Search

In this paper we confront a challenge to truthmaker theory that is analogous to the objections raised by deflationists against substantive theories of truth. Several critics of truthmaker theory espouse a 'deflationary' attitude about truthmaking, though it has not been clearly presented as such. Our goal is to articulate and then object to the underlying rationale behind deflationary truthmaking. We begin by developing the analogy between deflationary truth and deflationary truthmaking, and then show how the latter can be found in the work of Dodd, Hornsby, Schnieder, Williamson, and others. These philosophers believe that the ambitions of truthmaker theory are easily satisfied, without recourse to ambitious ontological investigation—hence the analogy with deflationary truth. We argue that the deflationists' agenda fails: there is no coherent deflationary theory of truthmaking. Truthmaking, once deflated, fails to address the questions at the heart of truthmaking investigation. Truthmaking cannot be had on the cheap. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues for a particular view about in what metaphysical equivalence consists: namely, that any two metaphysical theories are metaphysically equivalent if and only if those theories are strongly hyperintensionally equivalent. It is consistent with this characterisation that said theories are weakly hyperintensionally distinct; thus, affording us the resources to model the content of propositional attitudes directed towards metaphysically equivalent theories in such a way that non-ideal agents can bear different propositional attitudes towards metaphysically equivalent theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If we think in a lingua mentis, questions about relations between linguistic meaning and propositional-attitude content become questions about relations between meaning in a public language (p-meaning) and meaning in a language of thought (t-meaning). Whether or not the neo-Gricean is correct that p-meaning can be defined in terms of t-meaning and then t-meaning defined in terms of the causal-functional roles of mentalese expressions, it's apt to seem obvious that separate accounts are needed of p-meaning and t-meaning, since p-meaning, unlike t-meaning, must be understood at least partly in terms of communication. Paul Horwich, however, claims that his 'use theory of meaning' provides a uniform account of all meaning in terms of 'acceptance properties' that, surprisingly, implicate nothing about use in communication. But it turns out that the details of his theory belie his claim about it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fourteenth-century treatises on paradoxes of the liar family, especially Bradwardine's and Buridan's, raise issues concerning the meaning of sentences, in particular about closure of sentential meaning under implication, semantic pluralism and the ontological status of ‘meanings’, which are still topical for current theories of meaning. I outline ways in which they tend to be overlooked, raising issues that must be addressed by any respectable theory of meaning as well as pointing in the direction of possible answers. I analyse a Bradwardinian theory of sentential meaning as it emerges from his treatment of liar sentences, exploring where it requires more thorough elaboration if it is to be a fully developed theory of sentential meaning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mark Eli Kalderon has argued for a fictionalist variant of non-cognitivism. On his view, what the Frege–Geach problem shows is that standard non-cognitivism proceeds uncritically from claims about use to claims about meaning; if non-cognitivism's claims were solely about use it would be on safe ground as far as the Frege–Geach problem is concerned. I argue that Kalderon's diagnosis is mistaken: the problem concerns the non-cognitivist's account of the use of moral sentences too. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Proof-theoretic semantics is an approach to logical semantics based on two ideas, of which the first is that the meaning of a logical connective can be explained by stipulating that some mode of inference, e.g., a natural deduction introduction or elimination rule, is permissible. The second idea is that the soundness of rules which are not stipulated outright may be deduced by some proof-theoretic argument from properties of the rules which are stipulated outright. I examine the first idea. My main conclusion is that the idea is more problematic, and requires more discussion, than has been generally realized. I mention five problems which will have to be overcome before the idea can be accepted as definitely viable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I present two generalizations of Putnam's model-theoretic argument against realism. The first replaces Putnam's model theory with some new, and substantially simpler, model theory, while the second replaces Putnam's model theory with some more accessible results from astronomy. By design, both of these new arguments fail. But the similarities between these new arguments and Putnam's original arguments illuminate the latter's overall structure, and the flaws in these new arguments highlight the corresponding flaws in Putnam's arguments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The assumption that the future is open makes well known problems for traditional semantics. According to a commonly held intuition, today's occurrence of the sentence ‘There will be a sea battle tomorrow’, while truth-valueless today, will have a determinate truth-value by tomorrow night. Yet given traditional semantics, sentences that are truth-valueless now cannot later ‘become’ true. Relativistic semantics has been claimed to do a better job of accommodating intuitions about future contingents than non-relativistic semantics does. However, intuitions about future contingents cannot by themselves give good reasons for shifting to a new paradigm, for despite the initial appearances, standard non-relativistic semantics (plus an account of truth-value gaps) can accommodate both intuitions about future contingents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Critics of attempts to explain meaning in terms of truth-conditions have tended to charge their opponents with misconceptions regarding truth. I shall argue that the ‘naïve’ version of the truth-conditional theory which best accounts for its resilience fails for a different and more basic reason, namely, circularity arising from the contingency of meaning. One reason why this problem has been overlooked is a tendency (noted by Dummett in a different connection) to assimilate the naïve truth-conditional theory to an idealized verificationism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Jessica Brown contends that Keith DeRose's latest argument for contextualism fails to rule out contextualism's chief rival, namely, classic invariantism. Still, even if their position has not been ruled out, classic invariantists must offer considerations in favour of their position if they are to show that it is superior to contextualism. Brown defends classic invariantism with a warranted assertability manoeuvre that utilizes a linguistic pragmatic principle of relevance. I argue, however, that this manoeuvre is not as effective as it might be. I propose a different warranted assertability manonivre, which utilizes a pragmatic principle of strength, affords a more successful defence of classic invariantism, and helps to establish that classic invariantism is superior to contextualism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ruth Millikan has long argued that the phenomenon of confused thought requires us to abandon certain traditional programmes for mental semantics. On the one hand she argues that confused thought involves confused concepts, and on the other that Fregean senses, or modes of presentation, cannot be useful in theorizing about minds capable of confused thinking. I argue that while we might accept that concepts can be confused, we have no reason to abandon modes of presentation. Making sense of confused thought requires recognizing modes of presentation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Richard Heck has contested my argument that the equation of the meaning of a sentence with its truth-condition implies deflationism, on the ground that the argument does not go through if truth-conditions are understood, in Davidson's style, to be stated by T-sentences. My reply is that Davidsonian theories of meaning do not equate the meaning of a sentence with its truth-condition, and thus that Heck's point does not actually obstruct my argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his 'Meaning and Truth-Conditions', Gary Kemp offers a reconstruction of Frege's infamous 'regress argument' which purports to rely only upon the premises that the meaning of a sentence is its truth-condition and that each sentence expresses a unique proposition. If cogent, the argument would show that only someone who accepts a form of semantic holism can use the notion of truth to explain that of meaning. I respond that Kemp relies heavily upon what he himself styles 'a literal, rather wooden' understanding of truth-conditions. I explore alternatives, and say a few words about how Frege's regress argument might best be understood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focusses on social externalism as radical threat to individualism. Criticism on individualist accounts of meaning; Link between thought-content and truth-condition; Focus on Burge's thought-experiment concerning arthritis concept; Consequences of rejecting assumption underlying Burge's thought-experiment.

Presents a contextual analysis of the book 'Meaning,' by Paul Horwich. Components of the book; Purpose of the book; Claims of Horwich on the nature of acceptance properties.

Argues that the arguments used by Paul Horwich against Saul Kripke's central argument against dispositionalist theories of meaning are not sufficient to defend dispositionalism. Notion of determination which does not presuppose an inflationary conception of truth; Susceptibility of the use-theoretic version of dispositionalism espoused by Horwich to Kripke's argument.

Discusses the theories of meaning and transcendental idealism according to philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. Relationship between transcendental idealism and empirical realism; Traditional identification of the meaning of a declarative sentence; Information on Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy.

Examines key philosophical interpretations rule-following as discussed in the book "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language,: by Saul A. Kripke. Private language arguments; Rule-following concept; Common understanding of following a rule; Epistemology; Conception of an act of meaning; Manifestation of rule-following in the actual practices of acting, speaking, counting, calculating and other human acts.

Interprets the philosophical distinction between the use of the terms, true and false in utterances such as questions, commands and requests in relation to the basis of meaning. Radical interpretation as a basis for truth theories and theories of meaning for arbitrary languages; Emphasis on the sense and force distinction in theories of meaning; English manifestations of assent and dissent.

Discusses a paper by Jane Heal about her preferred model for the relation between word meaning and sentence meaning. Hypothetical account of attractive forces exerted by blocks of wood of different colors and shapes upon pieces of plastic; Argument that there is no reason to suppose that without syntactic complexity no language could be learned; Argument Heal alludes to for the priority of word meaning; Need for a complete account of language to give due place to syntax and the lexicon.

Examines various models or analogies by which the word-meaning/sentence-meaning relation might be illuminated. Paradoxical nature of the relation between sentence meaning and word meaning; Formulation of a scheme in which conceptual, epistemological and other explanatory relations all have their right places; Questions concerning syntactic complexity; Issues raised by the contention that syntactic complexity is an essential condition of sentences having certain sorts of meanings.

This article presents information about the book "Linguistic Behaviour," by Jonathan Bennett. Bennett's aim in this very stimulating book is to analyze the concepts of meaning and language by developing philosopher H. P. Grice's celebrated concept of non-natural meaning with a particular emphasis on the behavioral basis for applying the relevant concepts. The book is far more than an exercise in philosophy of language. The train of analysis starts at the concept of teleological behavior, moves from there to the concept of intentional behavior, and thence to meaningful behavior. Bennett develops detailed analyses of the concepts of teleological behavior and intentional behavior.

There is an important ambiguity in certain types of questions that the author wants to analyse. In general, what is an answer to the why-question will, with a slight logical change, also be an answer to the grounds-question, so that when one gives such an answer it may not be clear which question one is answering. The nature of this ambiguity can be more fully understood if one gets clear about certain uses of "I think" phrases. It is worth noting that "I think," used propositionally, can express a degree of belief anywhere from some minimum degree to complete certainty.

Comments on the article by H.J. McCloakey, "Rights," focusing on animal rights. Logical connection between possessing things and possessing rights; Contemporary phenomenalism; Terms of the permanent possibilities of sensations; Distinction between analysis and meaning.

Replies to comments made by Michael Keenan about the author's study concerning syntax, meaning and context. Keenan's major objections to the author's remarks about Austin's distinctions among phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts; Reply to Keenan's claim that the author was wrong to identify the phatic act as an utterance of a meaningful English sentence.

Replies to comments made by Jenefer Robinson about the author's analysis of Robinson's study on syntax, meaning and context. Author's major objections to Robinson's remarks about Austin's distinctions among phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts; Robinson's reply to the author's claim that Robinson was wrong to identify the phatic act as an utterance of a meaningful English sentence.