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According to the thesis known as 'Composition as Identity' ('CAI'), every entity is identical to the parts it fuses. Many authors in the literature acknowledge that, in spite of its controversial character, one attractive virtue of CAI is its apparent ability to give a straightforward account of the innocence of mereology. In this paper I will present a simple argument according to which CAI entails that no composite entity can be said to be ontologically innocent in the relevant sense. After having shown that said argument is independent from the problems surrounding the infamous 'Collapse Principle', I will conclude that CAI‐theorists should endorse a suitably 'restricted' version of CAI. In the final part of the paper I will then argue that the best restricted version of CAI is the theory according to which every composite entity is identical to the plurality of its atomic parts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to Sider, a question is metaphysically substantive just in case it has a single most natural answer. Recently, Barnes and Mikkola have argued that, given this notion of substantivity, many of the central questions in the metaphysics of gender are nonsubstantive. Specifically, it is plausible that gender pluralism—the view that there are multiple, equally natural gender kinds—is true, but this view seems incompatible with the substantivity of gender. The goal of this paper is to argue that the notion of substantivity can be understood in a way that accommodates gender pluralism. First, I claim that gender terms (at least as used in the ontology room) are referentially indeterminate, where referential indeterminacy holds in virtue of the way the world is. Second, I propose a degree‐theoretic (or scalar) account of metaphysical substantivity; genders are substantial to the degree that they are determinate. I conclude that gender is relatively, although not absolutely, substantial. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a straightforward view of perception that has not received adequate consideration because it requires us to rethink basic assumptions about the objects of perception. In this paper, I develop a novel account of these objects—the sensible qualities—which makes room for the straightforward view. I defend two primary claims. First, I argue that qualities like color and shape are "ontologically flexible" kinds. That is, their real definitions allow for both physical objects and mental entities to be colored or shaped. Second, a single instance of these qualities can be attributed to more than one entity. Just as we attribute the same instance of a material property to a statue and to the clay that constitutes it, single instances of sensible qualities should be attributed both to the physical objects perceived and to the perceptual states that have those instances as their objects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that subjects at least sometimes learn why they hold an attitude or perform an action in a distinctive first‐personal way, i.e., they learn of those facts in a manner that mere observers cannot. Subjects have this first‐personal self‐knowledge in virtue of first‐personal self‐knowledge of the reasons for which they hold an attitude or perform an action—their motivating reasons. This paper focusses on one's reasons for holding an attitude. So, it is not just that subjects have distinctive access to the fact that they, say, believe that q; they also have distinctive access to the fact that they believe that p for the reason that p. I argue for this position contra the prevailing orthodoxy. Philosophers and psychologists often deny that subjects have distinctive access to why they hold their attitudes. Indeed, even many of those who claim that subjects can use a special method to learn that they have a given attitude deny that this method provides knowledge of why one holds that attitude. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Numerous difficulties arising in connection with developing an ontology for linguistic entities can be thought of as manifestations of a more general problem, aptly characterized by David Lewis (1975) as a tension between two conflicting conceptions of language. On the one hand, our best theories model languages as abstract semantic systems—roughly, functions assigning meanings to expressions. On the other hand, we think of languages as contingent and changing social constructs—both grounded in, and grounding, various social relations and institutions of human beings. There are various ways in which these conceptions appear to be in conflict. For instance, if languages are set‐theoretical entities—as our best logical and linguistic theories would have it—how do we account for the fact that they change? Or that they could have been different in various respects? And how do we provide principled and noncircular conditions for set‐membership, when there appears to be nothing in common to all tokens of the same expression other than belonging to the same type? This paper aims to develop an ontology of linguistic entities—specifically, of languages and linguistic communities—that can resolve these apparent tensions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What does it take for a property to be a social property? This question is different from questions about what it takes for a property to be socially constructed. That is: it is one thing to be social, it is another to be socially constructed. Compared to questions about social construction, this question about sociality has received relatively little attention in social metaphysics. Here, I work from a very specific set of observations which arise from the social metaphysics literature to uncover a sufficient condition on sociality for properties, a condition which I argue all non‐social properties fail to satisfy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mereological nominalism is the thesis that properties are identical to fusions of their instances. Long ignored, this paper argues that it's a plausible ontology of properties. Whilst not everyone will accept it, it's going to appeal to many philosophers and (at the least) should no longer be relegated to the annals of the history of metaphysics.1 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to argue for some useful distinctions in the theory of grounding. I do so by first introducing the notion of grounding, discussing some of its features, and arguing that grounds must play some role in bringing about what they ground (sec.1). I then argue that there are various distinct roles a fact may play in bringing about another, and more particularly that we should distinguish between three such roles; enablers, partial grounds, and facts that partly ground (sec. 2). Finally, I present two theoretical advantages to incorporating these distinctions into our theory of grounding. Namely, that it reframes, and arguably dissolves, the contingentist‐necessitarian debate (sec. 3), and that it helps to elegantly deal with the purported counterexamples to the transitivity of grounding and thus maintain the plausible elements of the assumption that grounding is a transitive relation (sec.4). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is about the putative theoretical virtue of strength, as it might be used in abductive arguments to the correct logic in the epistemology of logic. It argues for three theses. The first is that the well‐defined property of logical strength is neither a virtue nor a vice, so that logically weaker theories are not—all other things being equal—worse or better theories than logically stronger ones. The second thesis is that logical strength does not entail the looser characteristic of scientific strength, and the third is that many modern logics are on a par—or can be made to be on a par—with respect to scientific strength. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues for a certain kind of anti-metaphysicalism about the temporal ontology debate, i.e., the debate between presentists and eternalists over the existence of past and future objects. Three different kinds of anti-metaphysicalism are defined-namely, non-factualism, physical-empiricism, and trivialism. The paper argues for the disjunction of these three views. It is then argued that trivialism is false, so that either non-factualism or physical-empiricism is true. Finally, the paper ends with a discussion of whether we should endorse non-factualism or physical-empiricism. An initial reason is provided for thinking that non-factualism might be true, but in the end, the paper leaves this question open. The paper also argues against a certain kind of necessitarianism about the temporal ontology debate; but this isn't an extra job-the falsity of this necessitarian view falls out of the other arguments as a sort of corollary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thomas Hofweber's Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics is ambitious, thought-provoking, and a good read. It expands upon a project he's developed in several previous papers-a project that seamlessly weaves together both metaphysics and metametaphysics. The book is as much about methodology as it is about the substantive conclusions he draws about what there is. As a consequence, it is a long book that covers a lot of ground. Since I cannot do justice to all of it, I hope my fellow symposiasts will take up parts of the book that I neglect. There is a lot of good stuff in there. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to give an account of what it is for an individual to instantiate thisness (i.e. primitive individual essence). Thisnesses are peculiar entities, and even those who endorse their existence and instantiation by objects/entities, have said very little about how an individual and its thisness are related. My approach will be to seek out a model for the instantiation of thisness by canvassing broadly Aristotelian accounts of the substance/attribute relation, and then by making appropriate modifications to the most likely candidates in order to accommodate an individual's instantiation of thisness. What will emerge is that the model with the most utility makes thisness redundant in the case of material substances. Nonetheless, I will suggest that a version of the model can be appropriately applied in the case of other individuals which might instantiate thisness: for example, events (where these are conceived as a fundamental category of ontology distinct from material substances). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the recent literature on all things metaontological, discussion of a notorious Meinongian doctrine-the thesis that some objects have no kind of being at all-has been conspicuous by its absence. And this is despite the fact that this thesis is the central element of the noneist metaphysics of Richard Routley (1980) and Graham Priest (2005). In this paper, we therefore examine the metaontological foundations of noneism, with a view to seeing exactly how the noneist's approach to ontological inquiry differs from the orthodox Quinean one. We proceed by arguing that the core anti-Quinean element in noneism has routinely been misidentified: rather than concerning Quine's thesis that to be is to be the value of a variable, the real difference is that the noneist rejects what we identify as Quine's 'translate-and-deflate' methodology. In rejecting this aspect of Quinean orthodoxy, the noneist is in good company: many of those who think that questions of fundamentality should be the proper focus of ontological inquiry can be read as rejecting it too. Accordingly, we then examine the differences between the noneist's conception of ontology and that offered by the fundamentalist. We argue that these two anti-Quinean approaches differ in terms of their respective conceptions of the theoretical role associated with the notion of being. And the contrast that emerges between them is, in the end, an explanatory one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many metaphysicians tell us that our world is one in which persisting objects are four-dimensionally extended in time, and persist by being partially present at each moment at which they exist. Many normative theorists tell us that at least some of our core normative practices are justified only if the relation that holds between a person at one time, and that person at another time, is the relation of strict identity. If these metaphysicians are right about the nature of our world, and these normative theorists are right about what justifies our normative practices, then we should be error theorists about the justification of at least some of our core normative practices and in turn, arguably we should eliminate those practices for which justification is lacking. This paper offers a way of resolving the tension between these two views that does not lead into the grips of error theory. It is a way that is amenable to 'exceptionists' about persons: those who think there is something special about persons and the first-person perspective; that personhood cannot be explained naturalistically, and the first-person perspective is naturalistically irreducible. The conclusion is thus a conditional: given that one is an exceptionist, an attractive way to resolve this tension is to embrace the view that persons are sui generis ontological kinds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most philosophical accounts of causation take causal relations to obtain between individuals and events in virtue of nomological relations between properties of these individuals and events. Such views fail to take into account the consequences of the fact that in general the properties of individuals and events will depend upon mechanisms that realize those properties. In this paper I attempt to rectify this failure, and in so doing to provide an account of the causal relevance of higher-level properties. I do this by critiquing one prominent model of higher-level properties—Kim’s functional model of reduction—and contrasting it with a mechanistic approach to higher-level properties and causation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Surprisingly, many ethical realists and anti-realists, naturalists and not, all accept some version of the following normative appeal to the natural (NAN): evaluative and normative facts hold solely in virtue of natural facts, where their naturalness is part of what fits them for the job. This paper argues not that NAN is false but that NAN has no adequate non-parochial justification (a justification that relies only on premises which can be accepted by more or less everyone who accepts NAN) to back up this consensus. I show that we cannot establish versions of NAN which are interesting in their own right (and not merely as instances of a general naturalistic ontology) by appealing to the nature of natural properties or the kind of in-virtue-of relation to which NAN refers, plus other plausible non-parochial assumptions. On the way, I distinguish different types of ‘in virtue of’ claims. I conclude by arguing that the way in which assessment of meta-ethical hypotheses is theory-dependent predicts the failure of non-parochial justifications of NAN. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is often thought that, although Spinoza develops a bold and distinctive conception of God (the unique substance, or Natura Naturans, in which all else inheres and which possesses infinitely many attributes, including extension), the arguments that he offers which purport to prove God’s existence contribute nothing new to natural theology. Rather, he is seen as just another participant in the seventeenth century revival of the ontological argument initiated by Descartes and taken up by Malebranche and Leibniz among others. That this is the case is both puzzling and unfortunate. It is puzzling because although Spinoza does offer an ontological proof for the existence of God, he also offers three other non-ontological proofs. It is unfortunate because these other non-ontological proofs are both more convincing and more interesting than his ontological proof. In this paper, I offer reconstructions and assessments of all of Spinoza’s arguments and argue that Spinoza’s metaphysical rationalism and his commitment to something like a Principle of Sufficient Reason are the driving force behind Spinoza’s non-ontological arguments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper argues that the assumption that there are property designators, together with two theoretically innocent claims, leads to a puzzle, whose solution requires us to reject the position that all (canonical) property designators are rigid. But if we deny that all (canonical) property designators are rigid, then the natural next step is to reject an abundant conception of properties and with it the suggestion that properties are the semantic values of predicates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An influential line of thought in metaphysics holds that where common sense discerns a tree or a dog or a baseball there may be just many microparticles. Provided the microparticles are arranged in the right way—are “treewise” or “dogwise” or “baseballwise” arranged—our sensory experiences will be just the same as if a tree or dog or baseball were really there. Therefore whether there really are such familiar objects in the world can be decided only by determining what more is needed for microparticles dogwise arranged actually to compose a dog. This paper argues that this line of thought sets up the wrong agenda. Composition is trivial; dogwise (etc.) arrangement is tricky. Dogwise arrangement will obtain in the wrong regions unless we stipulate that there are dogs, and that dogwise arrangement obtains only within their borders. The bearers of dogwise arrangement, moreover, will have to be dogs themselves, not their microparticles. Thus allowing that dogwise arrangement obtains at all is allowing that there are dogs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I outline an alternative to hermeneutic fictionalism, an alternative I call indifferentism, with the same advantages as hermeneutic fictionalism with respect to ontological issues but avoiding some of the problems that face fictionalism. The difference between indifferentism and fictionalism is this. The fictionalist about ordinary utterances of a sentence S holds, with more orthodox views, that the speaker in some sense commits herself to the truth of S. It is only that for the fictionalist this is truth in the relevant fiction. According to the indifferentist, by contrast, we are simply non-committal—or indifferent—with respect to some aspects of what is literally said in our assertive utterances (specifically, with respect to the ontologically committing aspects). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper concerns a fundamental dispute in ontology between the ‘Foundational Ontologist’, who believes that there is only one correct way of characterizing what there is, and the ontological ‘Skeptic’, who believes that there are viable alternative characterizations of what there is. I examine in detail an intriguing recent proposal in Dorr (2005), which promises to yield (i) a way of interpreting the Skeptic by means of a counterfactual semantics; and (ii) a way of converting the Skeptic to a position within Foundational Ontology, viz., that of Nihilism (according to which nothing composes anything and the world consists of mereological simples); this alleged conversion crucially turns on a novel notion of ‘metaphysical analyticity ’. I argue that both components of Dorr's proposal are problematic in central ways: as a result, the Foundational Ontologist gains an indirect argument against the coherence of the Skeptic's position; and the non-Nihilist Foundational Ontologist may feel confirmed in his doubts towards the Nihilist outlook. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two main claims are defended in this paper: first, that typical disputes in the literature about the ontology of physical objects are merely verbal; second, that the proper way to resolve these disputes is by appealing to common sense or ordinary language. A verbal dispute is characterized not in terms of private idiolects, but in terms of different linguistic communities representing different positions. If we imagine a community that makes Chisholm's mereological essentialist assertions, and another community that makes Lewis's four-dimensionalist assertions, the members of each community speak the truth in their respective languages. This follows from an application of the principle of interpretive charity to the two communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is often noted that institutional objects and artifacts depend on human beliefs and intentions and so fail to meet the realist paradigm of mind-independent objects. In this paper I draw out exactly in what ways the thesis of mind-independence fails, and show that it has some surprising consequences. For the specific forms of mind-dependence involved entail that we have certain forms of epistemic privilege with regard to our own institutional and artifactual kinds, protecting us from certain possibilities of ignorance and error; they also demonstrate that not all cases of reference to these kinds can proceed along a purely causal model. As a result, realist views in ontology, epistemology, and semantics that were developed with natural scientific kinds in mind cannot fully apply to the kinds of the social and human sciences. In closing I consider some wider consequences of these results for social science and philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I examine Kant's famous objection to the ontological argument: existence is not a determination. Previous commentators have not adequately explained what this claim means, how it undermines the ontological argument, or how Kant argues for it. I argue that the claim that existence is not a determination means that it is not possible for there to be non-existent objects; necessarily, there are only existent objects. I argue further that Kant's target is not merely ontological arguments as such but the larger 'ontotheist' metaphysics they presuppose: the view that God necessarily exists in virtue of his essence being contained in, or logically entailed by, his essence. I show that the ontotheist explanation of divine necessity requires the assumption that existence is a determination, and I show that Descartes and Leibniz are implicitly committed to this in their published versions of the ontological argument. I consider the philosophical motivations for the claim that existence is a determination and then I examine Kant's arguments in the Critique of Pure Reason against it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that a recent variation on the Sleeping Beauty case due to Titelbaum [2012a] puts significant pressure on Lewis's theory of doxastic content—the theory of content that Titelbaum and others presuppose. In particular, that theory cannot make sense of the rational constraints on credences imposed by the Principal Principle, as ordinarily understood. I then argue more generally that any theory on which contents of credences are sets of centered worlds cannot adequately represent all of the rational constraints on credences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the parallel between modern epistemology and traditional metaphysics. Thomistic metaphysics; God's causation in creation; Distinction between epistemology and ontology.

Amie Thomasson has articulated a novel conception of ontological debates, defending an easy approach to ontological questions as part of the articulation of a deflationary metaphysical view (Thomasson, 2015). After raising some concerns to the approach, we sketch a neutralist alternative to her ontological framework, offering an even easier way of conducting ontological debates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social groups—like teams, committees, gender groups, and racial groups—play a central role in our lives and in philosophical inquiry. Here I develop and motivate a structuralist ontology of social groups centered on social structures (i.e., networks of relations that are constitutively dependent on social factors). The view delivers a picture that encompasses a diverse range of social groups, while maintaining important metaphysical and normative distinctions between groups of different kinds. It also meets the constraint that not every arbitrary collection of people is a social group. In addition, the framework provides resources for developing a broader structuralist view in social ontology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers replies to commentaries on philosophy and phenomenological writings which focuses on connection between normativity and social ontology along with traditional versions of social constructivism. Topics include significant differences in the functioning of the human organism; remove the exhaustion, physical trauma, and pain that female bodies endure in the process of pregnancy and breast feeding; and nature of disability and its impact on wellbeing with the nature of health.

A literary criticism of the book "Ontology Made Easy," by Amie Thomasson. It explores the author's sceptical remarks about explanation and explanatory power in ontology. It mentions that the author in the book suggests that virtues such as simplicity may be merely ‘pragmatic' rather than truth-conducive.

The author presents replies to the authors including Karen Bennett, Agustín Rayo, and Thomas Sattig’s comments on his proposal for relationship between ontology and metaphysics, and the relationship between semantics and metaphysics in his book “Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics." Details related to Bennett’s objection on the metaphysics and ontology relationship, Rayo’s objection on internalism and philosophy of mathematics, and Sattig’s objection on ordinary objects are mentioned.

The article discusses author's rejection of the traditional bundle theory and his acceptance of the theory of deep platonism. He responds to several bundle theory objections and argues that one should accept the deep platonism theory by considering the parsimony about the fundamental. Other topics discussed include the preliminaries about the principle of grounding relation, the concept of a qualitative property and the objections to haecceities.

The article focuses on German philosopher and psychologist Franz Brentano's ontological theory of reism as a specific variety of truthmaker nominalism. It discusses the relation reism to modern-day nominalism. Also outlined is the use of the term nominalism in the philosophy-of-mathematics literature to designate the rejection of abstract objects and in the literature on the metaphysics of properties to designate the rejection of universals.

The author discusses the works of Dutch philosopher Benedictus de Spinoza and his concept of absolute infinity. He cites French philosopher Martial Gueroult's interpretation of Spinoza's work in which he argues the latter makes reference to substance that consist of single attribute such as thought or extension. However, the author argues that Spinoza never refer to any substance other than the absolute infinite and divine substance.

An essay is presented on the paradox of personal fission. It states that a person undergone fission of psychological persistence and its principle which require that person to choose whether to reject the persistence or one of the principles. It argues that fission changes the common-sense conception of a person and of the ontology of ordinary object.

The article presents the views of philosopher, John Skorupski, on the middle way in metaethics. It states that he rejects non-cognitivism about normative discourse and believes that the reason relation is not naturalistically reducible. It mentions that cognitive irrealism is a theory of the ontology and epistemology of the reason relation.

The article offers information on thinking positively about negative facts. It states that fact and state of affairs are used interchangeably, and the state of affairs consists of the thin particular, the lake, possessing the property of frozenness. It mentions that qualitative ontological cost is not a cogent argument against purchasing the postulate.

The article discusses the ontological challenges and ideological challenges with the help of examples. It mentions that ontological challenges explain past things. The authors talk about the true propositions and the ideas of philosophers related to it. They explain the abstract times and tenses and also discuss hypotheses.

I begin by contrasting three approaches one can take to the distinction between the essential and accidental properties: an ontological, a deflationary, and a mind-dependent approach. I then go on to apply that distinction to the necessary a posteriori, and defend the deflationist view. Finally I apply the distinction to modal truth in general and argue that the deflationist position lets us avoid an otherwise pressing problem for the actualist: the problem of accounting for the source of modal truth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I consider a grand, yet neglected proposal put forward by Shoemaker—a functionalist theory of all properties. I argue that two possible ways of developing this proposal meet with substantial objections. However, if we are prepared to endorse an ontology of tropes, one of these functionalist analyses can be developed into an original and informative theory of properties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The traditional debate about whether race should be eliminated from public discourse is often conducted in significant part by examining whether race is real. Whether race is real, in turn, often comes down to whether racial discourse purports to refer to social or natural kinds, which means that analysis of racial concepts is crucial to the question of racial eliminativism. The dominate theory of conceptual analysis in the race debate is that racial concepts should be analyzed according to how those terms have been used by historical experts. It is argued here that this dominant theory is misguided, and that we should therefore analyze racial concepts according to how they are used in contemporary, folk discourse. In addition, and in contrast to the main rival to the dominant theory, I argue that we should analyze folk racial discourse not from the armchair, but instead through empirical research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explains the explanatory priorities to understand the metaphysics of Intentionality. Because of the misleading and unclear situation, there is a problem regarding the formulation to start with the content of words and proceed to the content of sentences or vice versa. However, the reason to the fusion of sentences is that sentence meaning might be ontologically dependent on word meaning even if the order of explanatory priority is the other way around. It is not a good idea to confuse semantics with the epistemology of interpretation/translation, nor to confuse semantics with the psychology of learning, moreover to confusion semantic with the psychology of language production/comprehension.

The secondary qualities are those qualities of objects that bear a certain relation to our sensory powers: roughly, they are those qualities that we can readily detect only through a certain distinctive phenomenal experience. Contrary to what is sometimes supposed, there is nothing about the world itself (independent of our minds) that determines the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Instead, a theory of the secondary qualities must be grounded in facts about how we conceive of these qualities, and ultimately in facts about human perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Closest-continuer or best-candidate accounts of persistence seem deeply unsatisfactory, but it is hard to say why. The standard criticism is that such accounts violate the 'only a and b' rule, but this criticism merely highlights a feature of the accounts without explaining why the feature is unacceptable. Another concern is that such accounts violate some principle about the supervenience of persistence facts upon local or intrinsic facts. But, again, we do not seem to have an independent justification for this supervenience claim. Instead, I argue that closest continuer accounts are committed to unexplained correlations between distinct existences, and that this is their fundamental flaw. We can have independent justification for rejecting such correlations, but what the justification is depends upon much broader issues in ontology. There is no one-size-fits all objection to closest-continuer accounts of persistence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the view that the four-dimensionalist is mistaken in thinking that he can either explain chainge or countenance its very existence. Background on four-dimensionalism or the theory of temporal parts; Difference between temporal and spatial parts; Temporal parts and the indiscernibility of identicals; Problem of temporary intrinsics; Semantics of change.

Officially, for Kant, judgments are analytic iff the predicate is "contained in" the subject. I defend the containment definition against the common charge of obscurity, and argue that arithmetic cannot be analytic, in the resulting sense. My account deploys two traditional logical notions: logical division and concept hierarchies. Division separates a genus concept into exclusive, exhaustive species. Repeated divisions generate a hierarchy, in which lower species are derived from their genus, by adding differentia(e). Hierarchies afford a straightforward sense of containment: genera are contained in the species formed from them. Kant's thesis then amounts to the claim that no concept hierarchy conforming to division rules can express truths like '7+5=12.' Kant is correct. Operation concepts (<7+5>) bear two relations to number concepts: <7> and <5> are inputs, <12> is output. To capture both relations, hierarchies must posit overlaps between concepts that violate the exclusion rule. Thus, such truths are synthetic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on metaphysical progress which is the general line pursued by Hud Hudson in his book "A Materialist Metaphysic of the Human Person". Assumptions that many people are located more or less where each person is located; Concept of "partism" that offers the best resolution of the Problem of the Many; Hudson's resistance to the charge that folk ontology is fatally committed to objectual vagueness.

The article presents author's comments on the concept of metaphysics related to nature. It mentions that structure is subpropositional and absolute related to propositions. It focuses on the relationship between ontology and metaphysical issues that are nonobjective to certain issues. It states that Jonathan Schaffer philosopher refuses the notions of vicinity.