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Prevalence of cooperation within groups of selfish individuals is puzzling in that it contradicts with the basic premise of natural selection. Grasping the force that fosters and sustains cooperative behaviors is thus of central importance for the understandings of how companies develop and how societies thrive. In this paper, by means of evolutionary game theory, we refresh the strategy updating rule to be matched with a more realistic scenario where individuals choose someone excellent as the role model and improve themselves continuously to narrow the gap. Under the force of role model, individuals adjust their instantaneous strategy with the increment δ in the next continuous M time steps. And a new role model needs to be selected unless its payoff is more than the focal player's. The computer simulation results illustrate that the self-improvement driven by role model facilitate group cooperation significantly, and the slow but persistent self-improvement performs better. Therefore, in order to achieve higher enterprise performance and build a more harmonious society, managers and government officials should spare no effort to encourage people to keep improving themselves to keep up with their role models. • A new strategy updating rule, self-improvement driven by role model updating rule is proposed. • Players make self-improvement according to the persistent choosing reference roles. • The simulation results show that a slow but persistent self-improvemnet enhances cooperation markedly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In peer-to-peer interaction, people have conditions to adopt different strategies against different opponents, which is called interactive diversity. Recently, the evolution of cooperation under interactive diversity has attracted much attention, but the potential cost of maintaining interactive diversity is rarely considered. Actually, individuals may need to frequently switch their strategies between interactions with different opponents. If strategy switching is costly, individuals are likely to prefer strategies that can be maintained to strategies that require frequent changes. In other words, individuals may have behavioral inertia in their interactions with different opponents. Although some studies have found that appropriate strategy switching costs or inertia can promote cooperation under interactive identity, their role under interactive diversity remains to be further discussed. The main reason is that strategy switching costs may restrain the diversity of strategies, and the differentiation of strategies is exactly the key to cooperation under interactive diversity. In this work, we are devoted to reveal the impact of strategy switching costs on the evolution of cooperation under interactive diversity. Simulation results show that appropriate strategy switching costs are also positive under interactive diversity, but higher strategy switching costs play completely different roles in different networks. Especially, cooperation in lattice network sometimes shows a non-monotonic dependence of "first increasing, second decreasing and then increasing again" on unit switching cost. These findings are of great significance for understanding the emergence of cooperation in paired interaction under interactive diversity. • We study the effect of strategy switching costs under interactive diversity. • Small switching costs can promote cooperation on multiple networks. • Medium switching costs may hinder cooperation on lattice network. • Excessive switching costs in ER network and BA network are unbearable. • The reasons for the phenomenon differences across networks are analyzed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Affected by geographical or social factors, human communities are organized with changeless groups for teamwork. Within groups, defection dominates because the payoffs of defectors are often higher than those of cooperators; among groups, higher cooperation level makes individuals wealthier. For the previous mechanism of evolutionary dynamics leading individuals to imitate the rich in their groups, defective strategy evolves. However, individuals who belong to different groups and have no direct interaction of interests actually could influence each other. Due to the similarity of environment, the strategies among groups have the channel and necessity of dissemination. To this end, we propose an evolutionary game model with inter-group selection of strategy. By simulations, the effects of groups' selection preference, group size, multiplier factor, imitation intensity and competition among groups on cooperative evolution in populations are studied. We find that when the group makes selection without preference, the intensity of the choice positively affects the level of cooperation; the strategy selection with preference can effectively increase the group cooperation rate. • An evolutionary game model considering inter-group selection of strategy is proposed. • A player in one group can imitate strategy of individuals in other groups. • The preference and other factors have been considered in evolutionary game. • Cooperation can be promoted effectively by our new mechanism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is known that the vaccination is essential for suppressing the periodic prevalence of an infectious disease, while the vaccination decision is influenced by external factors. Whether or not to take vaccination depends not only on the expected benefit of individual, but also on the behavior of others. Nowadays, the speed of information transmission on the social media is fast with wide range, which extremely expands the scope of imitation, but it is unknown whether it is beneficial to vaccination. Inspired by this situation, a vaccination game model on two-layer network which increases the intensity of information sharing is proposed. The vaccination game layer and the information sharing layer are established to study the interaction between individual vaccination decisions and strategic exchanges. We find that although information sharing has inhibited individual vaccination decisions to some extent, the overall scale of disease spreading in society has decreased with increasing information sharing. • A new mechanism, information sharing, in evolutionary vaccination game is introduced. • The vaccination game model in two-layer network are taken into account. • The spread of epidemics is effectively suppressed under the information sharing mechanism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]