of aid as a foreign policy tool is still largely opaque and unaccountable. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article challenges the dominant narrative that overlooks the role of domestic factors in Taiwanese foreign aid in favour of politics cast at the cross-Strait and international levels. It examines the emergence and effects of partisan politics on Taipei's foreign aid policies, including aid budgets and the motivation for providing foreign aid. It argues that, rather than the cross-Strait conflict as such, it was contests and rivalries among Taiwan's political parties and government agencies – underpinned by ongoing projects of state building – that shaped the variable objectives, policies and processes of Taipei's foreign aid-giving. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

China and Taiwan have become important actors in South Pacific affairs due to their diplomatic rivalry. Securing the diplomatic recognition of the Pacific Islands countries is expensive for China and Taiwan. There are limits to what the rivals are willing to spend, and they attempt to reduce costs. This dynamic shapes how Taiwan and China engage Pacific Islands politicians. It also motivates their high level official visits to the region, and how they engage South Pacific regional organizations. Despite criticisms that China-Taiwan rivalry corrupts and destabilizes the South Pacific, the issue of whether China and Taiwan's diplomatic rivalry has been beneficial or detrimental to the region remains contentious. China and Taiwan appear to have recently called a truce in their decades-old rivalry. This tacit agreement is still tentative, and the involvement of China and Taiwan in the region has yet to change significantly. However, Taiwan has reportedly begun to reduce funding, and is likely to reform its aid delivery in order to satisfy demands from the South Pacific region's dominant power, Australia, and to improve its image as a humanitarian aid donor. China is also likely to reduce funding while the truce holds. However, China considers its ties with South Pacific governments more important than responding to Australian pressure, and is unlikely to reform its South Pacific aid programmes as a result of the diplomatic truce. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The issue of Taiwan and relations across the Taiwan Strait is not only of fundamental interest to China, but also crucial to peace and stability in the Asian Pacific, thereby also making it of key concern to major players such as the United States and Japan. Beijing has faced enormous challenges over how to solve its dilemma. I would like to achieve reunification with Taiwan through a peaceful path, but perceive that it must be prepared for a war scenario if Taiwan insists on breaking from the mainland for its independence. The dilemma facing Beijing in terms of war or peace with Taiwan has become more acute since the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) moved to power in 2000. This article analyses Beijing's dilemma over the above policy choices by examining five stages of Beijing's assessment toward regime change in Taiwan from late 1999 to early 2005. It also illuminates the potential impact on major power relations in East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]