Search

In repeated games, historical interactions lead to varying environment. Among existing studies, the variation of environment or game is basically considered from the perspective of nodes, while in pairwise game, it is more reasonable to consider the interactive environment from the perspective of edges. In addition, since historical interactive experience of pairwise players has an impact on the current interactive environment, the duration of pairwise strategies produces differentiated results. Therefore, we consider the persistence-dependent dynamic interactive environment where the persistence of pairwise strategy affects the weight between two interacting players, and the game resource of interactive environment is influenced by varying weight. The results suggest that the introduction of persistence-dependent dynamic interactive environment can effectively enhance cooperation, and a larger weight increment of CD link generates a higher cooperation level as it indicates that the reward for cooperative behavior is significant, although a single cooperator for the pairwise interacting players. • We introduce the persistence-dependent dynamic interactive environment in prisoner's dilemma game. • An intermediate variable, weight, is introduced and influenced by the strategy persistence of pairwise players. • The fluctuation scale of weight is dependent on distinct kinds of edge links, and a parameter η for CD link is introduced. • The variation of weight determines the changing resources for the interactive environment. • Our new model can boost cooperation significantly, especially for the larger η. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In previous studies of evolutionary games, players change reference objects at each time step. However, in real life, many people tend to consistently imitate outstanding role models instead of changing reference objects frequently. From this, a persistent imitation rule is proposed. In detail, a persistent imitator will persist in imitating his or her reference object until the wealth exceeds that of the reference object or the duration of continuous imitation exceeds a specific value. Furthermore, to reflect inter-individual differences, we divide the players into two categories, persistent imitators and random imitators. The simulation suggests that the presence of a high proportion of persistent imitators has a significant effect on the development of cooperation, and the level of cooperation increases as the maximum duration of imitation increases. However, when the proportion of persistent imitators or the maximum duration of imitation is small, the promotion effect on cooperation is not obvious. • The persistent imitation of reference objects is proposed. • Persistent imitators refresh the role model if their payoff exceeds the last one's. • After the maximum duration, the persistent imitator chooses a new reference object. • The presence of persistent imitators can effectively facilitate cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In previous studies about heterogeneous investment, many researchers only focus on the monodirectional effect of reputation, but ignore the reversed influence about the heterogeneity of reputation fluctuation driven by investment. Given this, considering the interplay between reputation and heterogeneous investment, we explore the evolution of cooperation in public goods game. In detail, each player's reputation situations in different groups determine its differentiated investment amounts, and in turn, the heterogeneity of reputation fluctuation is dependent on how much it invests into each group. Furthermore, we introduce two parameters, α and β , to characterize the effect degree of investment on heterogeneous reputation fluctuation and the one of reputation on heterogeneous investment, respectively. The simulation results suggest that cooperation can be boosted to some extent, especially for the larger α and β , as they magnify the interplay of reputation and heterogeneous investment. • We introduce the interplay between reputation and heterogeneous investment in the public goods game. • Reputation effects unequal investment and heterogeneous reputation fluctuation is effected by investment in turn. • We introduce parameter α to characterize the effect degree of investment on heterogeneous reputation fluctuation. • Parameter β is presented to denote the effect degree of reputation on heterogeneous investment. • Our new model can boost cooperation significantly, especially for the larger α and β. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]