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Progress in psychology has been frustrated by challenges concerning replicability, generalizability, strategy selection, inferential reproducibility, and computational reproducibility. Although often discussed separately, these five challenges may share a common cause: insufficient investment of intellectual and nonintellectual resources into the typical psychology study. We suggest that the emerging emphasis on big-team science can help address these challenges by allowing researchers to pool their resources together to increase the amount available for a single study. However, the current incentives, infrastructure, and institutions in academic science have all developed under the assumption that science is conducted by solo principal investigators and their dependent trainees, an assumption that creates barriers to sustainable big-team science. We also anticipate that big-team science carries unique risks, such as the potential for big-team-science organizations to be co-opted by unaccountable leaders, become overly conservative, and make mistakes at a grand scale. Big-team-science organizations must also acquire personnel who are properly compensated and have clear roles. Not doing so raises risks related to mismanagement and a lack of financial sustainability. If researchers can manage its unique barriers and risks, big-team science has the potential to spur great progress in psychology and beyond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the United States, White samples are often portrayed as if their racial identities were inconsequential to their thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, and research findings derived from White samples are often portrayed as if they were generalizable to all humans. We argue that these and other practices are rooted in a "White = neutral" framework (i.e., the conceptualization of White samples as nonracial). First, we review existing data and present some new data to highlight the scope of the White = neutral framework. Second, we integrate research from across psychological science to argue that the continued use of the White = neutral framework will prevent psychology from becoming a truly objective and inclusive science for at least three reasons: (a) Research with White samples will be valued over research with samples of color, (b) norms that maintain White neutrality will remain unchallenged, and (c) the role of White identity in psychological processes will remain underspecified and underexamined. Third, we provide recommendations for how to move beyond the White = neutral framework in hopes of encouraging all psychological scientists to move toward a White ≠ neutral framework in which all samples are identified for the unique and diverse perspectives that they bring to the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A target question for the scientific study of consciousness is how dimensions of consciousness, such as the ability to feel pain and pleasure or reflect on one's own experience, vary in different states and animal species. Considering the tight link between consciousness and moral status, answers to these questions have implications for law and ethics. Here we point out that given this link, the scientific community studying consciousness may face implicit pressure to carry out certain research programs or interpret results in ways that justify current norms rather than challenge them. We show that because consciousness largely determines moral status, the use of nonhuman animals in the scientific study of consciousness introduces a direct conflict between scientific relevance and ethics—the more scientifically valuable an animal model is for studying consciousness, the more difficult it becomes to ethically justify compromises to its well-being for consciousness research. Finally, in light of these considerations, we call for a discussion of the immediate ethical corollaries of the body of knowledge that has accumulated and for a more explicit consideration of the role of ideology and ethics in the scientific study of consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The replication crisis and credibility revolution in the 2010s brought a wave of doubts about the credibility of social and personality psychology. We argue that as a field, we must reckon with the concerns brought to light during this critical decade. How the field responds to this crisis will reveal our commitment to self-correction. If we do not take the steps necessary to address our problems and simply declare the crisis to be over or the problems to be fixed without evidence, we risk further undermining our credibility. To fully reckon with this crisis, we must empirically assess the state of the field to take stock of how credible our science actually is and whether it is improving. We propose an agenda for metascientific research, and we review approaches to empirically evaluate and track where we are as a field (e.g., analyzing the published literature, surveying researchers). We describe one such project (Surveying the Past and Present State of Published Studies in Social and Personality Psychology) underway in our research group. Empirical evidence about the state of our field is necessary if we are to take self-correction seriously and if we hope to avert future crises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although many psychologists are interested in making the world a better place through their work, they are often unable to have the impact that they would like. Here, we suggest that both individuals and psychology as a field can better improve human welfare by incorporating ideas from effective altruism, a growing movement whose members aim to do the most good by using science and reason to inform their efforts. In this article, we first briefly introduce effective altruism and review important principles that can be applied to how psychologists approach their work, such as the importance, tractability, and neglectedness framework. We then review how effective altruism can inform individual psychologists' choices. Finally, we close with a discussion of ideas for how psychology, as a field, can increase its positive impact. By applying insights from effective altruism to psychological science, we aim to integrate a new theoretical framework into psychological science, stimulate new areas of research, start a discussion on how psychology can maximize its impact, and inspire the psychology community to do the most good. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID-19 pandemic has extensively changed the state of psychological science from what research questions psychologists can ask to which methodologies psychologists can use to investigate them. In this article, we offer a perspective on how to optimize new research in the pandemic's wake. Because this pandemic is inherently a social phenomenon—an event that hinges on human-to-human contact—we focus on socially relevant subfields of psychology. We highlight specific psychological phenomena that have likely shifted as a result of the pandemic and discuss theoretical, methodological, and practical considerations of conducting research on these phenomena. After this discussion, we evaluate metascientific issues that have been amplified by the pandemic. We aim to demonstrate how theoretically grounded views on the COVID-19 pandemic can help make psychological science stronger—not weaker—in its wake. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The reliance in psychology on verbal definitions means that psychological research is unusually moored to how humans think and communicate about categories. Psychological concepts (e.g., intelligence, attention) are easily assumed to represent objective, definable categories with an underlying essence. Like the "vital forces" previously thought to animate life, these assumed essences can create an illusion of understanding. By synthesizing a wide range of research lines from cognitive, clinical, and biological psychology and neuroscience, we describe a pervasive tendency across psychological science to assume that essences explain phenomena. Labeling a complex phenomenon can appear as theoretical progress before there is sufficient evidence that the described category has a definable essence or known boundary conditions. Category labels can further undermine progress by masking contingent and contextual relationships and obscuring the need to specify mechanisms. Finally, we highlight examples of promising methods that circumvent the lure of essences and suggest four concrete strategies for identifying and avoiding essentialist intuitions in theory development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Psychologists are spending a considerable amount of time researching and developing interventions in hopes that their efforts can help to tackle some of society's pressing problems. Unfortunately, those hopes are often not realized—many interventions are developed and reported in journals but do not make their way into the broader world they were designed to change. One potential reason for this is that there may be a gap between the information reported in articles and the information others, such as practitioners, need to implement the findings. We explored this possibility in the current article. We conducted a scoping review to assess the extent to which the information needed for implementation is reported in psychological intervention articles. Results suggest psychological intervention articles report, at most, 64% of the information needed to implement interventions. We discuss the implications of this for both psychological theories and applying them in the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The scientific enterprise has long been based on the presumption of replication, although scientists have recently become aware of various corruptions of the enterprise that have hurt replicability. In this article, we begin by considering three illustrations of research paradigms that have all been subject to intense scrutiny through replications and theoretical concerns. The three paradigms are one for which the corpus of research points to a real finding, one for which the corpus of research points to a significantly attenuated effect, and one for which the debate is ongoing. We then discuss what scientists can learn—and how science can be improved—through replications more generally. From there, we discuss what we believe needs to be done to improve scientific inquiry with regard to replication moving forward. Finally, we conclude by providing readers with several different approaches to replication and how these approaches progress science. The approaches discussed include multilab replications of many effects, multilab replications of specific effects, adversarial collaborations, and stand-alone applications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Science is often perceived to be a self-correcting enterprise. In principle, the assessment of scientific claims is supposed to proceed in a cumulative fashion, with the reigning theories of the day progressively approximating truth more accurately over time. In practice, however, cumulative self-correction tends to proceed less efficiently than one might naively suppose. Far from evaluating new evidence dispassionately and infallibly, individual scientists often cling stubbornly to prior findings. Here we explore the dynamics of scientific self-correction at an individual rather than collective level. In 13 written statements, researchers from diverse branches of psychology share why and how they have lost confidence in one of their own published findings. We qualitatively characterize these disclosures and explore their implications. A cross-disciplinary survey suggests that such loss-of-confidence sentiments are surprisingly common among members of the broader scientific population yet rarely become part of the public record. We argue that removing barriers to self-correction at the individual level is imperative if the scientific community as a whole is to achieve the ideal of efficient self-correction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The field of psychology has a long history of encouraging researchers to disseminate their findings to the broader public. This trend has continued in recent decades in part because of professional psychology organizations reissuing calls to "give psychology away." This recent wave of calls to give psychology away is different because it has been occurring alongside another movement in the field—the credibility revolution in which psychology has been reckoning with metascientific questions about what exactly psychologists know. This creates a dilemma for the modern psychologist: How is one to "give psychology away" if one is unsure about what is known or what one has to give? In the current article, we discuss strategies for navigating this tension by drawing on insights from the interdisciplinary fields of science communication and persuasion and social influence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We identify points of conflict and consensus regarding (a) controversial empirical claims and (b) normative preferences for how controversial scholarship—and scholars—should be treated. In 2021, we conducted qualitative interviews (n = 41) to generate a quantitative survey (N = 470) of U.S. psychology professors’ beliefs and values. Professors strongly disagreed on the truth status of 10 candidate taboo conclusions: For each conclusion, some professors reported 100% certainty in its veracity and others 100% certainty in its falsehood. Professors more confident in the truth of the taboo conclusions reported more self-censorship, a pattern that could bias perceived scientific consensus regarding the inaccuracy of controversial conclusions. Almost all professors worried about social sanctions if they were to express their own empirical beliefs. Tenured professors reported as much self-censorship and as much fear of consequences as untenured professors, including fear of getting fired. Most professors opposed suppressing scholarship and punishing peers on the basis of moral concerns about research conclusions and reported contempt for peers who petition to retract papers on moral grounds. Younger, more left-leaning, and female faculty were generally more opposed to controversial scholarship. These results do not resolve empirical or normative disagreements among psychology professors, but they may provide an empirical context for their discussion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the face of unreplicable results, statistical anomalies, and outright fraud, introspection and changes in the psychological sciences have taken root. Vibrant reform and metascience movements have emerged. These are exciting developments and may point toward practical improvements in the future. Yet there is nothing so practical as good theory. This article outlines aspects of reform and metascience in psychology that are ripe for an injection of theory, including a lot of excellent and overlooked theoretical work from different disciplines. I review established frameworks that model the process of scientific discovery, the types of scientific networks that we ought to aspire to, and the processes by which problematic norms and institutions might evolve, focusing especially on modeling from the philosophy of science and cultural evolution. We have unwittingly evolved a toxic scientific ecosystem; existing interdisciplinary theory may help us intelligently design a better one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Race plays an important role in how people think, develop, and behave. In the current article, we queried more than 26,000 empirical articles published between 1974 and 2018 in top-tier cognitive, developmental, and social psychology journals to document how often psychological research acknowledges this reality and to examine whether people who edit, write, and participate in the research are systematically connected. We note several findings. First, across the past five decades, psychological publications that highlight race have been rare, and although they have increased in developmental and social psychology, they have remained virtually nonexistent in cognitive psychology. Second, most publications have been edited by White editors, under which there have been significantly fewer publications that highlight race. Third, many of the publications that highlight race have been written by White authors who employed significantly fewer participants of color. In many cases, we document variation as a function of area and decade. We argue that systemic inequality exists within psychological research and that systemic changes are needed to ensure that psychological research benefits from diversity in editing, writing, and participation. To this end, and in the spirit of the field's recent emphasis on metascience, we offer recommendations for journals and authors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most scientific research is conducted by small teams of investigators who together formulate hypotheses, collect data, conduct analyses, and report novel findings. These teams operate independently as vertically integrated silos. Here we argue that scientific research that is horizontally distributed can provide substantial complementary value, aiming to maximize available resources, promote inclusiveness and transparency, and increase rigor and reliability. This alternative approach enables researchers to tackle ambitious projects that would not be possible under the standard model. Crowdsourced scientific initiatives vary in the degree of communication between project members from largely independent work curated by a coordination team to crowd collaboration on shared activities. The potential benefits and challenges of large-scale collaboration span the entire research process: ideation, study design, data collection, data analysis, reporting, and peer review. Complementing traditional small science with crowdsourced approaches can accelerate the progress of science and improve the quality of scientific research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]