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This article advances a theoretical model of the National Economic Council (NEC) based on a policy network approach and group decision-making theory to explain why the U.S. president's NEC represents a significant development in the rise of the intermestic policymaking and decision-making processes. It develops theoretical conceptions of interests and manipulation based on a Policy Network Approach and the Advocacy Coalition Framework in policy studies research to illustrate the complexity of NEC group dynamics. Hopefully, such a contribution can further existing theoretical frameworks in the field of policy studies and analysis and can add to assessments of the NEC in policymaking and decision-making. Unlike much of the prevailing research, this article perceives the NEC as a political instrument used by policymakers and decision makers to protect their policy interests and engage in forms of political manipulation to increase their power over economic policy., Research demonstrates that the roles of the U.S. president's National Economic Council (NEC) and the policymaking process through which both international and domestic economic factors must pass continues to be [...]