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The development of new energy vehicles (NEVs) is one of the effective ways to alleviate carbon emissions, environmental pollution, and energy scarcity in the transportation sector. The Chinese government has innovatively proposed the "dual credit policy," but it is still a hot topic whether it can promote the NEVs' technological innovation. In this study, we construct game models and obtain the technological innovation strategies for NEVs under the dual credit policy, considering that the NEV supply chain contains one manufacturer and N suppliers. Further, we construct bargaining game models and study how to encourage manufacturers and suppliers to enhance technological innovation, realize supply chain coordination, and give the alliance strategy to maximize suppliers' profit. We found that the dual credit policy can effectively stimulate technological innovation, and the higher the credit price or technological innovation credit factor, the higher the technical level of NEVs. The findings could guide the government to adjust and revise the policy. Second, we found that the bargaining games could coordinate the NEV supply chain so that decentralized enterprises can achieve optimal technological innovation under centralized decision-making. Third, we found that suppliers can improve their profits by choosing a suitable alliance strategy under the manufacturer's different negotiating power.

With the development of economic globalization, the problem of unequal distribution of globalization dividends among and within countries has become increasingly serious, and reverse globalization has a great impact on the national economy and export trade. This paper uses the KOF Globalization Index and the world input-output tables in World Input-Output Database (WIOD), and empirically studies the transformation of a country's export trade and export structure in the context of reverse globalization from the perspectives of world, country, industry, subdivided manufacturing and service industry. The results show that reverse globalization has a significant non-linear negative effect on economic development and export trade. Compared with developed and European Union (EU) countries, the exports of developing and non-EU countries are more affected by reverse globalization shocks. Reverse globalization has the greatest inhibition on the secondary industry exports, followed by the tertiary industry. The suppressive effects on the exports of 12 subdivided manufacturing and 14 subdivided service in China are significantly greater than that of the United States, but most of sub-industry exports in the United States are more sensitive. Besides, China's exports of high-product-complexity industry such as metal products, medicinal chemicals, electrical and optical products and mechanical equipments are greatly affected by reverse globalization, while the exports of water transportation, construction, land transportation are relatively less restrained.

In this paper, we assume that the supply chain for new energy vehicles (NEVs) consists of a manufacturer and N parts suppliers, considering that the R&D investment of both manufacturer and suppliers will affect the market demand of NEVs and NEVs credit, we construct decentralized and centralized decision-making models under the dual-credit policy to study the R&D investment strategy of supply chain enterprises. Furthermore, considering that suppliers can form alliances, we establish bargaining game models under the conditions of the non-alliance and alliance of suppliers, and discuss the coordination strategy for the NEVs supply chain. It is found that, under the dual-credit policy, the higher the credit coefficient of technology improvement, the higher the transaction price of credits, and the higher the R&D investment of supply chain. Dual-credit policy can effectively encourage NEVs supply chain to increase R&D investment, improve NEV technology level, and improve the profit of supply chain. Under the dual-credit policy, the increment profit distribution strategy based on a bargaining game model can coordinate the NEVs supply chain. When suppliers separately negotiate with the manufacturer, bringing the negotiation sequence forward, the supplier can get more profits. However, as the manufacturer has the right to determine the negotiation sequence, the supplier can only get the profit of the last round of negotiation, and the manufacturer can get excess profit. Forming a suppliers alliance can solve this problem effectively, and increase the profit of all suppliers when the alliance`s negotiating power is improved to a certain threshold.

Different consumer groups accept new energy vehicles sequentially from the perspective of innovation diffusion theory, and the early adopter group has recently been identified. By assuming that the density of early adopters is increasing at minimum acceptable quality thresholds, this paper proposes a vertical quality differentiation model of product R&D with product subsidies. The impact of product subsidies on the R&D investment of new energy vehicle firms is discussed. We show that the early adopters' characteristics may affect the stagnant marginal R&D investment of new energy vehicle firms by increasing sales, which determines the impact mechanism of product subsidies. For firms with decreasing marginal R&D investments, insufficient R&D investments result from financial constraints. If insufficient R&D resources deter firms from conducting R&D, substantial unit subsidies invariably incentivize firms to spend their entire R&D budget. Firms with increasing marginal R&D investments, insufficient R&D profits, or financial constraints are prevented from increasing R&D investment. Product subsidies generally have a crowding-in effect on firms not subject to financial constraints, and this effect increases with the unit subsidy. However, the existence of a crowding-in effect may require sufficiently large unit subsidies. In both situations, product subsidies cannot modulate financial constraints if the firm has spent its entire R&D budget. In the first situation, we also show that product subsidies should be replaced by a funding support policy. In contrast, the second situation shows that a funding support policy should be coordinated with product subsidies.

The paradox between idle homesteads in rural areas and the shortage of construction land in urban areas is concerning. Hence, local governments encourage farmers to reclaim their idle homesteads and farmlands to generate quota. However, the current quota price, which is based on the land reclamation cost, is often inadequate to motivate farmers. This study proposed that the construction land quota and construction land are complementary items, and hence, their pricing should be studied simultaneously instead of independently. Therefore, the classical sequential auction model with complementarity was improved using the core characteristics of quota transactions and those were applied to design optimal pricing mechanisms. Subsequently, the influence of relevant factors on the bidding price was analysed. The results indicated that the bidding price decreases with an increase in the number of bidders and that a bidder's revenue is at a loss when they acquire the quota but fail to obtain the land; hence, the revenue probability is lost. However, bidding prices increase when the fine of delaying construction increases. To raise the quota price and encourage relatively more farmers to reclaim their idle homesteads, local governments should appropriately increase the delaying construction fines or repurchase the quota at a premium from the bidder who acquires the quota but fails to obtain the land, which is beneficial for easing conflict between construction land demands and farmland protection and for promoting the sustainable development of China's social economy.