1. Folk psychology and proximal intentions
- Author
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Mele, Alfred, Nadelhoffer, Thomas, and Khoudary, Maria
- Subjects
05 social sciences ,06 humanities and the arts ,0603 philosophy, ethics and religion ,050105 experimental psychology ,Epistemology ,Philosophy ,Action (philosophy) ,Order (business) ,Folk psychology ,Phenomenon ,060302 philosophy ,0501 psychology and cognitive sciences ,Psychology ,Experimental philosophy ,Applied Psychology - Abstract
There is a longstanding debate in philosophy concerning the relationship between intention and intentional action. According to the Single Phenomenon View, while one need not intend to A in order to A intentionally, one nevertheless needs to have an A-relevant intention. This view has recently come under criticism by those who think that one can A intentionally without any relevant intention at all. On this view, neither distal nor proximal intentions are necessary for intentional action. In this paper we present the results of two studies that explore folk ascriptions of proximal intentions and intentional actions in garden-variety, non-moral cases. Our findings suggest a very tight relationship between the two. We argue that the results from these two studies cohere with the Single Phenomenon View and give theorists who reject this view on conceptual grounds reason to worry.
- Published
- 2021