Search

Several studies have found a robust effect of truth on epistemic evaluation of belief, decision, action and assertion. Thus, truth has a significant effect on normative participant evaluations. Some theorists take this truth effect to motivate factive epistemic norms of belief, action, assertion etc. In contrast, I argue that the truth effect is best understood as an epistemic instance of the familiar and ubiquitous phenomenon of outcome bias. I support this diagnosis from three interrelating perspectives: (1) by epistemological theorizing, (2) by considerations from cognitive psychology and (3) by methodological reflections on the relationship between folk epistemology and epistemological theorizing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A literary criticism of the book "Assurance: An Austinian View of Knowledge and Knowledge Claims," by Krista Lawlor is presented. It argues Lawlor's Austinian account and explores Lawlor's Austinian semantics for knowledge ascriptions that are constitutively associated with the speech act of providing assurance. The author concludes that Lawlor has overestimated her insights that knowledge ascriptions have an important function of providing assurance.

The article presents author's comments on the concept of internalism and externalism related to the epistemology of testimony. It mentions that epistemic pluralism is discussed in the exclusive and an inclusive version. It mentions that the pluralism related to testimonial warrant helped in offering assumptions about cognitive accessibility.