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UMass Boston has been a campus in turmoil for the past 20 months. Internal upheaval first became public in January 2017 when the UMass Board of Trustees (BoT) refused to extend Chancellor Keith Motley's contract. In March 2017 the trustees disclosed that the campus was facing a budget deficit of up to $30 million with just three months remaining in fiscal year 2017. In April of 2017, Chancellor Motley resigned, prompting students, alumni, and community leaders to rally on the State House steps demanding that officials reject his resignation. UMass Boston has struggled to right its financial and administrative ship amidst the continuing frustration of students and faculty. In May 2016, seven months before the financial crisis at UMass-Boston became public, Pioneer Institute published a three-part analysis entitled "UMass at a Crossroads." The report identified many of the systemic financial problems that ultimately led to the UMass-Boston budget crisis, including unsustainable cost growth resulting from student enrollment expansion, facility expansion, rapid growth in self-funded research and development, a rising UMass Central Office budget, and unfunded deferred maintenance at campus facilities. Pioneer's report cited data from internal UMass documents and financial disclosures to Wall Street bond rating agencies and federal student lending agencies. Following a detailed review of records obtained from the UMass Comptroller's office and other publicly available sources, Pioneer Institute concludes that the UMass President and Board of Trustees (BoT) unfairly scapegoated former Chancellor Keith Motley and UMass Boston administrators for creating UMass Boston's $30 million fiscal crisis in 2017-2018 when the president and BoT themselves bore primary responsibility for creating the crisis as a result of their having approved a massive, accelerated capital expansion plan without assuring that capital reserves would be available to pay for it. This white paper provides an introduction, detailed summary of findings from that review, and recommendations for the future. [For "UMass at a Crossroads Part 1: Is the UMass Enrollment Expansion Plan Sustainable? White Paper No. 145," see ED598651. For "UMass at a Crossroads Part 2: Is UMass' Expansion Fiscally Sustainable? White Paper No. 146," see ED598659. For "UMass at a Crossroads Part 3: UMass' Growing Dependency on Tuition and Fees and Strategic Recruitment of Out-Of-State Students. White Paper No. 147," see ED598661.]

On average, only about 16 percent of annual union dues paid by members in 19 Massachusetts public school districts stayed with local union chapters. The remaining 84 percent of dues revenue went directly to the state (Massachusetts Teachers Association) and national (National Education Association) union affiliates. But what about public higher education in Massachusetts? For unions representing faculty at the Commonwealth's community colleges, state colleges and universities, and the University of Massachusetts system, the dues revenue structures are also hierarchical. Individual university unions remit a substantial portion of their dues revenue to state and national-level organizations. This brief report takes a closer look at teacher union dues and public higher education in Massachusetts.