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American cities vary considerably in the degree to which they pursue sustainability. What explains this variation? One plausible cause of such differences is that sustainability may be more appealing to high-income cities than to more economically challenged cities. Yet such strict economic determinism seems simplistic and removes politics from an inherently political process. The hypothesis here is that any such relationship between income and commitment to sustainability is conditioned by a city's level of environmental advocacy. The data utilized in this analysis are derived from two large-scale data sources. One is a comprehensive inventory of sustainability programs and policies in 50 large American cities. The other is a set of surveys in those same 50 cities. The multivariate model supports the hypothesis. Controlling for income growth and the predisposition of policymakers to be supportive of sustainability (as well as other alternative explanations), a city's commitment to sustainability is strongly linked to the advocacy of environmental and sustainability groups in the policymaking process. The example of Sustainable Seattle is used to illustrate the linkages that would seem to underlie the statistical analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the potential of the theory of compensation for mitigating public opposition to hazardous waste treatment facility siting. Public opinion data from five Massachusetts communities discover the potential of the theory for successful siting; Public attitudes toward hazardous waste treatment facility siting in Massachusetts communities.

This article mainly focuses on benefits and burdens which results from the existing or potential government policies. Economists and political scientists have a long standing interest in questions of distributional impact. The analysis of distributional impacts may appear to represent an attempt to subordinate politics to analysis. The more traditional political science approach, emerging from the group theories of politics, suggests that if legislation supported by some group is actually enacted, that group has obtained some benefits not obtained by other groups.

Over the past decade and a half, economists, sociologists, political scientists, and other social scientists have undertaken systematic examinations of different kinds of distributional impacts associated with public policies. Each social science discipline brings a different perspective to the study of distributional impacts, and their results have very different implications for the theories underlying each of the disciplines. This article offers a broad definition of distributional impacts which encompasses many characteristics that are distributed across a variety of units.

Using scattered analyses linking partisan control of political institutions to taxation decisions as the point of departure, this paper examines patterns of tax preferences in American States. Focusing on the order in which states enacted personal income taxes, general sales taxes, and corporation income taxes, several important patterns emerge. First, states with both the governorship and state legislature traditionally controlled by members of the same political party showed a strong tendency to prefer a corporation income tax and a personal income tax together as a first preference, followed by a general sales tax. Second, partisan competition and divided institutional control seemed to constitute a modest impediment to taxation of personal incomes as a high priority. And third, the nature of the partisan culture did not seem to facilitate or impede high preference for either general sales taxes or corporation income taxes to the extent found for personal income taxation. The implication is that where there is traditionally a high degree of partisan competitiveness and fragmentation, personal income taxes is likely to be accorded rather low preferences relative to other taxes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]