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A growing body of literature has found that photographs of politicians can influence electoral preferences. In this article we assess whether candidates rating higher on electoral attractiveness perform better in a series of hypothetical elections, and whether their advantage is magnified when their appearance is printed not only on campaign materials but also on ballot papers. We find that candidate appearance only had a significant impact on vote choice when photographs were printed on ballot papers, and even then there was an impact on only some of the elections, notably those pitting male against female candidates. Photographs had most impact on the choices of those least interested in politics and least likely to vote, and magnified a tendency (among voters of all ages) to favour younger candidates and to penalise older candidates. Findings suggest that the addition of photographs to ballot papers could affect the outcomes of marginal British constituency races. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The difficulty with resolving the classic problem of whether newspapers influence voting patterns is self-selection: readers select a paper to fit their politics, and newspapers select particular types of readers. One way round this chicken-and-egg problem is to compare the voting behaviour of individuals whose politics are reinforced by their paper, with those who are cross-pressured by their paper, and to compare both with those who do not regularly read a paper. Using the British Household Panel study to analyse voting patterns in 1992 and 1997, this study suggest that newspapers have a statistically significant effect on voting, larger for Labour than Conservative sympathizers, and larger for the 1992 than the 1997 election. The broader implications of these findings for British politics and democracy are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since Converse's paper, opinion constraint has been defined as the degree to which voters hold ideologically consistent opinions across different issues. Yet, scholars have found that opinions departing from the liberal/conservative categories constitute alternative ways of organizing political preferences. This suggests a methodological dilemma: how can we assess the consistency of opinions based on empirical, rather than theoretically predefined, criteria? This article proposes measuring constraint as the extent to which citizens' policy preferences resemble those of their most preferred political parties (a top-down approach). To do so, it relies on data from the 2019 European Election Studies and the 2019 Chapel Hill Expert Survey. Analyses show that a top-down measure of opinion constraint correlates weakly with pre-existing measures of this concept (discriminant validation). Findings also suggest that well-established hypotheses about the predictors and effects of constraint are confirmed when using the top-down measure (nomological validation). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Deliberative scholarship is particularly well positioned to offer insight on our new digital reality. The papers in this Special Issue showcase both the methodological pluralism that flourishes in deliberative democracy studies and the productive collaborations across methodologies. This Special Issue shows how deliberative theory can place digital media in a wider theoretical context, sharpen our understanding of the Internet's worst features, and show the way forward to a better design for digital public engagement. Whether online or offline, democracy will always remain a work in progress, and these essays should help us navigate a course toward a more deliberative democracy in the digital age. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

That civil society activism can strengthen accountability and limit government corruption is theoretically compelling and popular in policy circles. Whether civic engagement can limit grand corruption, and if so in what types of settings, remains an open question. This paper presents the first large-N study of societal accountability with respect to grand corruption. Using objective indicators of procurement corruption from 173 EU regions, the study finds that civil society strength is associated with lower levels of corruption but that the association is not monotonic. Civil society strength seems to constrain procurement corruption where accountability conditions are the least favorable. Where accountability conditions are well-functioning, we find no evidence that societal accountability constrains corruption. The findings help to adjudicate between competing expectations from research on horizontal and societal accountability. Moreover, they confirm that societal accountability can complement horizontal accountability where institutional conditions function sub-optimally, even limiting grand corruption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is perennial debate in comparative politics about electoral institutions, but what characterizes this debate is the lack of consideration for citizens' perspective. In this paper, we report the results of an original survey conducted on representative samples in 15 West European countries (N = 15,414). We implemented an original instrument to elicit respondents' views by asking them to rate "real but blind" electoral outcomes. With this survey instrument, we aimed to elicit principled rather than partisan preferences regarding the kind of electoral outcomes that citizens think is good for democracy. We find that West Europeans do not clearly endorse a majoritarian or proportional vision of democracy. They tend to focus on aspects of the government rather than parliament when they pass a judgment. They want a majority government that has few parties and enjoys wide popular support. Finally, we find only small differences between citizens of different countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is a republication of Judith N. Shklar's paper "Rights in the Liberal Tradition" first published in an issue of Colorado College Studies in 1992. This is the first time the piece has been made digitally available. Edward Hall and Matt Sleat provide a brief foreword to the essay. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides a critical appraisal of the ontological method of political theorizing through an examination of the methodological development of the work of William E. Connolly. Connolly has often been taken as a paradigmatic figure of the 'ontological turn'. This is not only because of the significance of his work in the field but because he is one of its major methodological articulators. However, there has been no systematic evaluation of that method and its development. This paper rectifies that lacuna by critically illustrating Connolly's turn from a post-positivistic interpretivism to his much noted 'onto-political method'. It argues that the latter, while usually thought to be modelled on the work of Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault, is structured by Heidegger's understanding of ontological difference. The paper then argues that this leads to several problematic tendencies within Connolly's model that undermine the critical-explanatory and normative power of his methodology by compromising the critical reflexivity ontology is meant to provide. All of this raises some concerns and criticisms of the use of ontological method of political theorizing, which has escaped sustained methodological analysis and scrutiny. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question of whether high immigration produces anti-immigration hostility has vexed researchers across multiple disciplines for decades. And yet, understanding this relationship is crucial for countries dependant on immigrant labour but concerned about its impact on social cohesion. Absent from most of this research are theories about the impact of early-years socialisation conditions on contemporary attitudes. Using the British sample of the European Social Survey (2002–2017) and two innovative approaches to modelling generational differences – generalised additive models and hierarchical age‒period‒cohort models – this paper shows that rather than producing hostility to immigration, being socialised in a context of high immigrant-origin diversity is likely to result in more positive attitudes to immigration later in life. This implies that through generational replacement, countries like the UK are likely to become increasingly tolerant of immigration over time. Importantly, however, a context of high-income inequality may diminish this effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the role, significance and consequences of decisions in the United Kingdom about the definition of public expenditure for planning and control purposes. Three major definitional issues are examined: the narrowing in 1977 of the UK public expenditure definition from a public-sector-wide definition to something much closer to the OECD's ‘general government’ definition; the treatment of the proceeds of asset sales as negative expenditure: and the introduction in the 1990 white paper of a planning total excluding local government expenditure. Three sets of consequences are examined: the eroding commitment to comprehensive coverage; the resulting policy distortions; and the erosion of conventions traditionally governing the relationships between central and local government. Grounds for unease with present developments are identified, notably the fragmentation of public expenditure documentation and the loss of information, the consequences of which will unfold as public expenditure faces a difficult period because of problems of macro-economic imbalance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the end of the 1990s, ‘new modes of governance’ have been presented by academics and political actors as an answer to the EU's ‘democratic deficit’. Analysing the intellectual roots of this idea, and the concrete proposals made by those who, like the European Commission, support it, this paper argues that it is very unlikely to reach this ambitious purpose. Far from breaking with the Community method, these participatory mechanisms constitute extensions of existing practices, and are underpinned by the same élitist and functionalist philosophy. They remain limited to ‘stakeholders’ and will not improve the ‘enlighted understanding’ of ordinary citizens and the general level of participation. The paper examines the obstacles to the politicisation of the EU inherent in its institutional model, and discusses other options which might help bypass the limits of ‘governance’. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The White Paper The Reorganization of Central Government (Cmnd 4506) not merely announced extensive changes in the organizational structure of Whitehall, it did so in unusually ambitious and philosophically explicit terms. This paper traces the origins of the policies announced in the white paper, identifies the main groups and individuals involved, and shows how some elements were more successfully implemented than others. The concluding analysis seeks to penetrate behind the functional-rationalist vocabulary of Cmnd 4506 and identify an underlying set of choice criteria and decision procedures which permit a fuller explanation of the events of 1970-4. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The annual Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), published by Transparency International (TI), has had a pivotal role in focusing attention on corruption. Despite recent critiques of the CPI, it remains highly influential on research into the causes of corruption and is also extensively used to galvanise support for measures to fight corruption. In this article we explore the CPI in more depth in order to highlight how the index has been used for political ends which may not always turn out to be supportive of anti-corruption efforts. The argument is developed in four sections: in the first, we focus on Transparency International's definition of corruption, highlighting some conceptual difficulties with the approach adopted and its relationship to the promotion of ‘good governance’ as the principal means of combating corruption. In the second section, we outline some methodological difficulties in the design of the Corruption Perceptions Index. Although the CPI has been much criticised, we demonstrate in the third section that the index continues to exercise great influence both in academic research and in the politics of anti-corruption efforts, particularly as exercised by Transparency International itself. In the final section we argue that the CPI contributes to the risk of creating a ‘corruption trap’ in countries where corruption is deeply embedded, as development aid is increasingly made conditional on the implementation of reforms which are impossible to achieve without that aid. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to examine the extent to which left-wing forces are making a comeback in Latin America and to draw out the political implications of their political ascendancy. It argues that while left-of-centre parties have developed a persuasive critique of the failures of liberal democracy and economic neoliberalism in the region, there is as yet no conceptual clarity or distinct policy initiatives materialising from the left's promises of deepening democracy and implementing an alternative economic model. When in power, left-of-centre parties have followed a strategy of ‘bending and moulding’ existing political institutions and the free-market economic model rather than attempting radical political and economic reforms. This paper concludes that left-of-centre parties are right in accepting that there is little room in the region for an anti-systemic model and that instead the emphasis should be placed on making states, markets and democracy work better to secure development, address social demands and attack the root causes of discrimination and inequality. But leaving behind old certainties and adapting to the new political and economic environment has come at the cost of a loss of intellectual confidence, ideological clarity and weakened identities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents two conceptions of the scope of public reason. The narrow view asserts that the ideal of public reason must regulate questions of constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice, but should not apply beyond this limited domain. The broad view claims that the ideal of public reason ought to be applied, whenever possible, to all political decisions where citizens exercise coercive power over one another. The paper questions whether there are any good grounds for accepting the narrow view. I survey and reject three potential reasons. The priority argument for the narrow view claims that constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice are the only proper subjects of public reason because they have a special moral priority for our reasoning about justice. The basic interests argument supports the narrow view by arguing that public reasons only exist at the level of constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice. Finally, the completeness argument defends the narrow view on the grounds that public reason can only be complete if it abstains from most legislative questions. I conclude that there are no good reasons for accepting the narrow view of the scope of public reason, whereas there are several reasons to prefer the broad view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is social capital a prerequisite for prosperity? This paper analyzes social capital and economic performance in the British regions. Like Italy, Britain has a north–south economic divide. Are these differences caused by unequal stocks of social capital? This paper provides limited support for the hypothesized relationship between some indicators of social capital (especially trust and civic associations) and economic performance. Economic associations, however, are negatively correlated. This highlights shortcomings in social capital theory in terms of transferring the concept to new settings, the mechanisms linking social capital to production and the translation of social capital into public policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is concerned with the extent to which individual members of governments reliably implement the decisions of the governments to which they belong, a matter which is rarely discussed, if ever, and yet can be critical for the operation of national executives. After a general presentation of the problem, the paper examines the reasons why members of collegial governments are more likely to be reliable than members of hierarchical governments. As ‘cabinet’ governments tend to be more collegial while ‘presidential’ governments tend to be more hierarchical, unreliability seems also more likely to take place in presidential governments, to the extent that these are indeed hierarchical. Progress in this area has been hampered so far by the absence of a tight operational definition of collegial and hierarchical governments: such a definition is presented here, opening the way for the empirical testing of the impact which the distinction may have on the reliability of members of governments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Interference and domination make persons less free. This paper discusses how they do so. It considers and rejects two influential recent accounts of freedom, one that holds that freedom is best understood in terms of non-interference and one that holds that freedom is best understood in terms of non-domination. Against these accounts, the paper argues that both interference and domination play an important role in reducing freedom and that neither concept can be reduced to the other. To bolster this argument, the paper presents and defends an account of freedom that relates both concepts back to a common source. This account shows that while interference and domination have independent significance for judgments of freedom both reduce freedom by obstructing the ability of persons to plan their lives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses various reports within the journal on topics including political ideas, the roles of power and persuasion in politics, and inequality in relation to post-war British conservatism.

This paper contributes to the issue of political deception by exploring the role of self-deception in democratic politics. Within politics, deception of the people is actually very often produced by the self-deception of political leaders and officials, which is then supplemented by mechanisms of self-deception of the public itself. That self-deception, rather than simply straightforward deception, is a significant obstacle to truth and transparency in democratic politics is often hinted at by political scientists and historians but never properly pursued. And yet it should be, for which one of them is the case has important normative implications. This paper briefly presents the notion of self-deception and offers some reasons to take its presence in politics seriously. It also counters possible objections to doing so. Different kinds of political self-deception are presented and illustrated through historical examples so as to provide a clear typology and make the case for self-deception in politics stronger. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What does the value of political equality imply for the institutional design of democracies? The existing normative literature highlights the importance of proportional representation and legislative majority rule, but neglects the choice of an executive format. This paper explores two potential egalitarian trade-offs in this choice. First, while presidential systems tend to achieve too little bundling of separable decision-making issues (within political parties), parliamentary systems often tend towards too much bundling (between political parties), thus establishing informal veto positions in the democratic process. This is a trade-off between the 'adversarial' and 'deliberative' aspects of equality. Second, there is a trade-off between 'horizontal' and 'vertical' equality. Neither pure presidentialism nor pure parliamentarism may be able to maximise both dimensions of equality simultaneously. The paper argues that certain hybrids between parliamentarism and presidentialism have the potential to mitigate both trade-offs. These hybrids establish power separation between the executive and legislature without allowing for popular executive elections. The argument also has potential implications for the democratisation of the European Union. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Notice and consent approaches, being the most prevalent legal frameworks, have in recent years come under fire. I suggest they fail because they rest on a historical approach to privacy justice, whereby the justice of a particular state of affairs is a function of whether each transaction on the way was just. Instead, I make use of a background justice framing. Even where consent is present it is inadequate to secure the values at stake. When we only assess the fairness or freedom of individual information transactions, we fail to see the way many can undercut the very values we seek to secure by requiring consent for disclosures in the first place. I propose a patterned principle to regulate the distribution of individual control over privacy, and to set the background against which individual notice and consent can still play a role, albeit a limited one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Street-level bureaucrats shape policy through using discretion in their interactions with citizens and service users in delivering public services. Discretion allows street-level bureaucrats to bridge between public policy and the complex, individual, human situations they encounter. Drawing on insights from feminist institutionalism, this article establishes gender as a relevant analytical category in understanding discretion. We set out three analytical propositions: street-level bureaucrats work in gendered institutional contexts that shape their discretion; street-level bureaucrats are gendered actors, whose discretion is shaped by their individual gendered dispositions; and street-level bureaucrats' discretion has gendered effects. We investigate these propositions through a case study of the early implementation of the classification of misogyny as a hate crime among police forces in England and Wales. In addressing this analytical intersection between street-level bureaucracy and feminist institutionalism, we bring a gendered perspective to street-level bureaucracy, and a focus on how rules are interpreted to feminist institutionalism, forging new ground in public administration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We combine two dominant approaches to studying how issues influence elections: one that emphasizes parties' issue positions, and the other parties' issue ownership. Research from the latter approach shows that voters ascribe greater economic competence to right-wing parties. Based on this finding, we argue that parties enhance their economic issue ownership when voters perceive them shifting to the right. In the following step, we show that perceived rightward shifts of parties also lead to subsequent increases in electoral support. We analyze economic ownership survey data and election outcomes in 15 democracies over the period 1986–2015 that supports the expectations that parties' perceived rightward shifts result in increases in economic ownership and subsequent vote shares. We also show that the right-shift vote gains are strongest during recessions when voters prioritize parties' economic competence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies on electoral clientelism are increasingly focusing on the demand side and explaining how voters react to electoral inducements. However, there is limited research about how candidate attributes and partisanship can determine citizens' reactions to clientelism. This article therefore tests the relative weight that voters place on candidate attributes and partisanship in their reactions to clientelistic targeting in the context of a new democracy. We use evidence from an original conjoint experiment conducted in 2021 in Romania, where electoral clientelism is frequent. Our findings show that citizens react negatively to clientelistic inducements in general, but the effects vary based on the targeting strategy used by politicians. These negative effects are considerably weaker among co-partisans. This observation is especially relevant when testing the effect of partisanship in a political setting where it is low. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely feared that the onset of populism poses a threat to democracy, as citizens' support for democracy is essential for its legitimacy and stability. Yet, the relationship between populism and democratic support at the citizen level remains poorly understood, particularly with respect to support for liberal democracy. Data measuring citizens' populist attitudes in conjunction with a comprehensive range of measures of democratic support have been lacking. Using unique data from the Netherlands, we study the relationship between individuals' populist attitudes and their attitudes towards democracy in three studies. We examine the association between populism and support for democracy and satisfaction with democracy (Study 1), populism and support for liberal democracy (Study 2), and populism and support for majoritarian conceptions of democracy (Study 3). We find that while citizens with stronger populist attitudes are dissatisfied with how democracy works, they are no less supportive of the principle of democracy. Contrary to most theorizing, we find that citizens with higher populist attitudes not less supportive of key institutions of liberal democracy, but reject mediated representation through political parties. At the same time, individuals with stronger populist attitudes are highly supportive of forms of unconstrained majoritarian rule. These findings suggest that the relationship between populism and support for (liberal) democracy is more complicated than commonly assumed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that shifts in the UK's territorial management practice in the late 2010s and early 2020s, described by various terms, including 'muscular unionism', may be more rhetorical and ideational than substantive. The practices associated with these terms are recognisably part of the 'British political tradition', and the changes of the early 2020s can be viewed as reasserting traditional governance practices rather than introducing new ones. The article examines the various phenomena described as 'muscular unionism' and suggests that many are relatively ad hoc, low-level initiatives, often rhetorical. There is also much evidence that the UK governments of the 2020s see the 'Millennium Settlement', introduced in 1999, as continuing to be a core part of UK territorial management. The clearest break from historical practice comes in the overt, explicit quality of 'muscular unionist' rhetoric. The article then suggests that, contrary to some scholarly expectations, this muscular unionist turn may come to be an effective territorial management strategy for the UK government, as it aligns with an Anglo-British imaginary within England that continues to conflate England, Britain and the UK in terms of governance and national identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Populist radical right parties are often considered to be the most extreme opponents of climate protection in Western Europe. Others predict a 'climate nationalism' among populist radical right parties combining nativism with a pro-climate agenda. Based on a new data set on party positions on climate change, including 485 party manifestos – 76 from populist radical right parties – from the 1990s to 2022 in 10 Western European countries, we find that populist radical right parties are divided but generally less likely to speak out for climate protection than other parties, which rather contradicts the climate nationalism argument. We find that populist radical right parties only became more aware of the issue since 2019 in the face of the mass mobilizations of Fridays for Future and, to a lesser extent, when it became a visible issue within the party system. Thus, we argue that populist radical right parties are forced to talk about the climate when the issue is emphasized by organized actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do home ownership and house prices impact the shaping of individual perceptions on inequality and belief in meritocracy? We argue that home ownership and rising asset prices increase the salience of an individual's own relative economic position, which in turn facilitates belief in meritocracy. We expect that, when house prices increase, homeowners are likely to strengthen their belief in meritocracy and defend their position by rationalizing that income distribution in society is fair and that economic success and failure are primarily determined by individual efforts. Our analysis of both a Korean panel survey and a cross-national survey finds strong and robust evidence of the asset price effect. Our findings suggest that the housing price effect on economic ideology is a general pattern, which implies that there are social and political consequences to the asset price effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Candidates with local ties perform better than their rivals without such attachments. We focus on the underlying mechanism of the localness effect and hypothesise that voters prefer local candidates for instrumental reasons, expecting better representation, and for reasons of a shared place identity. To test these expectations, we rely on the unusually detailed ballot for local elections in the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia. Using multi-level regressions of the electoral results of 6503 candidates running in 21 cities in 2014, we confirm the importance of candidate localness for electoral success in low-information elections. Furthermore, we provide insights into the mechanisms behind this relationship. While instrumental motivations are independent of the composition of the electorate, a large share of elderly voters amplifies the identity effect, whereas many young voters, a high residential mobility, and a high population density diminishes this effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public administration is the largest part of the democratic state and a key consideration in understanding its legitimacy. Despite this, democratic theory is notoriously quiet about public administration. One exception is deliberative systems theories, which have recognized the importance of public administration and attempted to incorporate it within their orbit. This article examines how deliberative systems approaches have represented (a) the actors and institutions of public administration, (b) its mode of coordination, (c) its key legitimacy functions, (d) its legitimacy relationships, and (e) the possibilities for deliberative intervention. It argues that constructing public administration through the pre-existing conceptual categories of deliberative democracy, largely developed to explain the legitimacy of law-making, has led to some significant omissions and misunderstandings. The article redresses these issues by providing an expanded conceptualization of public administration, connected to the core concerns of deliberative and other democratic theories with democratic legitimacy and democratic reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

David Hume alluded to the politics of slaveholding throughout his career and was among the first to observe that the republican tradition has an awkward relationship with slavery. This article places Hume's critique of Roman slavery in conversation with recent debates over "neo-Roman" liberty, paying special attention to Hume's complaint that some republican advocates for political liberty have also apologized for personal slavery. Most of Hume's direct comments on slaveholding appear in the 1752 essay, "Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations," where Hume criticized Roman slavery for its negative effects on population growth. But more was at stake than ancient demography. Even abolitionists who abhorred Hume's racism still drew upon his argument against ancient slavery—which they read as a commentary on the modern colonies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines how the growing competition over immigration and welfare between social democratic parties and populist radical right parties impacts electoral outcomes. The study argues that the historical legacies of the social democratic and conservative welfare regimes influence how voters respond to this competitive struggle. The findings support this argument. In the social democratic regime, populist radical right parties gain more support when they compete over welfare, although Nordic social democratic parties can mitigate this trend by appearing tough on immigration. However, populist radical right parties' emphasis on welfare is the main source of electoral mobilization, particularly among voters with anti-immigration sentiments. In the conservative regime, the competitive dynamic is less connected to immigration, and populist radical right parties' welfare discourse appeals primarily to economically vulnerable voters, while social democratic parties lose votes by taking a strict stance on immigration. These results have important implications and suggest that welfare regimes shape voting behaviour differently today than in previous eras. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the practice of using aid to control migration, which we refer to as 'inducement aid'. We examine two potential objections to inducement aid, each of which concerns a message that the practice communicates to two corresponding audiences: would-be migrants and other developed states. We suggest that the first objection has intuitive force but is undermined by a powerful reply. This finding seems to bolster the intuitive appeal that inducement aid might exhibit as a non-compulsory and apparently option-enhancing form of migration control. However, we argue that the second objection, which targets inducement aid in its capacity as a form of development assistance, has greater power. Developing the second objection, we argue that inducement aid threatens the establishment and maintenance of important international norms, thereby risking degrading the options of the world's poorest people and setting back the cause of cosmopolitan morality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Populism is often characterized as a rejection of scientific expertise and a key obstacle to societies' ability to address the climate crisis today. I challenge this account, arguing for a more inclusive conception of populism and a more critical account of expertise. Consistent with this, I delineate a range of responses to the challenges of climate politics in populist times. In doing so, I have two primary aims: first, to highlight limitations of "anti-populist" responses among proponents of climate change action, and, second, to lean into populist criticisms of elite expertise, by delineating how some challenges to dominant forms of science and elite power are themselves expert knowledge and integral to promising movements that address climate change. This can allow expertise to be distinguished from elitism and to be recognized in caring relations to the subjects of knowledge. Here, expertise is not manifest as separation from the common world, but as immersion in it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the use of populism by comparatively privileged groups, a specific type of populism we call the 'populism of the privileged'. Our argument is not merely that 'populisms of the privileged' are also forms of populism, but that they warrant a specific label. We first identify intersections between populism and privilege on the levels of populist actors, support for populism and beneficiaries of populism, which we call populism by, with and for the privileged. We then present a discursive conceptualization of 'populism of the privileged'. Building on this we develop analytical strategies for the study the 'populism of the privileged', zooming in on how 'the people' and 'the elite' are constructed in such populisms, their sociological directionality, the layeredness of privilege and un(der)privilege, the discursive construction of 'crisis' and 'unmet demands' and the role of discourses about populism in reproducing the claims of populisms of the privileged. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Authoritarian populists offer a vision of state. This ideologically fixed imaginary provides an electoral-authoritarian template for how to shape states once in power. Yet not all those called populists are populist. Some are elitist plebeians. They construct themselves as 'the moral elite' above which fights for 'the people' below against 'the corrupt'. I argue that elitist plebeianism contains a distinct vision of government as elected guardianship. Like populists, elitist plebeians advocate extending executive power. Yet they envisage this not as the realization of the people's will, but as the projection of accountability downwards. To them, divisions of power are acceptable as divisions of guardian labour. Rival opinions are not illegitimate, just irrelevant, but opposition is intolerable. Therefore, studies of populist authoritarianism should be revisited. Elitist plebeian visions of state may have been misread as authoritarian populist ones. I examine President Magufuli (Tanzania) as an exemplar and identify other potential elitist plebeians worldwide. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I initially approached Stokes' paper (this issue pp. 105-123) with some scepticism, just because the device -- which one might almost now call traditional -- of putting a conception of human nature at the centre of our understanding of the work of a political philosopher has always seemed to me grossly overrated. To be sure, political philosophers will hold some view about human nature. But there seems no special reason why this should play a central role in their work, unless the way in which we interpret 'human nature' is so extended as to make the claim relatively uninteresting. Further, insofar as concerns about human nature are focused upon the psychological, Popper might seem to be a somewhat unlikely candidate for such an approach. For while Popper had early interests in psychology,(n1) and has over a long period made suggestions about psychological issues, notably in connection with what has subsequently become known as 'evolutionary epistemology',(n2) his work has nonetheless been characterized by its de-emphasis upon psychology as a key to other disciplines. Popper's Logic of Scientific Discovery argues for 'The elimination of psychologism', and more generally that knowledge is an inter-subjective product having autonomy vis-à-vis the psychological experiences of particular individuals. His Open Society endorses the primacy that Marx gave to the sociological over the psychological.(n3) His Objective Knowledge stresses the primacy over the logical over the psychological.(n4) And in The Self and Its Brain, Popper espoused a social or cultural theory of the self, in which the individual's self-identity depends on its links with cultural objects? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The principle of fairness, first introduced by H. L. A. Hart in 1955, is able to support a workable theory of political obligation upon liberal premises. In a previous paper, ‘Presumptive benefit, fairness, and political obligation’, I argued that the principle can establish general obligations to cooperate in the provision of ‘presumptive public goods’ (that is, public goods that are indispensable to the typical member of society). Because a wider range of governmental services is necessary for the provision of presumptive goods, the principle also supports obligations to support ‘discretionary public goods’ (goods that are desirable but not indispensable). The ‘indirect argument’ developed in this paper counters the criticisms of my previous paper presented by A. John Simmons in ‘The anarchist position: a reply to Klosko and Senor’. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]