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Human activities such as transport, trade and tourism are likely to influence the spatial distribution of non-native species and yet, Species Distribution Models (SDMs) that aim to predict the future broad scale distribution of invaders often rely on environmental (e.g. climatic) information only. This study investigates if and to what extent do human activities that directly or indirectly influence nature (hereafter the human footprint) affect the global distribution of invasive species in terrestrial, freshwater and marine ecosystems. We selected 72 species including terrestrial plants, terrestrial animals, freshwater and marine invasive species of concern in a focus area located in NW Europe (encompassing Great Britain, France, The Netherlands and Belgium). Species Distribution Models were calibrated with the global occurrence of species and a set of high-resolution (9×9 km) environmental (e.g. topography, climate, geology) layers and human footprint proxies (e.g. the human influence index, population density, road proximity). Our analyses suggest that the global occurrence of a wide range of invaders is primarily limited by climate. Temperature tolerance was the most important factor and explained on average 42% of species distribution. Nevertheless, factors related to the human footprint explained a substantial amount (23% on average) of species distributions. When global models were projected into the focus area, spatial predictions integrating the human footprint featured the highest cumulative risk scores close to transport networks (proxy for invasion pathways) and in habitats with a high human influence index (proxy for propagule pressure). We conclude that human related information-currently available in the form of easily accessible maps and databases-should be routinely implemented into predictive frameworks to inform upon policies to prevent and manage invasions. Otherwise we might be seriously underestimating the species and areas under highest risk of future invasions.

Multiple national and international trends and drivers are radically changing what biological security means for the United Kingdom (UK). New technologies present novel opportunities and challenges, and globalisation has created new pathways and increased the speed, volume and routes by which organisms can spread. The UK Biological Security Strategy (2018) acknowledges the importance of research on biological security in the UK. Given the breadth of potential research, a targeted agenda identifying the questions most critical to effective and coordinated progress in different disciplines of biological security is required. We used expert elicitation to generate 80 policy-relevant research questions considered by participants to have the greatest impact on UK biological security. Drawing on a collaboratively-developed set of 450 questions, proposed by 41 experts from academia, industry and the UK government (consulting 168 additional experts) we subdivided the final 80 questions into six categories: bioengineering; communication and behaviour; disease threats (including pandemics); governance and policy; invasive alien species; and securing biological materials and securing against misuse. Initially, the questions were ranked through a voting process and then reduced and refined to 80 during a one-day workshop with 35 participants from a variety of disciplines. Consistently emerging themes included: the nature of current and potential biological security threats, the efficacy of existing management actions, and the most appropriate future options. The resulting questions offer a research agenda for biological security in the UK that can assist the targeting of research resources and inform the implementation of the UK Biological Security Strategy. These questions include research that could aid with the mitigation of Covid-19, and preparation for the next pandemic. We hope that our structured and rigorous approach to creating a biological security research agenda will be replicated in other countries and regions. The world, not just the UK, is in need of a thoughtful approach to directing biological security research to tackle the emerging issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]