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This paper attempts to explore the influence mechanism of carbon trading on new energy based on a novel nonlinear energy-saving and emission-reduction system. The dynamics behavior of the novel system is discussed, and the existence of chaotic motion is approved by using digital simulation. With the aid of genetic algorithm-back propagation neural network, the quantitative coefficients of the actual system are identified according to Chinese statistics. The result of scenario analysis shows that carbon trading can drive the development of new energy under given conditions, the driving effect is closely related to a threshold. The mature carbon trading can control carbon emissions and energy intensity effectively. The more perfect carbon trading market can better promote the development of new energy when meets such constraints. Carbon trading and new energy are very sensitive to government control. Grasping the reasonable boundary of government and market is the key to realize sustainable development of carbon trading and new energy. • The influence mechanism of carbon trading on new energy is explored. • The existence of chaotic motion is approved by using digital simulation. • Only the mature carbon trading market can boost new energy. • Carbon trading and new energy are very sensitive to government control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to pilot subsidy policy for new energy vehicles in China, this paper introduces a signaling game model to explore the adverse selection issue in the process of subsidy and to analyze the game equilibrium between government and automobile enterprises. The results show that the development level of new-energy vehicles determines the different strategies adopted by enterprises in the process of obtaining subsidies. The government can dynamically adjust the subsidies policy in the following ways. In the early stage of research and development of new energy vehicles, appropriate subsidies should be given to enterprises. Before the new energy vehicles go on the market, the establishment of new energy vehicle infrastructure should be concentrated. After the vehicle enters the market, the government should provide necessary support for the purchase of new energy vehicles and expand the market share of new energy vehicles. • There is adverse selection in new energy automobile industry with subsidy. • The interaction between government and enterprises is analyzed by the signal game. • The strategy of enterprises is determined by the development level of the industry. • Subsidy should be adjusted in different development periods of new energy vehicles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]